Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) through GM Vs Federation of Pakistan etc.

Stereo.HCJDA 38.

Judgment Sheet

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Writ Petition No.38599 of 2026.

Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited.

Versus

Federation of Pakistan, etc.

J U D G M E N T.

Date of hearing: 01.10.2026.

Petitioner by: Mr. Arsalan Saleem Chaudhry, Advocate.

Rana Arfan Ali, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.

Respondent No.2 by: Muhammad Yahya Umar Bajwa, Advocate.

Respondent No.4 by: M/s Ch. Zulfiqar Ali, Muhammad Imran Chohan and Syed Zill-e- Hasnain Sherazi, Advocates.

MUHAMMAD AJMAL ZAHID, J.— Through this Constitutional Petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ("the Constitution"), the petitioner has called in question the validity and legality of order dated 23.11.2016 passed by respondent No.3, whereby the complaint filed by respondent No.4 before the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority ("OGRA") was partly allowed, as well as order dated 04.04.2024 passed by respondent No.2, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the aforesaid order was dismissed.

2.Briefly stated, the controversy arises out of certain charges raised by the petitioner-Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited ("SNGPL") against respondent No.4 on account of alleged tampering

with gas meters installed at his premises. According to the petitioner, three gas meters bearing Nos.0948287, 0640807 and 0842976 were installed at the premises of respondent No.4 and were subsequently replaced on 22.07.2010, 25.11.2011 and 17.09.2013, respectively. Subsequent inspections allegedly disclosed tampering in respect of all three meters for different periods. On the basis of the inspection reports and other material available on record, SNGPL raised aggregate charges amounting to Rs.11,754,994/- against respondent No.4. Aggrieved, respondent No.4 challenged the said charges before OGRA by filing Complaint No.1559/2016. The complaint was partly allowed vide order dated 23.11.2016, whereby a charge of Rs.1,608,649/- relating to Meter No.0842976 for the period from 13.09.2012 to 17.09.2013 was upheld, whereas the remaining charges, including those relating to Meter Nos.0948287 and 0640807, pressure enhancement, sticky meter, security deposit and the remaining late payment surcharge, were set aside for want of sufficient documentary evidence. The petitioner-SNGPL challenged the said order before the Appellate Authority of OGRA through Appeal No.256/2016; however, the appeal was dismissed vide order dated 04.04.2024. The petitioner thereafter invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court through the instant petition on 23.06.2026.

3.Learned counsel for the parties have been heard at considerable length and the record has been examined with their assistance.

4.At the very outset, learned counsel for the petitioner was confronted with the question of maintainability of the instant petition on account of inordinate and unexplained delay. It was pointed out that the order of the Appellate Authority of OGRA was passed on 04.04.2024, whereas the instant petition was instituted on 23.06.2026, after a lapse of more than twenty-six months.

5.Learned counsel, while placing reliance upon Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority v. Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (2023

SCMR 908), Riaz Hussain v. Chairman, Federal Land Commissioner, etc. (PLD 2026 FCC 22) and Ghulam Abbas v. Telephone Industries of Pakistan (PLD 2026 FCC 309), contended that the principle of laches would not operate where the order under challenge is void ab initio, without lawful authority or passed without jurisdiction. According to learned counsel, since the impugned orders are alleged to suffer from jurisdictional defects, the petitioner cannot be non-suited merely on the ground of delay and laches.

6.The contention, however, does not satisfactorily answer the fundamental question as to what prevented the petitioner from approaching this Court for more than twenty-six months after the passing of the impugned appellate order. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution is extraordinary, discretionary and equitable in nature. A person invoking such jurisdiction is expected to approach the Court with reasonable promptitude and, where there is substantial delay, to furnish a plausible and satisfactory explanation for such delay.

7.The requirement of reasonable promptitude is not a mere procedural technicality. It is founded upon the equitable nature of constitutional jurisdiction, the need to avoid unsettling matters which have been allowed to attain finality, and the settled principle that a litigant who seeks discretionary relief must demonstrate due diligence in pursuing his rights.

8.The mere characterization of an impugned order as “void”, “without lawful authority” or “without jurisdiction” does not, by itself, render the principle of laches inapplicable. Whether an order is in fact without jurisdiction or suffers from a jurisdictional defect is a question to be determined upon examination of the record and the applicable law. A litigant cannot, merely by assigning such a description to an impugned order, assume the existence of a

jurisdictional defect and thereby neutralize the consequences of an otherwise inordinate delay.

9.If such a proposition were accepted, the settled requirement of approaching the constitutional Court within a reasonable time could readily be circumvented by simply pleading that the impugned order is void. The plea of want of jurisdiction, therefore, cannot be used as a device to defeat the equitable principle of laches without first demonstrating the jurisdictional defect on the basis of the record.

10.In the present case, no plausible, sufficient or legally cognizable explanation has been furnished for the petitioner's failure to challenge the order dated 04.04.2024 for more than twenty-six months. The petitioner was admittedly a party to the proceedings before the statutory appellate forum and was fully aware of the order sought to be impugned. No circumstance has been identified which prevented it from invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court within a reasonable period.

11.It is true that no specific period of limitation has been prescribed by the legislature for invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. The absence of a prescribed period, however, does not confer an unfettered right upon a litigant to approach the Court at any point in time. The petitioner must approach the Court within a reasonable time, the determination whereof depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The superior Courts have, in appropriate cases, regarded ninety days as a reasonable benchmark for invoking constitutional jurisdiction. Reference in this regard may be made to Pakistan International Airline Corporation and others v. Tanweer- Ur-Rehman and others (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 676) and Mian Aurangzeb Noor v. Rent Controller, Lahore and another (2012 CLC

12.Measured against the aforesaid principle, the unexplained lapse of more than twenty-six months in the present case assumes considerable significance.

13.The principle of laches acquires still greater significance where a party, after allowing an adverse order passed by a statutory forum to remain unchallenged for a considerable period, seeks to reopen the matter through constitutional jurisdiction. The law assists the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights—vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt. Equally relevant is the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, which embodies the public- policy consideration that litigation must, at some stage, attain finality.

14.The period of limitation would run even against an order alleged to be void, from the date on which such order came to the knowledge of the aggrieved party, and limitation would accordingly be computed from the date of such knowledge. It is equally well settled that the question of condonation of delay must be determined in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case, and no inflexible rule can be laid down so as to extend an indulgence to a person who, despite having knowledge of the impugned judgment or order, consciously remained silent, kept mum and failed to challenge the same within the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance in this regard may be placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Full Court of Supreme Court in Gen. (R) Pervez Musharraf v. Nadeem Ahmed (Advocate) and another (PLD 2014 Supreme Court 585).Courts, therefore, do not ordinarily permit concluded matters to be reopened after prolonged and unexplained inaction, particularly where the aggrieved party was fully aware of the impugned order and had an available remedy which it failed to pursue with due diligence. Reliance in this regard may be placed upon Ghulam Hussain Ramzan Ali V. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Karachi (2014 SCMR 1594), Messrs Blue Star Spinning Mills Limited V. Collector of Sales Tax and others (2013 SCMR 587) Ghulam Sarwar v.

Province of Punjab through District Collector, Lodhran (PLD 2025 SC 60), Muhammad Faisal, Proprietor F.A. Traders Lahore v. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Lahore (2025 SCMR 930), Asad Ali and 9 others v. The Bank of Punjab and others (PLD 2020 SC 736), Commissioner Inland Revenue, Faisalabad v. Messrs Engineers Associated Precast (Pvt.) Ltd. (2023 PTD 393) and Muslim Commercial Bank Limited and others v. The Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal Lahore and others (2025 SCMR 269).

15.The petitioner has, therefore, failed to explain the prolonged period of inaction. Such unexplained delay cannot be treated as a mere technical irregularity, particularly when the petitioner seeks the exercise of an extraordinary and discretionary constitutional jurisdiction. The petition, on this ground alone, does not merit interference.

16.There is, however, another and independent aspect which further militates against the maintainability of the instant petition. The petitioner itself, being aggrieved of the order dated 23.11.2016, consciously elected to challenge the same by availing the statutory appellate remedy before the competent forum. Not only this, the petitioner-Department also instituted a suit before the Gas Utility Court against respondent No.4 for recovery of an amount of Rs.18,642,731/-. Thus, the petitioner did not remain without a remedy, nor was it prevented from pursuing the remedies available to it in law. Rather, it availed the statutory appellate remedy and also instituted independent proceedings for recovery arising out of the same underlying dispute. Having pursued those remedies, and upon failing to obtain the desired relief, the petitioner has now invoked the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of this Court seeking substantially the same object.

17.The conduct of the petitioner consequently attracts the well- settled doctrine of election of remedies. The doctrine postulates that where the law provides a person with more than one available and

legally permissible remedy in respect of a grievance, the person may elect one of them; however, having consciously chosen and pursued a particular course of remedy, a litigant cannot ordinarily abandon that course after an adverse result and invoke another remedy against the same cause of action, particularly where the latter is sought merely as a means of achieving what could not be obtained through the remedy already pursued. The principle has been recognized and applied by the august Supreme Court in Mst. Fehmida Begum v. Muhammad Khalid and another (1992 SCMR 1908), Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. Devan Sugar Mills Limited and others (PLD 2018 SC 828), Jubilee General Insurance Co. Ltd., Karachi v. Ravi Steel Company, Lahore (PLD 2020 SC 324), Mir Mujib-ur- Rehman Muhammad Hassani v. Returning Officer, PB-41 Washuk and others (PLD 2020 SC 718) and Qazi Mumtaz Hussain and others v. Government of Sindh through Secretary Revenue and others (2025 SCMR 939).

18.In the case before this Court, the petitioner consciously elected to challenge the order dated 23.11.2016 through the statutory appellate mechanism and, in addition, instituted civil proceedings for recovery of the disputed amount. Having pursued the available remedies, the petitioner cannot, after an adverse outcome and after a further prolonged period of inaction, invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court as a further avenue for obtaining substantially the same relief. The constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 is not intended to operate as a second or successive appellate forum against an order of a statutory authority merely because the litigant has remained dissatisfied with the outcome of the remedy already pursued.

19.There is yet another principle which operates against the petitioner. It is a settled principle of administration of justice that no person can be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. A party cannot, by its own omission, inaction or non-compliance with a

mandatory requirement of law, create a situation and thereafter seek to derive benefit from the very situation brought about by its own conduct. The principle has been recognized in Mian Muhammad Saeed etc. v. Province of West Pakistan etc. (PLD 1964 SC 572), Sakhi Jan etc. v. Shah Nawaz etc. (2020 SCMR 832), Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Administration Department and others v. Liaquat Ali (2021 SCMR 630), Mukhtiar Hussain v. Mst. Shafia Bibi (2023 SCMR 159) and Zeeshan Pervaiz (Late) through his LRs v. Muhammad Nasir (2024 SCP 409).

20.In the present case, the petitioner, having consciously pursued the statutory remedy and having remained inactive for more than twenty-six months after the decision of the appellate forum, cannot seek to convert its own prolonged inaction into a ground for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court at this belated stage. The constitutional jurisdiction cannot be employed to confer an advantage upon a litigant arising from its own failure to act with due diligence.

21.Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgments referred to above, principally to contend that delay and laches do not constitute an absolute bar where the impugned order is without jurisdiction or without lawful authority. There can be no quarrel with the general proposition that a genuinely void order or an order passed wholly without jurisdiction may stand on a different footing from an order suffering from an ordinary error of law or fact.

22.The difficulty for the petitioner, however, lies in the application of that principle to the facts of the present case. The petitioner has not demonstrated, at this stage, any patent or established jurisdictional defect which would justify overlooking the extraordinary delay. The authorities relied upon by learned counsel, therefore, do not advance the petitioner's case in the circumstances obtaining before this Court and are distinguishable on facts and in principle.

23.It is also pertinent to reiterate that the jurisdiction under Article 199 is not attracted merely because a litigant remains dissatisfied with the determination of a statutory forum. The person invoking such jurisdiction must demonstrate a legally enforceable right and a corresponding legal duty, together with circumstances warranting the exercise of the Court's extraordinary jurisdiction. The petitioner has failed to establish any such exceptional circumstance sufficient to overcome the twin impediments of unexplained delay and the subsequent invocation of another remedy after having consciously pursued the statutory course.

24.For what has been discussed above, the instant petition is dismissed, inter alia, being barred by laches and hit by the doctrine of election.

(MUHAMMAD AJMAL ZAHID)

JUDGE.

Approved for Reporting.

JUDGE.

M. Arsalan*