Shahid-Ur-Rehman vs State

Stereo. H C J D A 38.

Judgment Sheet

LAHORE HIGH COURT,

RAWALPINDI BENCH, RAWALPINDI.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Crl. Appeal No.314/2026 (Shahid-ur-Rehman vs. The State)

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 23.09.2026 Appellant by: Mr. Khuda Yar Mohla, Advocate/Defence Counsel.

State by: Mr. Naeem Akbar, Deputy Prosecutor General with Afzaal, S.I.

TARIQ MAHMOOD BAJWA, J.:- Appellant (Shahid-ur-Rehman), has been tried by the trial Court in case FIR No.11 dated 27.01.2022 in offence 295-B PPC, registered at Police Station Sarai Alamgir, District Gujrat, and was convicted and sentenced vide judgment dated 20.12.2025 as under:- ➢ Under Section 295-B PPC, sentenced to life imprisonment. Benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C. was extended to the convict.

2.Appellant has filed the titled Criminal Appeal against his conviction and sentence

3.The prosecution’s version of the case, as mentioned in para No.3 of impugned judgment is reproduced as follows: “According to the prosecution version, as unfolded in complaint Ex.PA, on 27.01.2022 at about 10:30 am., the complainant Bilal Khalid (PW-1), along with Muhammad Azhar Iqbal (PW-2), Arshad Mehmood (PW-3), Allah Ditta and Muhammad Hanif alias Babar (since given up), was present in front of Fayyaz Electronics, Dandi Dara Bazaar. It is alleged that the accused suddenly emerged from the street of his residence holding a burning copy of the Holy Quran. When the complainant party rushed to extinguish

Crl. Appeal No.314/2026 (2)

the fire, the accused allegedly threw the burning copy on the main road, as a result whereof a major portion of the Holy Quran was burnt and defiled. Subsequently, on the written application of the complainant, FIR Ex. PC was registered."

4.Heard. Record perused.

5.Before embarking upon a reappraisal of the evidence, this Court, being the last Court of fact in its appellate jurisdiction, considers it appropriate to first advert to the statutory requirement governing the offence. In this regard, Section 295-B, P.P.C. provides as under:- “Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur'an or of an extract therefrom or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life.”

Thus, the prosecution was required to establish not merely that a copy of the Holy Quran was burnt, damaged or defiled, but also that the appellant was responsible for the proscribed act and that the same was done wilfully.

6.A man is responsible, not for his acts in themselves, but for his acts coupled with the mens rea or guilty mind, popularly rather legally, actus rea and mens rea are the key components. In the said text, further stress has been made while introducing the word willfully, the same was interpreted in the case law1 wherein it was observed:- “13. The legal word "wilfully would, therefore, essentially connote that the act of defiling, damaging or desecrating the Holy Qur'an must be wilful. The term' wilful in law means an intentional and deliberate act. A default or negligence may amount to wilful act if the doer of the wrongful act when under the ordinary circumstances while committing the default or guilty of negligence knows that what he was doing and intended to do as a free agent was forbidden or injurious in view of the concept of penal law. The dictionary meaning of "wilful" means "wantonly, deliberate, intentional and consciously and not accidentally".

In the context of the provision of section 295-B, P.P.C. "wilfully" would, therefore, means that the act of defiling, damaging, desecrating or distorting the original text of the Holy Qur'an or part of it must be with intention to achieve a nefarious objective Abdul Ahad vs. The State and another (PLD 2007 Peshawar 83)

contemptuously and showing disrespect to the Holy Qur'an which he was forbidden by law not to do.

14.Precisely the act of wilfully, defiling, damaging and desecrating of Holy Qur'an or part of it, would constitute the offence committed intentionally, knowingly, purposely for achieving the detestable objectives while in the absence of such intention, the necessary "mens rea" would be absolutely lacking and in that eventuality the person accused for such an offence cannot be held guilty except in very rare and exceptional circumstances.”

7.Adverting towards the evidence of the case, keeping in view the two inseparable ingredients, actus rea and mens rea and additional requirement of the relevant penal provision willfully, as interpreted supra. The complainant as well as the all the other private witnesses deposed the appellant as a person suffering from mental illness and stated that he had remained confined to his house for years, the verbatim portion of the statement of the whole private witnesses for ready reference, is as under:-

(i)Bilal Khalid, Complainant (PW-1) deposed “I have been working in the Bazar for about 14 years and since then I have heard about accused being lunatic and he has been confined in the house. I have seen the accused while hitting/throwing the stones on the people while praying in the mosque. I have also seen him while hit the stones even to his children.”

(ii)Azhar Iqbal (PW-2) described “He is mentally ill person. He has not been properly given treatment by his family members being poor people...... The accused was confined in his house being lunatic for the last 12 years. He also used to throw the stones on the people who came into the mosque for prayers.”

(iii)Arshad Mehmood (PW-3) deposed “He is lunatic person and he was confined in his house since years. He also used to hit/throw stones on the people who used to come to the mosque for offering the prayer.”

8.Now adverting to the second requirement “willfully”, the expression “willfully”, as employed in Section 295-B, P.P.C., carries a clear connotation of an intentional, deliberate and conscious act. Thus, the mere fact of defiling, damaging, desecrating or otherwise distorting the Holy Qur’an or any part thereof would not, by itself, suffice unless such act is shown to have been committed knowingly and purposely, with the requisite intention to achieve a nefarious object or to manifest contempt and disrespect towards the Holy Qur’an.

9.The question, therefore, is not merely whether the appellant had previously been declared a lunatic or whether any proceedings under Section 464, Cr.P.C. had been initiated, but whether, at the time of the alleged occurrence, he was, by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. In addition to the requirement of the willful act, to attract penal provision, Section 84, P.P.C. embodies substantive protection by excluding criminal liability where, at the time of doing the act, the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing what was wrong or contrary to law. In the present case, all private prosecution witnesses themselves consistently described the appellant as mentally unsound and used the expression even “lunatic” for the preceding 13/14 years, besides stating that he had remained confined to his house for about twelve years. These circumstances could not have been brushed aside on the ground that no formal application under Section 464, Cr.P.C. had been moved. Furthermore, a clear distinction must be drawn between unsoundness of mind at the time of commission of the offence and the accused’s incapacity to make his defence during trial. The statutory scheme embodied in Chapter XXXIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, commencing from Section 464 Cr.P.C. onwards, comes into operation where a question arises as to the accused’s incapacity to understand the proceedings or to make his defence. In such circumstances, the law contemplates appropriate medical examination and determination of

the accused’s mental condition in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, where the private prosecution witnesses, in clear, unequivocal and confidence-inspiring terms, have consistently testified to the accused’s unsoundness of mind at the time of the occurrence, the issue assumes a distinct significance. In the circumstances, no separate question concerning the accused’s capacity to make his defence during trial arose for determination so as to attract the procedural requirements contemplated under Section 367(2) Cr.P.C. Even where the charge was framed under section 295-C, P.P.C., the Honourable Supreme Court extended the benefit arising from the accused’s mental illness, while emphasizing the relevant legal principles in the case law2 as under:- “In this case the appellant was not aware that his actions were influenced by the mental disorder from which he was suffering. The culpability of the offence for which the appellant was charged requires establishing the actus rea and mens rea.....”

The Investigating Officer also made no meaningful effort to ascertain or address his mental condition and, according to his own deposition, hurriedly sent him to judicial lock-up without even taking him to the police station. In these circumstances, the material emerging from the prosecution's own evidence gives rise to a serious and reasonable doubt as to the appellant's mental capacity at the time of occurrence, attracting the protection contemplated by Section 84, P.P.C. In addition to the absence of the essential ingredients of the penal provision under which the accused was charged, as discussed hereinabove, it is well-settled that the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution is entirely distinct from that which may be required of the defence.

10.Furthermore, the term “willful” essentially excludes an accidental act or a mere act of negligence, and imports conscious knowledge of the nature and consequences of the conduct. Where such deliberate intent is absent, the necessary mens rea for an offence under Section 295-B, P.P.C.

Anwar Keneth v. The State (PLD 2026 SC 326)

would be lacking, except in rare circumstances recognized by law. PW-1, the complainant, while narrating the occurrence, stated that the appellant was holding a burning copy of the Holy Quran. However, during cross- examination, he candidly admitted that he did not witness the appellant while litting the fire to the copy. This admission assumes considerable significance because the precise act of setting the copy on fire has not been attributed to any act actually witnessed by the complainant. The same omission is not confined to the complainant(PW.1). PW-2 Muhammad Azhar Iqbal also admitted in unequivocal terms that he did not witness the appellant burning the copy of the Holy Quran. Thus, the two principal witnesses, who according to the prosecution were present at the spot, do not provide direct ocular account of the crucial act by which the fire was allegedly caused. Dil Nawaz Khan, Investigating Officer (PW-5), deposed that the complainant had handed over to him the allegedly defiled copy of the Holy Quran (P-1); however, he did not specify the particular Surah, Para, or any other portion thereof which was allegedly defiled. Mere description of the recovered pieces by the prosecution witnesses as pages of the Holy Quran, without any scientific examination or other reliable means of identification, cannot by itself furnish safe and conclusive proof of their identity. This omission assumes greater significance where the charge carries severe penal consequences and the prosecution is required to establish every essential ingredient of the offence beyond reasonable doubt3. Another significant aspect of the case is that neither the matchbox was taken into possession by the investigating officer nor was any investigation conducted to ascertain the circumstances in which it was allegedly burnt.

11.It is also significant that the prosecution case cannot be strengthened merely by the fact that a burnt copy of the Holy Quran was allegedly recovered from the spot. The existence of the burnt copy may establish that the sacred text had been damaged by fire; however, the Muhammad Zafran vs. The State (2024 SCMR 548)

prosecution was still required to establish, through reliable evidence, that it was the appellant who wilfully caused such damage. The distinction between proof of the occurrence and proof of the accused's authorship thereof cannot be overlooked.

12.The prosecution evidence is marred by material discrepancies regarding the arrival and duration of the police at the place of occurrence. PW-1 stated that the police arrived at 10:45 a.m. and stayed for 10–12 minutes, PW-2 placed their arrival at 11:15 a.m. with a stay of about one hour, whereas PW-3 stated that they arrived at 10:30 a.m. and remained for 15–20 minutes. The witnesses also contradicted one another regarding the recording of their statements, obtaining of signatures, and their attendance at the police station. These inconsistencies cast doubt on the sequence and manner of the initial investigative proceedings.

13.It is a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution must prove its case on its own legs and cannot derive strength from weaknesses in the defence. The accused is presumed innocent unless his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. Where the evidence gives rise to a reasonable doubt as to the identity or authorship of the act attributed to the accused, such doubt must necessarily be resolved in his favour. In the present case, the cumulative effect of the above circumstances has created more than a mere possibility of doubt; it renders the prosecution version unsafe for the purpose of maintaining a conviction. The Court is mindful to the fact that the frightful nature of crime should not blur the eyes of justice, allowing emotions triggered by the horrifying nature of the offence to prejudge the accused. Cases were to be decided on the basis of evidence alone and not on the basis of sentiments and emotions.

14.Based on the facts and circumstances presented, it is evident that the prosecution has failed to provide compelling and coherent evidence to establish the involvement of appellant in the alleged crime. It is a cardinal principle of the criminal justice system that for extending the benefit of the doubt, there doesn’t need to be several circumstances, rather one reasonable

Crl. Appeal No.314/2026 (8)

doubt is sufficient to acquit an accused, not as a matter of grace but as of right4.

15.Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence awarded to appellant Shahid-ur-Rehman vide judgment dated 20.12.2025 are set aside and he is acquitted of the charge by extending to him the benefit of doubt. He shall be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

(TARIQ MAHMOOD BAJWA)

JUDGE

*M.S.Aleem*

Approved for reporting

Judge

Munir Ahmad and 3 others vs. The State and others” (2026 SCMR 1498) and “Abdul Raheem and another vs. The State through Special Prosecutor ANF” (2026 SCMR 1516)