Nazar Muhammad etc. vs Muhammad Shahid etc.

Stereo. H C J D A 38.

JUDGMENT SHEET

LAHORE HIGH COURT

RAWALPINDI BENCH RAWALPINDI

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

C.R. No.757 of 2014

Nazar Muhammad (deceased) through legal heirs, etc.

Vs.

Muhammad Shahid, etc.

JUDGMENT

Date of Hearing: 15.09.2026 Petitioners by: Agha Muhammad Ali Khan, Advocate.

Respondents No.1 to 8 Barrister Emad Nadeem Chaudhry, by: Advocate.

Mr. Muhammad Taimur Malik, Advocate.

Mr. Muhammad Javed Bhatti, Advocate.

Syeda Nida Zohra, Advocate Respondents No.10 to 13: Proceeded against ex-parte on Anwaar Hussain, J. This Civil Revision is directed against judgment and decree dated 12.06.2014 passed by the Additional District Judge, Attock, whereby the appeal filed by respondents No.1 to 8 (“the contesting respondents”) was accepted and judgment and decree dated 05.10.2011 passed by the Trial Court was set aside. The Trial Court had decreed the suit instituted by the petitioners, inter alia, for declaration and cancellation of registered sale deed bearing document No.1148 dated 12.09.1970 executed in favour of Muhammad Nisar alias Nisar Ahmad, predecessor-in-interest of the contesting respondents.

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2.By way of factual background, it has been noted that Maseeta Khan, predecessor-in-interest of the parties, had four sons and three daughters. His eldest son, Nazar Muhammad, was predecessor-in-interest of petitioners No.1-A to 1-G; petitioner No.2, namely, Muhammad Javed, was his second son; Nisar Ahmad, the original defendant and predecessor-in-interest of the contesting respondents, was his third son; whereas Muhammad Yaseen, predecessor-in-interest of respondents No.9 to 13, was his fourth son. The three daughters of Maseeta Khan are petitioners No.3 to 5. The controversy pertains to property measuring 07- Marla, comprising two portions/houses measuring 31⁄2-Marla each.

3.On 13.05.2008, the petitioners instituted a suit challenging registered sale deed dated 12.09.1970 with the specific averment that the property had, in fact, been purchased by Maseeta Khan for a consideration of Rs.11,000/-. It was pleaded that Maseeta Khan was illiterate and, for purposes of preparation and completion of the sale deed, had associated Munshi Khan, his cousin, who subsequently became the father-in-law of Nisar Ahmad. According to the petitioners, Nisar Ahmad, in connivance with Munshi Khan, managed to have the sale deed executed in his own name despite the consideration having been provided by Maseeta Khan. It was further pleaded that Maseeta Khan, who was working with Muhammad Shafi, a contractor at the Artillery Centre, had borrowed Rs.8,000/- from him for acquisition of the property and subsequently repaid the amount.

4.The petitioners further pleaded that throughout the lifetime of Maseeta Khan and even thereafter, Nisar Ahmad continued to acknowledge the rights of the other family members in the property. In support thereof, a specific instance relating to Muhammad Yaseen,

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predecessor-in-interest of respondents No.9 to 13, was pleaded. According to the petitioners, Muhammad Yaseen claimed his share in the suit property in the year 1984 as he was in need of money, whereupon the matter was taken before the elders of the family (Jirga) and the value of his share was settled at Rs.20,000/-, which amount was paid to him by Nisar Ahmad. The petitioners further pleaded that the immediate cause for institution of the suit arose when Nisar Ahmad decided to gift the 31⁄2- Marla portion, in occupation of predecessor-in-interest of petitioners No.1-A to 1-G and petitioner No.2, to his son Muhammad Shahid, respondent No.1. The petitioners treated this as the first unequivocal assertion of exclusive title inconsistent with the rights claimed by them and, consequently, instituted the suit.

5.Nisar Ahmad contested the suit and took a categorically position. In his written statement, he pleaded that he had purchased the entire property himself through registered sale deed No.1148 dated 12.09.1970 for Rs.11,000/- and had paid the entire consideration from his own resources. He denied that Maseeta Khan had ever been the owner or in possession of the property. As regards the occupation of predecessor- in-interest of petitioners No.1-A to 1-G and petitioner No.2, his specific case was that, being his real brothers and financially constrained, they had no residence of their own and were, therefore, permitted to occupy one of the houses gratuitously, on the understanding that possession would be returned whenever demanded. He maintained that the need for the house subsequently arose upon the marriage of his son, respondent No.1, and, when possession was demanded, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners No.1-A to 1-G and petitioner No.2, instead of vacating the premises, set up title in themselves and joined the remaining petitioners with them.

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6.Nisar Ahmad also specifically denied the pleaded transaction concerning Muhammad Yaseen. His explanation regarding financial dealings with his brother was that he had always been financially well placed and had extended financial assistance to Muhammad Yaseen and the petitioners from time to time. A counter-suit was also instituted by Nisar Ahmad, alongwith respondent No.1 for recovery of possession of the 31⁄2-Marla portion in occupation of predecessor-in-interest of petitioners No.1-A to 1-G and petitioner No.2 on the premise that he was the exclusive owner, whereas said petitioners were merely licensees under a gratuitous arrangement arising out of the close relationship between the parties.

7.Both suits were consolidated; and the consolidated issues were accordingly framed and evidence was recorded. The Trial Court decreed the suit of the petitioners and dismissed the suit for possession instituted by Nisar Ahmad and respondent No.1. However, the Appellate Court below reversed those findings, resulting in the present Civil Revision.

8.Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that where the findings of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court below are at variance, the entire evidentiary record requires examination to ascertain which of the two conclusions is sustainable in law. He submits that the oral as well as documentary evidence, when read with the manner in which the property remained occupied over the years, establishes that the purchase was made by Maseeta Khan and that the registered title in favour of Nisar Ahmad did not reflect the true nature of the transaction. He particularly refers to the claim raised by Muhammad Yaseen and the payment of Rs.20,000/- to him in the year 1984, which was ultimately admitted by Nisar Ahmad while appearing as DW-1.

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9.Learned counsel further submits that the testimony of Nisar Ahmad as DW-1 materially departed from his own pleadings. In the written statement, Nisar Ahmad had unequivocally pleaded that the entire consideration of Rs.11,000/- had been paid by him from his own resources; however, while appearing as DW-1, he admitted that Maseeta Khan had contributed towards the purchase price, though he attempted to describe it as a small amount and was unable to quantify the same. He further admitted that both he and his father worked at the Artillery Centre under Muhammad Shafi; that the entire financial affairs of the family were handled by Maseeta Khan; that wages were received by the latter; and that the family expenditure was jointly managed. Learned counsel also places reliance upon the continued possession of predecessor-in- interest of petitioners No.1-A to 1-G and petitioner No.2 over one-half of the property, the electricity connection installed in the name of Nazar Muhammad— predecessor-in-interest of petitioners No.1-A to 1-G, and the improvements/construction made by said Nazar Muhammad and petitioner No.2 without objection from Nisar Ahmad. It is argued that these circumstances are inconsistent with the plea that their possession was merely permissive. On limitation, it is submitted that the cause of action arose upon an unequivocal denial of the petitioners’ rights when Nisar Ahmad decided to gift the portion in their occupation to respondent No.1, Muhammad Shahid. Reliance has been placed upon cases reported as Saadat Khan and others v. Shahid-ur-Rehman and others (PLD 2023 Supreme Court 362) and Muhammad Boota (deceased) through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fatima daughter of Gohar Ali and others (2023

SCMR 1901).

10.Conversely, learned counsel for the contesting respondents supports the judgment of the Appellate Court below and contends that in case of divergent findings, preference ought to be accorded to the

C.R. No.757 of 2014

findings returned by the Appellate Court below. He emphasizes that Maseeta Khan himself never challenged the registered sale deed during his lifetime despite being aware of its registration. It is further contended that the alleged Jirga has not been independently established and that the witness relied upon in that regard was related to one of the petitioners. According to learned counsel for the contesting respondents, the contents of a registered document cannot be displaced by oral testimony in view of Articles 102 and 103 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (“QSO”). It is also argued that a claim by Muhammad Yaseen in the property during the lifetime of Maseeta Khan would itself be inherently improbable if the property actually belonged to Maseeta Khan. Reliance has been placed upon cases reported as Ghulam Murtaza v. Mst. Asia Bibi and others (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 569), Mst. Shamim Akhtar through Special Attorney v. Province of Punjab through Collector/DOR and 3 others (2019 YLR 870), Mst. Rabia Gula and others v. Muhammad Janan and others (2022 SCMR 1009), Mst. Nazeeran and others v. Ali Bux and others (2024 SCMR 1271) and Muhammad Ramzan and others v. Haleema Bibi and others (2025 MLD 847).

11.Arguments heard. Record perused.

12.The following legal question arises for determination:

“Whether a registered title, while carrying due weight, is to be assessed in isolation or in the light of the circumstances attending its execution and registration, including the source and payment of consideration, possession, and the contemporaneous and subsequent conduct of the parties, in determining their respective rights in the property?”

13.There can be no cavil with the proposition that a registered sale deed carries substantial evidentiary value. Where an instrument of transfer stands in the name of a particular person, the party asserting

C.R. No.757 of 2014

rights contrary to its apparent tenor carries the burden of establishing the circumstances upon which such assertion is founded. There is no cavil to preposition that a registered instrument cannot be displaced by suspicion, conjecture or a subsequently devised oral version. There is, however, a distinction between according due evidentiary weight to a registered instrument and treating it as irrebuttable and conclusive transaction, foreclosing inquiry into the very nature of the transaction where the same is directly in issue. Such inquiry may extend to the source of consideration, possession, relationship of the parties, circumstances attending the transaction and their subsequent conduct. None of these factors is necessarily conclusive; their significance lies in their cumulative effect.

14.The petitioners primarily contended that Nisar Ahmad was a benamidar. In cases of Muhammad Sajjad Hussain v. Muhammad Anwar Hussain (1991 SCMR 703), as subsequently held in case reported as Ghulam Murtaza v. Mst. Asia Bibi and others (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 569), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan identified the relevant considerations in determining the true character of a transaction to include the source of consideration, custody of the original title deed, possession of the property and motive for the transaction. At the same time, mere payment of consideration by one person does not, by itself, establish that the person in whose name the property stands is merely a benamidar; the intention underlying the transaction remains material.

15.Tested against these principles, the petitioners specifically pleaded that the consideration was supplied by Maseeta Khan and that he had borrowed Rs.8,000/- from Muhammad Shafi, the contractor under whom he, as also Nisar Ahmad, worked. Muhammad Shafi appeared as PW-2 and supported the factum of financial dealing. More significant,

C.R. No.757 of 2014

however, is Nisar Ahmad’s own testimony. His categorical plea in the written statement was that he had purchased the property for Rs.11,000/- and paid the entire consideration from his own resources. While appearing as DW-1, however, he admitted:

“”اکمندتموعہییکرخدیےکےیلوھتڑییسرمقوادلےندییھتاوراقبایرمقںیمےناےنپرطفےسدییھت He further admitted that he could not remember how much his father had contributed. This admission does not mean that contribution by Maseeta Khan automatically established his ownership, for a father may contribute towards acquisition of property by a son without retaining any proprietary interest. Its significance lies in inherent contradiction in the factual foundation of Nisar Ahmad’s pleaded case that the entire consideration had been provided exclusively by him. To that extent, the principle allegans contraria non est audiendus (a person alleging contradictory facts is not entitled to be heard) is attracted.

16.The departure assumes greater significance when read with Nisar Ahmad’s further admissions that in 1970 both he and Maseeta Khan worked at the Artillery Centre under Muhammad Shafi; that he had no separate business of his own; that the financial affairs of the household were managed by his father; that Maseeta Khan received the wages from Muhammad Shafi; and that the money was thereafter jointly spent by the family. Once the registered vendee himself materially qualifies the factual premise upon which he asserts exclusive acquisition, the controversy cannot be determined merely from the facial tenor of the instrument.

17.Similarly, the objection under Articles 102 and 103 of the QSO does not alter this position. The petitioners are not merely seeking to vary the terms of the registered sale deed through an unsupported oral

C.R. No.757 of 2014

assertion. The inquiry concerns independent facts surrounding the transaction, including the source of consideration, possession and subsequent conduct, coupled with admissions emanating from the registered vendee himself. Such relevant and otherwise admissible evidence cannot be excluded merely because the transaction is embodied in a registered instrument. As a matter of fact, it is the very registered sale deed coupled with the underlying transaction that has been subjected to judicial scrutiny by way of filing the suit. Once challenge raised, the registered deed cannot be so construed as to rule out any challenge to it, rather it merely carries a presumptive evidentiary value, which may be displaced by cogent material.

18.As regards the circumstances attending the transaction, Nisar Ahmad admitted that his marriage took place in 1972 and that negotiations for his marriage in the family of Munshi Khan had commenced in 1970. Munshi Khan was also his paternal relative. His subsequently becoming the father-in-law of Nisar Ahmad does not, by itself, establish the alleged collusion and is merely one of the surrounding circumstances to be considered with the remaining evidence.

19.The manner in which the property was subsequently possessed is more significant. The 07-Marla property comprises two separate houses/portions measuring 31⁄2-Marla each. Nisar Ahmad admitted that Nazar Muhammad and petitioner No.2 were in possession of one house, whereas he occupied the other, and that the two stood separated by a constructed boundary wall. He explained that he had erected the wall because the brothers used to quarrel. Whatever the reason, the explanation itself acknowledges separate occupation of the two houses. Nisar Ahmad’s pleaded case was that Nazar Muhammad and

C.R. No.757 of 2014

petitioner No.2 were financially distressed brothers whom he had gratuitously permitted to reside in one house subject to its return on demand. The material consideration is not merely the duration of their possession, since a gratuitous family arrangement may continue for a considerable period, but whether Nisar Ahmad’s own conduct as the registered owner was consistent with that plea. Nazar Muhammad and petitioner No.2 remained in exclusive occupation of one whole 31⁄2- Marla house; utility connections stood in the name of Nazar Muhammad; and Nisar Ahmad admitted that Nazar Muhammad and petitioner No.2 carried out work and construction upon the property without objection from him. Certainly, these circumstances do not convert possession into title, however, they are relevant because Nisar Ahmad’s prolonged acquiescence in the manner in which one entire half of the property was separately occupied and dealt with has to be reconciled with his subsequent characterization of that occupation as no more than a revocable gratuitous licence.

20.The same course of family dealing brings the payment to Muhammad Yaseen into perspective. This factum, admitted by Nisar Ahamd, might have had its own standing in isolation as pleaded by Nisar Ahamd that he helped his brother during financial distress but this isolation reading, if at all, would fail to hold water when juxtaposed with the attending circumstances spelled above. The petitioners specifically pleaded that in the year 1984 Muhammad Yaseen claimed his share, whereafter a Jirga valued it at Rs.20,000/- and Nisar Ahmad paid that amount to him. Nisar Ahmad denied the Jirga but admitted payment to Muhammad Yaseen of the exact amount of Rs.20,000/- in the very year pleaded by the petitioners. Thus, the amount and timing of the payment ceased to be disputed; only its purpose remained in controversy. Nisar Ahmad explained it as financial assistance enabling Muhammad Yaseen

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to purchase a house, whereas the petitioners connected it with his assertion of an interest in the suit property. However, the physical arrangement at the time lends significance to that admitted payment. Maseeta Khan had four sons. Nazar Muhammad and petitioner No.2— Muhammad Javed were together occupying one of the two houses; Nisar Ahmad alone occupied the other; while Muhammad Yaseen occupied neither. It was Nisar Ahmad, therefore, who was himself enjoying one complete half of the property, who admittedly paid Rs.20,000/- to the only brother then occupying neither house, and no repayment of that amount was ever sought. These circumstances do not, by themselves, prove either the alleged Jirga or a legally enforceable share of Muhammad Yaseen. They do, however, lend probability to the petitioners’ explanation of the admitted payment when tested against the competing plea that it was merely gratuitous financial assistance.

21.The contention of learned counsel for the contesting respondents that Muhammad Yaseen could not have asserted such an interest while Maseeta Khan was alive is also misconceived. Plainly, succession had not opened and Muhammad Yaseen could not claim an inherited share during his father’s lifetime. The issue, however, is evidentiary rather than one of inheritance: whether the manner in which the family actually dealt with the property was consistent with Nisar Ahmad having throughout been regarded as its exclusive beneficial owner. No presumed conversation or direction by Maseeta Khan is required for this purpose; the admitted conduct of Nisar Ahmad speaks for itself and has to be assessed with the remaining evidence.

22.The strongest circumstance in favour of the contesting respondents remains that Maseeta Khan himself did not challenge the

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registered sale deed during his lifetime. If he had provided the consideration and nevertheless intended the property to belong to himself, his failure to question its registration in the name of Nisar Ahmad is undoubtedly a weighty circumstance. The petitioners, who claim through him, cannot escape its evidentiary effect and, viewed in isolation, it lends substantial support to the apparent tenor of the registered instrument. This circumstance, however, has to be weighed against the conduct of Nisar Ahmad himself as the registered vendee. During the same period, he acquiesced in Nazar Muhammad and petitioner No.2—Muhammad Javed separately occupying one entire house, maintaining utility connections and carrying out construction/improvements therein; his own testimony contradicted his pleaded assertion of exclusive funding; and his admitted dealings with Muhammad Yaseen occurred against the physical arrangement already noticed above. Thus, Maseeta Khan’s silence and his failure to challenge the deed has to be weighed against the admissions and conduct of Nisar Ahmad, whose own case was that the registered instrument represented his exclusive beneficial ownership.

23.The case law relied upon by learned counsel for the contesting respondents regarding the significance of a registered instrument and the failure of a person directly affected to challenge a transaction during his lifetime embody settled principles, but their application necessarily depends upon the facts of each case. The present case does not involve successors seeking, decades later, to contradict a registered instrument merely through an unsupported oral assertion. It contains admissions by the registered vendee—Nisar Ahmad touching the source of consideration, evidence regarding the financial arrangement prevailing at the time of acquisition, separate possession of the claimants and treatment of one-half of the property, and subsequent

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conduct towards another claimant—Muhammad Yaseen. These circumstances required cumulative appraisal before determining the effect of Maseeta Khan’s failure to challenge the instrument.

24.The question of limitation also has to be examined in this setting. Mere existence of a registered instrument does not invariably compel a person already in settled possession to institute proceedings from the date of its execution irrespective of whether the right asserted by him has been effectively denied. Nazar Muhammad and petitioner No.2 continued to occupy the 31⁄2-Marla house and were not dispossessed therefrom. The overt hostile assertion pleaded as giving rise to the suit arose when Nisar Ahmad decided to gift house in occupation of the petitioners No.1-A to 1-G and petitioner No.2, to respondent No.1, Muhammad Shahid. The petitioners could not, therefore, be non-suited merely by reference to the year 1970 without determining when the asserted right was actually and effectively denied.

25.This Court is aware of the fact that the Appellate Court below is the final Court of fact and revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely because another view of the evidence is possible. A reversal of decision of the Trial Court is open to interference where material admissions are overlooked, a party’s testimony is not reconciled with his pleaded case, or the evidence is fragmented rather than cumulatively appreciated. In the present case, the Appellate Court below rightly attached substantial weight to the registered sale deed and to Maseeta Khan’s failure to challenge it during his lifetime. The error lay in allowing those considerations substantially to conclude the inquiry without reconciling them with Nisar Ahmad’s admission regarding his father’s contribution, his inability to quantify it, his financial circumstances at the relevant time, Maseeta Khan’s management of the

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family finances, Nisar Ahmad’s acquiescence in the separate occupation and treatment of one-half of the property by Nazar Muhammad and petitioner No.2—Muhammad Javed, and the admitted payment of Rs.20,000/- to Muhammad Yaseen in the precise year pleaded by the petitioners. None of these circumstances may be decisive independently; together, they materially affect the probability of the competing versions.

26.Suffice to state that civil cases are determined on the preponderance of probabilities. On cumulative appraisal, the version accepted by the Trial Court carries the greater probability. This conclusion proceeds neither on the premise that Maseeta Khan’s contribution towards consideration, standing alone, made him owner nor on the assumption that prolonged possession independently conferred title upon the petitioners. It flows from the combined effect of the circumstances attending the acquisition, the financial arrangement within the family, the material departure of Nisar Ahmad from his pleaded stance, the manner in which the two houses remained occupied and dealt with.

27.In view of the above discussion, the question formulated above is, therefore, answered in the terms that a registered title carries due and substantial evidentiary weight and cannot be displaced by conjecture, suspicion or a bare oral assertion. Registration, however, does not foreclose inquiry into independent facts concerning the source of consideration and the true character of the transaction where those matters are directly in issue and are supported by admissible evidence, including the admissions and subsequent conduct of the person in whose favour the instrument stands. Its evidentiary effect must be assessed with the surrounding circumstances, possession and conduct of the parties,

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and the determination ultimately rests upon the cumulative effect of the evidence tested on the standard of preponderance of probabilities.

28.The Appellate Court below, therefore, fell in error in reversing the findings of the Trial Court without adequately reconciling the registered title with the material admissions of Nisar Ahmad and the proved course of conduct. Such omission went to the root of the evidentiary appraisal and rendered the reversal vulnerable on account of misreading and non-reading of material evidence, warranting interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

29.Consequently, this Civil Revision is allowed. Judgment and decree dated 12.06.2014 passed by the Appellate Court below is set aside, whereas judgment and decree dated 05.10.2011 passed by the Trial Court is restored. The suit instituted by the petitioners shall accordingly stand decreed and the counter-suit for possession instituted by the contesting respondents shall stand dismissed in terms of the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. There shall be no order as to costs.

(ANWAAR HUSSAIN)

JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

Judge Announced in open court and, dictated on the same date, however, finalized on 01.10.2026.

Maqsood*