Faheem Fayyaz & 8 Others vs Gop etc.

Stereo. H C J D A-38.

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, MULTAN BENCH

MULTAN.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P. No.10756 of 2026

Faheem Fayyaz, etc.

Versus

Government of the Punjab, etc.

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 14.10.2026.

Petitioners by: Syed Najam us Saqib Mumtaz, Advocate.

Respondents by: Ms. Samina Mehmood Rana, Assistant Advocate General with Muhammad Asif Chadhar, Law Officer.

MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.- Through instant petition, petitioners have assailed order dated 08.06.2026, passed by respondent No.1, whereby their representation for grant of Time Scale Personal Upgrdation (TSPU) was declined.

2.The petitioners seek Time Scale Personal Upgradation from 14.12.2018 to 02.09.2022 on the ground stagnation in their respective posts, the absence of an effective avenue or promotion, and complain that the benefit was granted to other similarly placed employees. The controversy previously came before this Court in W.P. No. 10944 of 2024, which was decided on 18.03.2026. The denial of TSPU for the period commencing from 03.09.2022 was left undisturbed in view of the promotion channel said to be available under the 2022 Regulations, but the claim for the period from 14.12.2018 to 02.09.2022 was remanded to the competent authority for fresh consideration. The

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competent authority was specifically directed to record clear findings regarding on (i) the legal status and applicability of the 2017 Schedule, (ii) whether the petitioners were holding stagnant posts during the relevant period, and (iii) whether the denial of TSPU to the petitioners amounted to discrimination vis-à-vis similarly placed employees and to pass a reasoned and speaking order within thirty days. In compliance with the aforesaid directions, respondent No.1 passed the impugned order dated 08.06.2026, regarding primarily on the stance of the Administrative Department regarding the effectiveness of 2017 Schedule and observing that appointments had been made in accordance with it whereby the petitioners' claim was declined.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the impugned order has been passed in disregard of the specific directions issued by this Court vide order dated 18.03.2026. He argues that the competent authority has failed to determine whether the petitioners were holding stagnant posts, whether the 2017 Schedule had any statutory force, and whether denial of TSPU amounted to discriminatory treatment. He points out that the Schedule, as the petitioners contend, was approved by the Human Resource Management Committee to regulate initial recruitment criteria and sanction of posts rather than to create a lawful promotional structure, and that the relevant standards were required to be prescribed by regulations under Section 7(1)(c) of the applicable Act. He further relies on the departmental correspondence suggesting that the service structure had not been formally notified before 03.09.2022 and that approval of the competent authority was still awaited. He further submits that the authority has relied upon mere departmental assertions without establishing the existence of an effective promotional avenue during the relevant period. He maintains that the impugned order, being devoid of adequate reasons and failing to address material pleas, is not a speaking order. He, therefore, prays that the impugned order be set aside and appropriate directions be issued for the grant of relief in accordance with law.

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4.Conversely, learned Law Officer submits that TSPU is a policy- based concession and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. She argues that the petitioners' claim has rightly been declined in view of the applicable Finance Department policy and the administrative effectiveness of the 2017 Schedule. She further contends that the petitioners' appointment on the basis of Intermediate qualification does not entitle them to upgradation to BS-15. She further argues that the earlier upgradation granted to 111 incumbents was withdrawn for being contrary to the applicable policy and, therefore, cannot form the basis of a claim of discrimination. She maintains that the competent authority has considered the matter in accordance with law and prays that the writ petition be dismissed.

5.Arguments heard. Record perused.

6.The question is whether the impugned order satisfies the requirements of lawful adjudication and complies with the directions given by this Court on 18.03.2026 in W.P. No. 10944 of 2024.

7.A judicial remand confined to specified questions obliges the authority concerned to determine those questions in accordance with the directions issued. It does not confer unrestricted discretion to reconsider the matter without addressing the issues identified by the remanding Court. In Muhammad Tahir v. Abdul Latif and 5 others (1990 SCMR 751), the Honourable Supreme Court recognized the binding effect of a remand and held that matters falling outside its scope could not be reopened. In the present case, the earlier order dated 18.03.2026 expressly identified three questions for determination and required a reasoned and speaking order. Consequently, mere reference to departmental correspondence or adoption of an administrative stance could not substitute for findings on those questions.

8.A perusal of the impugned order reveals that respondent No.1 has not discharged this obligation. Although the order refers to the 2017 Schedule and correspondence with the Administrative Department, it does not meaningfully determine the Schedule's legal status, the availability of an effective promotional avenue during the

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relevant period, or the allegation of discriminatory treatment. The central questions entrusted to the authority have thus remained substantially unanswered.

9.The legal status of the 2017 Schedule was fundamental to the controversy. The authority was required to identify the enabling provision under which the Schedule was issued, determine whether it had been approved or notified by the competent authority in the prescribed manner, and examine whether it possessed the legal force necessary to constitute an effective promotional avenue. An administrative instrument cannot be presumed to have statutory force merely because the department treats it as operative. In Gul Zarif Khan and others v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others (2025 SCMR 415), the Honourable Supreme Court reiterated that governmental policy remains amenable to judicial review where, inter alia, the decision-maker fails to observe statutory procedure, misdirects itself in law or exercises its power improperly. The impugned order, however, does not disclose any examination of the enabling law or the prescribed requirements governing the Schedule. The question of its legal status, therefore, has not been determined in the manner required by the earlier judicial directions.

10.The authority also failed to examine whether the petitioners had an actual and legally recognized avenue of promotion between 14.12.2018 and 02.09.2022. The existence of a schedule, a proposed service structure or an administrative arrangement does not, without more, establish that an effective promotional mechanism was available. The fact that appointments may have been made under the 2017 Schedule is not, by itself, determinative of whether promotion to higher posts was legally permissible or practically available to the petitioners. The distinction between initial recruitment against sanctioned posts and promotion to higher posts was material and required an express finding.

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11.In this regard, the departmental letter dated 09.01.2023, stated by the petitioners to indicate that the relevant Schedule was notified on 03.09.2022, and the position allegedly conveyed before this Court on 02.06.2022 that the service structure was awaiting Cabinet approval, required consideration. These circumstances were directly relevant to the question whether an effective promotional avenue existed during the period in dispute. The impugned order neither reconciles these circumstances nor explains the basis for treating the 2017 Schedule as an effective promotional structure for the earlier period. The authority was required to evaluate the relevant material independently instead of resolving the controversy merely by adopting the Administrative Department's position.

12.The plea of discriminatory treatment has likewise not received the consideration required by law. The petitioners relied upon the grant of TSPU to employees of other cadres, including Fire Rescuers and Emergency Medical Technicians, as well as the upgradation extended to 111 incumbents through order dated 25.02.2019. The competent authority was required to determine whether those employees were similarly situated, whether the benefits had been granted under the same policy and what effect the subsequent withdrawal of the earlier upgradation had upon the petitioners' claim. In Gul Zarif Khan and others v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others (2025 SCMR 415), the Honourable Supreme Court explained that lawful classification may distinguish between different categories of persons where the distinction rests upon an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Although an unlawful benefit granted to another employee does not, by itself, confer an enforceable right to the same benefit, the authority remains obliged to examine a properly raised allegation of unequal treatment and determine whether the distinction is legally sustainable. The impugned order contains no adequate findings on this material aspect.

W.P. No.10756 of 2026

13.The submissions concerning the policy-based nature of TSPU, the petitioners' qualifications, the applicable Finance Department policy and the withdrawal of the earlier upgradation are relevant considerations. They do not, however, dispense with the obligation to determine the questions expressly entrusted to the competent authority. In Khalid Humayun v. The NAB through Director General, Quetta and others (PLD 2017 Supreme Court 194), the Honourable Supreme Court emphasized the need for independent application of mind in the exercise of statutory discretion. Similarly, in Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others (2015 SCMR 630), the Honourable Supreme Court reiterated that executive power must be exercised reasonably, fairly and justly and that reasons are required where the governing law so demands. These principles, read with section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, required respondent No.1 to evaluate the relevant material, reconcile the departmental positions and record its own conclusions. The impugned order does not demonstrate such independent consideration.

14.A speaking order must disclose the reasons forming the basis of the decision; a mere narration of the proceedings, reference to departmental correspondence or announcement of a conclusion does not satisfy that requirement. Where an administrative authority is specifically directed by a constitutional Court to determine identified questions, its order must demonstrate that the relevant issues have been considered and answered through a rational application of the governing law and policy. The impugned order fails this test, as its deficiencies concern the very questions upon which the petitioners' claim was declined. Its defect is, therefore, substantive rather than merely procedural.

15.This Court is conscious that, in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, it ordinarily does not substitute its own assessment for that of the authority lawfully entrusted with the decision. In Murad Khan and others v. Mst. Humaira Qayyum and others (2025 SCMR 739),

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the Honourable Supreme Court reiterated the limits of such substitution while recognizing the power of the High Court to quash an unlawful decision and direct reconsideration in accordance with law. Likewise, Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Water and Power and another v. Spencer Powergen Company of Pakistan Limited (2026 SCMR 339) recognizes the amenability of public-law action to judicial review, subject to the applicable limits of constitutional jurisdiction. The present case concerns the legality of an administrative decision made pursuant to specific judicial directions. Interference is warranted not to determine the petitioners' entitlement on an incomplete administrative assessment, but to address the failure to comply with the earlier directions and the absence of findings on material legal and factual questions.

16.In view of the foregoing, the impugned order dated 08.06.2026 cannot be sustained. It fails to determine the legal status and applicability of the 2017 Schedule, the availability of an effective promotional avenue during the relevant period, and the petitioners' plea of discriminatory treatment. It also does not demonstrate the independent application of mind or provide adequate reasons for rejecting the claim. The impugned order is, accordingly, set aside.

17.For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the impugned order dated 08.06.2026 is unsustainable in law on account of failure to comply with the earlier judicial directions, non-application of mind, absence of adequate reasons and failure to adjudicate the material questions concerning the legal status of the 2017 Schedule, the availability of an effective promotional avenue and the plea of discriminatory treatment. The impugned order is, accordingly, liable to be set aside.

18.Consequently, the instant constitutional petition is allowed, and the impugned order dated 08.06.2026, passed by respondent No.1, is hereby set aside, being unsustainable in law and without lawful authority. The petitioners are held entitled to the benefit of Time Scale Personal Upgradation, in accordance with the applicable rules, policy

W.P. No.10756 of 2026

and instructions governing the matter. The competent authority is directed to extend the said benefit to the petitioners, subject to fulfilment of the prescribed eligibility criteria, and to undertake the consequential exercise in accordance with law. No order as to costs.

(Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi) Judge

Approved for reporting

Judge *Waseem.*