Muhammad Iqbal Nadeem vs Mst. Talat Riaz etc.

Stereo. H C J D A-38.

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, MULTAN BENCH

MULTAN.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

C.R. No.1484-D of 2025 Muhammad Iqbal Nadeem Versus

Mst. Talat Riaz, etc.

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 23.09.2026.

Petitioner by: Mr. Javed Iqbal Thaheem, Advocate.

Respondents by: Syed Muhammad Raza Bokhari, Advocate.

MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.- Through instant revision petition, petitioner has assailed the judgments and decrees dated 03.12.2024 and 06.11.2025, passed by learned Civil Judge and Addl. District Judge, Multan, respectively, whereby suit for possession through specific performance of agreement to sell filed by respondent No.1 was concurrently decreed.

2.The facts necessary for disposal of the instant revision petition are that respondent No.1/plaintiff instituted a suit on 14.02.1993 in respect of property measuring 12-Marlas 17-Yards, claiming rights therein on the basis of agreements dated 01.02.1984 and 07.07.1992. During pendency of the said suit, the petitioner Muhammad Iqbal Nadeem claimed to have purchased a portion measuring 2-Marlas 1- Yard from Muhammad Asif son of Ameer Bakhsh through registered Sale Deed No.2409 dated 19.03.2003. He asserted that he was a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, had no notice of any defect in title, and subsequently raised construction over the property. He further claimed that a portion measuring 1-Marla 6-Yards had been acquired by the National Highway Authority, for which compensation

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had been paid to him, and that respondent No.1 never objected to his possession or construction. The claim of the petitioner was contested by respondent No.1 on the ground that his rights were anterior to the petitioner’s purchase and that the latter had acquired the property during pendency of the suit. The learned Trial Court, vide judgment and decree dated 03.12.2024, decided the matter against the petitioner. His appeal was dismissed by the learned Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 06.11.2025, which maintained the findings of the learned Trial Court and, inter alia, held that the subsequent purchasers could not claim protection as bona fide purchasers against rights involved in the pending litigation in view of the principle of lis pendens. Hence, the instant revision petition.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the actual transfer in his favour had taken place earlier, while the registered sale deed dated 19.03.2003 was executed later only to formalize the transaction. He further submits that petitioner claims to be a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, having acquired the property in good faith and that his possession, construction and receipt of NHA compensation, coupled with respondent No.1's alleged silence, support his claim. He submits that the learned Courts below erred in applying lis pendens solely on the basis of the date of registration.

4.Conversely, learned counsel for respondent No.1 supports the impugned judgments and submits that the alleged earlier transfer has neither been established through a legally effective instrument nor shown to have preceded the suit instituted on 14.02.1993. The petitioner's registered sale deed dated 19.03.2003 was executed during pendency of the litigation and cannot defeat respondent No.1's prior rights arising from the agreements dated 01.02.1984 and 07.07.1992. NHA compensation and alleged silence do not establish title or acquiescence, while the concurrent findings disclose no ground for revisional interference.

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5.Arguments heard. Record perused.

6.The petitioner's principal contention is that the actual transfer in his favour took place before the registered sale deed dated 19.03.2003, which merely formalized an earlier transaction. The question, therefore, is whether the petitioner has established any legally effective transfer in his favour before institution of the suit on 14.02.1993 so as to take his acquisition outside the operation of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TPA”). On examination of the record, the answer is in the negative.

7.The petitioner's own case, as reflected from the record, is that he acquired the property through Sale Deed No.2409 dated 19.03.2003. Section 54 of the TPA provides that a sale of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards can be made only by a registered instrument, while a contract for the sale of such property does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on the property. This distinction between a completed sale and a mere agreement to sell was recognized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abdul Jabbar and others v. Mst. Maqbool Jan and others (2012 SCMR 947). The Registration Act, 1908 likewise requires registration of such instruments of conveyance. Therefore, where a party relies upon a registered sale deed as the source of his title, an assertion that the transfer had in fact occurred at an earlier point in time must be supported by an independent and legally effective instrument or other cogent material establishing such earlier transfer. In the present case, no such instrument or material has been pointed out. The burden of establishing the alleged earlier transaction, payment of consideration thereunder and the circumstances showing that the transfer had legally become effective before institution of the suit rested upon the petitioner. A bare assertion that the transaction had taken place earlier, without proof of a legally operative transfer, cannot displace the registered instrument relied upon by the petitioner himself. Consequently, for purposes of the present controversy, the petitioner's acquisition has to be treated as having occurred on 19.03.2003,

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approximately ten years after institution of the suit and while the litigation remained pending.

8.Section 52 of the TPA embodies the doctrine of lis pendens. It applies during the pendency of a suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question. The Explanation to the section makes it clear that pendency commences from the date of presentation of the plaint and continues until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and the decree or order has been satisfied or the period for its execution has expired. The doctrine does not render a transfer made during pendency of litigation void between the transferor and transferee; rather, the transfer remains subject to the rights declared by the final adjudication and cannot operate to prejudice the rights of the successful litigating party. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Muhammad Ashraf Butt and others v. Muhammad Asif Bhatti and others (PLD 2011 SC 905), authoritatively explained that the rule of lis pendens is founded upon necessity and expediency and that a transferee pendente lite takes the property subject to the final outcome of the litigation. The doctrine is not founded upon actual or constructive notice; its object is to prevent a litigating party from defeating the eventual decree by alienating the subject matter of the litigation during its pendency. The same principle was reiterated in Farzand Ali and another v. Khuda Bakhsh and others (PLD 2015 SC 187), wherein the object of section 52 was recognized as protecting parties to litigation against alienation during its pendency and preserving the efficacy of the ultimate adjudication.

9.Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, the suit instituted on 14.02.1993 directly and specifically involved rights in the immovable property, namely the claim for possession through specific performance of the agreements to sell dated 01.02.1984 and 07.07.1992. The suit was pending before a Court of competent jurisdiction when the petitioner's vendor conveyed a portion of the suit property to him through registered Sale Deed No.2409 dated

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19.03.2003. There is neither any assertion nor material showing that the transfer was made with the permission of the Court. The petitioner's acquisition, therefore, falls squarely within the mischief contemplated by section 52 of the TPA. The same principle finds support in Captain-PQ Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. Sargodha Road, Faisalabad through General Manager v. Province of Punjab through District Officer Revenue/Collector, Faisalabad and 6 others (2007 MLD 1678), wherein transfer of the suit property during pendency of the plaintiff's suit was held to be hit by the rule of lis pendens and incapable of affecting the original cause of action.

10.The contention that the learned Courts below applied lis pendens merely on the basis of the date of registration is misconceived. The real question is whether an effective transfer had already taken place before institution of the suit. If such an earlier transfer had been established through a legally operative instrument, its legal effect would require examination independently. However, no such earlier executed sale deed or other legally effective instrument has been established in the present case. Reliance on Muhammad Rafique and 7 others v. Noor Ahmad (2007 MLD 1554) is, therefore, misplaced. In that case, the sale deed had been executed before institution of the suit but was registered subsequently, and the legal effect of the transaction was considered with reference to the date of its execution. The factual foundation of that case is materially different from the present one. Here, the petitioner has failed to establish any earlier executed instrument evidencing a completed transfer before 14.02.1993. He cannot, therefore, rely upon an unproved antecedent transaction to displace the legal effect of Sale Deed No.2409 dated 19.03.2003 or to escape the operation of section 52 of the TPA.

11.The petitioner's further plea that he was a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice also does not advance his case. Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, permits enforcement of a contract against a person claiming under the promisor by a title arising subsequent to the contract, subject to the protection

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available to a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. The protection is founded upon proof of the requisite ingredients by the transferee who invokes it. In Abdul Jabbar and others v. Mst. Maqbool Jan and others (2012 SCMR 947), the Hon'ble Supreme Court also considered the position of a subsequent purchaser claiming bona fide status and recognized the importance of inquiry where another person is found in possession. The present case, however, does not merely involve a subsequent purchaser claiming absence of notice of an earlier agreement. The petitioner's own case is that the transfer in his favour was completed through Sale Deed No.2409 dated 19.03.2003, whereas the suit had already been instituted on 14.02.1993. Once the transfer is found to have taken place during pendency of the litigation, section 52 of the TPA directly governs its effect upon the rights being adjudicated in the suit.

12.The provisions of section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and section 52 of the TPA operate in distinct fields. A transferee seeking protection as a bona fide purchaser cannot invoke the equitable protection associated with want of notice to defeat the statutory operation of lis pendens where the transfer itself was made during pendency of the suit. In Muhammad Ashraf Butt and others v. Muhammad Asif Bhatti and others (PLD 2011 SC 905), the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that the doctrine of lis pendens is not dependent upon actual or constructive notice and that even a purchaser for value without notice takes the property subject to the result of the pending litigation. Thus, the petitioner's plea of bona fides cannot, in the circumstances of the present case, confer upon him a title superior to that which his vendor could transmit consistently with the pending litigation.

13.The petitioner's possession and construction over the property also do not alter the legal position. Such acts may establish what the petitioner did after acquiring possession, but they do not, by themselves, establish a title superior to the rights already under

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adjudication. A person who enters upon or constructs upon property during pendency of litigation takes the risk of the ultimate adjudication. Equally, payment of compensation by the National Highway Authority does not constitute an adjudication of title between the petitioner and respondent No.1. At the highest, such payment may indicate that the petitioner was treated by the acquiring authority as a person interested in the property for purposes of compensation; it does not conclusively determine the competing civil rights of the parties, which remained subject to adjudication by the competent Court.

14.The plea of acquiescence is equally without substance. Mere silence does not, by itself, amount to acquiescence. It must be shown that the person alleged to have acquiesced had knowledge of the material facts and, by his conduct, manifested assent to the assertion of the other party's right. Respondent No.1 had already invoked the jurisdiction of the civil Court in 1993 to enforce his claim arising from the agreements dated 01.02.1984 and 07.07.1992. The pendency of that litigation constituted a continuing assertion of the rights claimed by him. His alleged failure to interfere with the petitioner's construction, therefore, cannot be treated as abandonment of those rights or as consent to an alienation made during pendency of the suit. More importantly, the operation of section 52 of the TPA does not depend upon whether the plaintiff objected to the subsequent transfer. The very object of lis pendens is to preserve the subject matter of litigation and prevent intermediate alienations from frustrating the final adjudication.

15.It is also significant that the learned Courts below concurrently found the agreements dated 01.02.1984 and 07.07.1992 in favour of respondent No.1 to have been proved. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to identify any material evidence which was either ignored or misread by the learned Courts below so as to render their concurrent findings perverse or otherwise vulnerable in revisional jurisdiction. Once the petitioner's vendor had transferred the property to him during pendency of the suit, such subsequent

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transaction could not confer upon him a better right than that which his vendor could lawfully transmit consistently with the pending litigation. The petitioner's rights, if any, remained subject to the final adjudication in the suit.

16.The jurisdiction of this Court in revision is not intended to provide a forum for reappraisal of evidence merely because another view of the matter may be possible. Interference is warranted where the subordinate Courts have acted without jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them, or their findings suffer from material illegality or irregularity of such nature as to occasion failure of justice. In the present case, the learned Courts below have concurrently examined the material available on record, returned findings regarding the agreements relied upon by respondent No.1, and correctly applied the principle of lis pendens to the petitioner's subsequent acquisition. No illegality, material irregularity, jurisdictional defect or perversity warranting interference has been demonstrated.

17.For what has been discussed above, the petitioner has failed to establish that his acquisition preceded institution of the suit or that the transaction in his favour was otherwise insulated from the operation of section 52 of the TPA. His pleas of bona fide purchase, want of notice, possession, construction, receipt of NHA compensation and alleged acquiescence do not displace the statutory consequence of a transfer made during pendency of litigation. The concurrent judgments and decrees of the learned Courts below, therefore, call for no interference.

18.Consequently, the instant revision petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

(Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi) Judge

Approved for reporting.

Judge *Waseem.*