Lahore High Court

Muhammad Din Vs Muhammad Mansha

Outcome The civil revision was dismissed.

Case
70953/25
Type
Civil Revision
Judge
Mr. Justice Muzamil Akhtar Shabir
Length
15 pages

Summary

AI-generated · quotes checked against the text

This civil revision challenged orders of the appellate court that dismissed the petitioner’s appeal on the basis of the respondent’s statement on oath of the Holy Quran. The Lahore High Court held that, on the facts of this case, the petitioner could not resile from his own offer after the respondent accepted it and the appeal was decided accordingly.

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  • 11 cases relied on, linked to the library
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Written by AI from the judgment's text and may miss nuance. Rely on the full judgment below and the court's official copy. Court's own note: After statement on oath is recorded by the respondent by accepting the offer made by the petitioner and the case is decided, the petitioner cannot resile from the same.

Full judgment

Official copy

FORM No. HCJD/C-121

ORDER SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT,

LAHORE

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

Muhammad Din. Vs. Muhammad Mansha.

Sr. No. of Date of order/ Order with signature of Judge, and that of order/ Proceeding Parties’ counsel, where necessary proceedings 22.10.2026. Sheikh Naveed Shahryar, Rehana Khalid Baloch and Safina Safdar Bhatti, Advocates for petitioner. Mr. Muhammad Nazeer Raza, Advocate for respondent.

Barrister Hassan Khalid Ranjha, Additional Advocate General, Punjab.

Mr. Qamar Hanif Ramay, Assistant Advocate General for Pakistan.

M/s. Muhammad Dilbar Ghauri, Subhan Ali, Shahryar Farhan Beg, Mazhar Hussain Tahir, Advocates. Mr. Muhammad Abid, Civil Judge/Research Officer, Lahore High Court, Lahore,

Through this Civil Revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘C.P.C’), the petitioner (Muhammad Din) seeks setting-aside of judgment and decree dated 28th February, 2025, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Depalpur, whereby the learned trial court dismissed the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell filed by him against the respondent (Muhammad Mansha) and order dated 25th October, 2025, whereby appeal of the petitioner filed to challenge decree of trial court was dismissed on the basis of statement on oath of the respondent/defendant and order dated 28th October, 2025, through which the application filed on the same day by the petitioner for decision of the said appeal on merit instead of aforementioned statement on oath was dismissed by the learned appellate court/ Additional District Judge, Depalpur.

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

2.Learned counsel for the petitioner states that superior courts have deprecated decision of cases on oath and directed decisions to be given on merits. Further states that it is not appropriate for courts to quickly accept an offer from either of the parties to decide a case on oath, as there is a strong likelihood that in the heat of the moment an offer to decide a case on oath is made or accepted without knowledge of its consequences. Seeks setting aside of the impugned decisions by relying upon judgments titled as Muhammad Ali versus Major Muhammad Aslam and others (PLD 1990 Supreme Court 841), Ahmed Khan and others versus Jewan (PLD 2002 Supreme Court 655), Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs versus Mst. Nazira Bibi and 4 others (2007 CLC 1874) and Abdul Aziz versus Muhammad Yousuf (PLD 2015 Lahore

3.On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has defended the impugned decisions by stating that the offer had been made and accepted after due consideration and in presence of counsel for the parties, which is evident from the order passed by the appellate court, wherein it is specifically mentioned that after offer an acceptance was made and before statement on oath was recorded, the learned judge took thumb impressions of the parties on the order sheet, who were duly identified by their counsel and after the statement on oath was recorded and appeal was dismissed, the petitioner as an afterthought on the same day filed an application for decision of the case on merits, which had rightly been dismissed, hence, there is no reason to set-aside the impugned orders/decisions.

4.Brief facts of the case as narrated in the plaint are that the respondent/defendant is owner-in-

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

possession of suit property measuring 35K-16M-30F, situated at Mouza Naday, Tehsil Depalpur, District Okara, according to copy of Register of Record of Rights for the year 2019-2020; beside the aforementioned suit property, the respondent was also owner of electricity connection as well as transformer and other electrical articles; the respondent offered to sell the suit property as well as electricity connection and transformer to the petitioner, which was accepted by him; the respondent entered into an agreement to sell with the petitioner regarding suit property along with electricity connection and transformer for total sale consideration of Rs. 2,11,00,000/-, out of which an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- was paid as earnest money and remaining consideration amount of Rs. 40,00,000/- was settled to be paid till 1st March, 2023 and further remaining outstanding amount of Rs. 1,61,00,000/- was settled to be paid till 1st July, 2023 and in this regard written agreement to sell was also reduced into writing on 4th January, 2023; the respondent instead of transferring the suit property in his favour wanted to further alienate the same to someone else; the petitioner asked the respondent time and again to transfer the suit property in his favour but he lingered on the matter on one pretext or the other and finally refused to perform his part of agreement to sell, hence, the suit for possession, specific performance with perpetual injunction was filed. The said suit was contested by the respondent by filing written statement, through which he denied the execution of agreement and receipt of payment of consideration. In the suit, after framing of issues and recording of evidence, the suit filed by the petitioner was dismissed vide judgment dated 28th February, 2025, as the petitioner had failed to establish

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

execution of agreement to sell and making payment there-against. The petitioner filed an appeal before the appellate court and after arguments, the petitioner made an offer that in case the respondent namely Muhammad Mansha takes an oath on Holy Quran that neither he entered into an agreement to sell nor received any sale price then petitioner would have no objection on dismissal of his appeal. The respondent accepted this offer and got his statement recorded on oath of Holy Quran and appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed in the following terms:- Present: Malik Muhammad Aslam Jhujh Advocate, learned counsel for appellant.

Ch. Muhammad Kamran Nawazish Advocate, learned counsel for respondent. Parties are present in person.

After hearing arguments of learned counsel for parties at length, it was offered by the appellant namely Muhammad Deen that if the respondent gives an oath on Holy Quran that neither he entered into an agreement to sell nor received any sale price then he has no objection on the dismissal of his appeal. Respondent is ready to give oath on Holy Quran. In this regard thumb impressions of parties duly identified by their counsel have been taken on the margin of order sheet.

Addl: District Judge, Depalpur.

STATEMENT OF MUHAMMAD MANSHA S/O

HASHIM, CASTE DOGAR, RESIDENT OF

MOUZA NADHAY, POST OFFICE HUJRA SHAH

MUQEEM, TEHSIL DEPALPUR, DISTRICT

OKARA, DULY IDENTIFIED BY HIS LEARNED

COUNSEL CH. MUHAMMAD KAMRAN

NAWAZISH ADVOCATE.

ON OATH OF HOLY QURAN

Stated that neither I entered into alleged agreement to sell nor received any earnest money in this regard from appellant / plaintiff.

R.O. & A.C. ABIDA RAFIQ,

25.10.2025 Addl: District Judge, Depalpur.

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

ORDER

In view of the oath taken by the appellant on Holy Quran from the respondent, appeal in hand filed by the appellant is hereby dismissed. There is no order as to costs. Record of learned trial court be returned immediately along with the copy of this judgment while file of appeal be consigned to record room after its due completion.

Announced: ABIDA RAFIQ, 25.10.2025 Addl: District Judge, Depalpur.”

On the same day i.e. 25.10.2025, the petitioner filed an application that he does not want to have the appeal decided in terms of his offer addressed to the respondent to take oath and the appeal be decided on merits, which application was fixed in the court on 28th October, 2025, and was dismissed in the following manner:

“ Through this order, I would like to decide above cited petition filed by petitioner / appellant praying therein that instant appeal may very kindly be decided on merits.

Arguments heard. Record perused.

Perusal of record reveals that after arguing the case at length, it was offered by the petitioner namely Muhammad Deen that if the respondent gives an oath on Holy Quran that neither he entered into an agreement to sell nor received any sale price then he has no objection on the dismissal of his appeal. In this regard both parties put their thumb impressions on the margin of order sheet which were duly identified by their counsel. Their I.D. Cards numbers and pictures were also taken for the verification of taking oath. Resultantly, in view of the oath taken by the respondent, appeal of the petitioner was dismissed. Later on, petitioner has filed instant application without any lawful justification. In these circumstances, application in hand is hereby dismissed. This application and order be annexed with main file.”

5.The grievance of the petitioner is that sufficient opportunity to think over his offer for decision of the appeal on statement on oath was not

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

given to the petitioner in order to re-consider whether he wanted the suit/appeal to be decided on oath, therefore, the impugned orders were not sustainable whereas learned counsel for the respondent states that the petitioner made offer after he had not been able to substantiate through evidence that agreement had been executed and payment had been made, hence it is incorrect that the said offer was not deliberated upon and was made in the heat of the moment as is evident from the observation in the subsequent order passed by the appellate court while dismissing the application of the petitioner to decide the appeal on merits. Besides, it was for the safe administration of justice for court to see that the person who accepts offer, i.e. respondent in the instant matter, is given reasonable time to consider whether he has to accept the offer and not to promptly decide the same at the spur of moment as the person making the offer may have deliberated over the same for quite some time before suddenly making the said offer before the court but the person accepting the same would have had no opportunity to make deliberations over its consequences. Moreover, it has been argued that trial court had already held that the petitioner failed to prove execution of agreement between the parties and payment of sale consideration by appraising the evidence in detail, and to cover the said lacuna the petitioner had made an offer to the respondent to take oath with intention that if the respondent would not agree to the same, adverse presumption may be drawn against him. In order to determine the said aspect of the matter in dispute between the parties, the following case laws have been referred.

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

6.The Supreme Court in Muhammad Ali versus Muhammad Aslam and others (PLD 1990 SC 841) has held as under:

‘11. In cases such as the present, where it is not possible to lay down guiding principles as to what facts or circumstances in a given case would induce a judge to permit a party to resile from either the offer or the acceptance, it is necessary for the Court to guard itself and the parties against snap decisions taken by the parties in this connection. More often than not, during examination of a party or a witness, or during a heated discussion or argument, a party in the excitement of the moment may be led to make a snap decision in this respect. He may in the heat of passion make such an offer, or accept such a one, which otherwise in a state of cool deliberation he would not do. The Court should be careful to see that such offers and acceptances are not recorded with the same snap speed with which they are made, for such offers and acceptances would not be founded in piety and grace and would not be made at the highest level of truth. For no sooner a person makes an offer to another to make a statement on the Holy Qur'an or his Holy Book, whichever it may be, with regard to any matter or fact, the effect of which will be to bind him in a particular manner, for good or for worse, he does so on the assumption that the person who will accept it is conscious of his trust and whilst making the statement on the Holy Book shall place himself figuratively before his Maker and his Holy Prophet and state the truth, on pain of divine wrath. The Court should, therefore, be somewhat circumspect in this matter and refrain from permitting parties to enter into such agreements, which otherwise do not appear to have been made by them in some reasonable frame of mind, or which appear to be the result of indecent haste, or which otherwise, from the apparent conduct of any of the parties, appear to be such as would make a mockery of the oath. The need for recording separate statements of the parties in respect of the offer and acceptance made in such cases deserves to be over‐emphasised, for such a procedure would give parties some short time to think over the matter and extricate themselves from hasty decisions, before appending their signatures to their statements. We do not wish to go down on the record as suggesting that this procedure must invariably be observed, for

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

there is no such legal compulsion, not do we want to suggest that certain safeguards suggested here should be treated as rules of prudence to be observed in such cases, because sections 9 to 11 of the Oaths Act do not admit of such intrusions, but we would say that all this may be treated as a note of caution, for a Court is as much bound to ensure the solemnity of these proceedings, as the parties are bound to respect them.’

7.While referring to the principles laid down in the said judgment, the Supreme Court in Ahmad Khan and others versus Jewan (PLD 2002 SC 655) held as under:

‘7. There is no hard and fast rule for accepting or rejecting the statement of a person given on oath provided departure from it is made on the basis of cogent grounds, depending upon case to case. As in instant case the apprehension of Jewan that his brother Muhammad Nawaz in collusion with the other side has given the statement on oath seems to be convincing because the same fellow had denied the claim of the petitioners/plaintiffs by filing written statement but after some time he has changed his earlier stance. therefore, in such circumstances, the trial Court may have not accepted the statement of Muhammad Nawaz made by him on oath and on allowing the application filed by Jewan alleging therein that his brother has given the statement in collusion with the other side may have proceeded to decide the case on merits.’

8.In Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. versus Mst. Nazira Bibi and 4 others (2007 CLC 1874 Lahore), the matter in issue was that the petitioner Khushi Muhammad filed a suit to challenge transfer of his property through gift in favour of his wife Nazira Bibi, respondent and she while recording of statement in defence made a statement that let the matter be decided on oath, which the petitioner accepted and recorded statement on oath upon which the suit was decree. However, the appellate court set aside the said decree and remanded the matter for decision afresh. When the said matter came upon for hearing before this

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

Court in its revisional jurisdiction, this Court by referring to the case of Muhammad Ali (Supra) held that courts are not required to act too promptly as had been done by the learned trial Court in the said case and upheld the order of appellate court, whereby it had set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court.

9.The principles recorded in the case of Muhammad Ali (Supra) again came up for consideration before this Court in Abdul Aziz versus Muhammad Yousaf (PLD 2015 Lahore 348), wherein it was held as under:- ‘8. In the light of the above quoted observations of the Hon'ble apex Court scrutiny of proceedings recorded by the learned trial Court in this case clearly manifests that during lengthy cross- examination respondent had made a spontaneous offer accepted by the petitioner and the learned trial Court also acted swiftly without adhering to the safeguards suggested by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan as rule of prudence to ensure safe administration of justice. In the peculiar circumstances of this case the learned trial Court was obliged to give reasonable time to the parties to think over the matter in order to extricate themselves from hasty decisions before appending their signatures on their statements. In the instant case record transpires that no separate statements regarding offer by the respondent or acceptance by the petitioner were recorded by the learned trial Court rather their signatures were obtained on the margins of interim orders sheets. Impugned proceedings before the learned trial Court therefore lack due care, caution and solemnity. The learned trial Court thus failed to exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law to ensure safe administration of justice. In view of the above learned first Appellate Court carefully scrutinizing the proceedings of the learned trial Court in the light of the guideline provided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Muhammad Ali (supra) has rightly set aside the proceedings and order of the learned trial Court. I do not find any legal infirmity or jurisdictional error in the impugned judgment passed by learned Appellate Court. Petitioner therefore has no case

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of this Court for interference in the impugned judgment.’

10.The main principle of law laid down in all the aforementioned cases is that as it is not possible to lay down guiding principles as to what facts or circumstances in a given case would induce a judge to permit a party to resile from either the offer or the acceptance and it is necessary for the Court to guard itself and the parties against snap decisions taken by the parties in this connection for the reason that more often than not, during examination of a party or a witness, or during a heated discussion or argument, a party in the excitement of the moment may be led to make a snap decision in this respect. A party may in the heat of passion make such an offer, or accept such a one, which otherwise in a state of cool deliberation he would not do. The Court should be careful to see that such offers and acceptances are not recorded with the same snap speed with which they are made, for such offers and acceptances would not be founded in piety and grace and would not be made at the highest level of truth. For no sooner a person makes an offer to another to make a statement on the Holy Qur'an or his Holy Book, whichever it may be, with regard to any matter or fact, the effect of which will be to bind him in a particular manner, for good or for worse, he does so on the assumption that the person who will accept it is conscious of his trust and whilst making the statement on the Holy Book shall place himself figuratively before his Maker and his Holy Prophet and state the truth, on pain of divine wrath. The Court should, therefore, be somewhat circumspect in this matter and refrain from permitting parties to enter into such agreements, which otherwise do not appear to have

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

been made by them in some reasonable frame of mind, or which appear to be the result of indecent haste, or which otherwise, from the apparent conduct of any of the parties, appear to be such as would make a mockery of the oath. The need for recording separate statements of the parties in respect of the offer and acceptance made in such cases deserves to be over‐emphasized, for such a procedure would give parties some short time to think over the matter and extricate themselves from hasty decisions, before appending their signatures to their statements.

11.While laying down the aforementioned principles it was also held by the Supreme Court that they do not lay down that the said procedure must invariably be observed, for there is no such legal compulsion, nor did the Supreme Court suggest that certain safeguards suggested above should be treated as rules of prudence to be observed in such cases, because Sections 9 to 11 of the Oaths Act do not admit of such intrusions, and mentioned that all this may be treated as a note of caution, for a Court is as much bound to ensure the solemnity of these proceedings, as the parties are bound to respect them.

12.From the above it is noted that the aforementioned principles were mentioned as safeguard and caution and not to be treated as a mandatory requirement for setting aside each and every decision made on the basis of oath administered in the matter by consent of parties, which resulted in final decision of the matter and the court has to decide each and every matter keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of that particular case for the reason that a situation may arise that a party may make an offer or accept the said offer hoping for a decision in his/her

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

favour on the basis of oath as the said party either does not have cogent evidence available with it or has not led the same in support of its claim and after adverse decision is made against his/her expectations to benefit from such statement on oath may resile from the same by objecting to the procedure adopted by the court by claiming that sufficient opportunity to deliberate over the said decision was not provided to the said party. It is pertinent to mention here that subsequent to the aforementioned judgment, the Supreme Court has laid down principles relating to oath in judgment titled Sajid Mehmood versus Mst. Shazia Azad and others (2023 SCMR 153), wherein it is mentioned that under the provisions of the Oaths Act, 1873, a party in litigation can offer the opposite party to accept or reject the claim on special oath, but they cannot compel each other to take the special oath, however if the offer is accepted by the other party then a binding agreement comes into existence and the party making the offer has no right and authority in law to resile from it. When the Court communicates the offer to the other party and gets hold of his assent or refusal, as the case may be, it in fact plays a role as an intermediary between the parties and when the offer is accepted by the other party, the acceptance is transmitted to the party inviting the other to take special oath, thereafter the agreement is completed between the parties, unless the offer is withdrawn before its acceptance by the other side.

13.The same principle has been laid down in Amanullah versus Kashmir Khan (2008 SCMR 152) by observing that respondent, in the facts and circumstances of the case, had willingly and voluntarily offered the appellant to take the oath, which he took, hence respondent could not be permitted to

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

resile from said oath subsequently. It is pertinent to mention here that the Supreme Court in Attiqullah versus Kafayatullah (1981 SCMR 162), held that where an offer was made by a party for decision of a case on special oath, such offer when accepted results in an agreement in nature of contract and one of the contracting parties could not back out of such agreement unless contract was void or frustrated. Where none of such eventualities were occurring, trial court would be justified in refusing to permit petitioner from resiling from his offer to be bound by special oath of other party after such other party had accepted offer. Moreover, this Court in Muhammad Aslam versus Chand Khan (1999 MLD 3407 Lahore) has held that if the parties agreed to special oath, the suit could be disposed of on Special Oath even if the case was ripe for decision. In Asif Ali versus Additional District Judge, Faisalabad and another (2018 CLC 1350 Lahore), this Court held that where an offer of Special Oath was made by one party and accepted by the other party, none could be allowed to travel beyond the offer made. In Abdul Sattar versus Judge Family Court, Toba Tek Singh and 2 others (PLD 2010 Lahore 484), this Court held that once an offer to decide the matter on oath was made by one party and accepted by the other party, then the party making offer cannot resile from the same. The same principle has been laid down in Akhtar Ali and others versus Ejaz Ahmad and others (2000 CLC 1829 Lahore).

14.Now coming to the present case, the perusal of the record shows that after arguing the case at length, the petitioner, Muhammad Din himself offered that if the respondent takes an oath on Holy Quran that neither he entered into an agreement to sell nor received any

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

sale price then he would have no objection on the dismissal of his appeal, which offer was accepted by the respondent. The said offer and acceptance was made in presence of learned counsel of both the parties before the court. The appellate court in this regard obtained thumb impressions of both parties on the margin of order sheet which were duly identified by their counsel and in continuation thereof their I.D. Cards numbers and pictures were also taken for the verification of taking oath and thereafter the oath was administered and statement was recorded and as a consequence in view of the oath taken by the respondent, appeal of the petitioner was dismissed. Subsequent to the decision of the appeal petitioner filed application for decision of said appeal on merits instead of oath, which application was held to be without any lawful justification and was dismissed. In the opinion of this court, the appellate court had given sufficient time to the parties for recording their statements for the reason that not only the impugned order mentions the offer of the petitioner but also mentions that before recording the statement of the respondent, while accepting the said offer not only pictures of both the parties were got affixed on the margin of the order sheet, they also signed the same in affirmation of the statement as a token of correctness in presence of their counsel and case was decided on the basis of statement recorded on oath, consequently, no ground remains in the field that sufficient opportunity was not provided to the petitioner to consider consequences of his decision to seek decision on appeal on the basis of oath, which is also evident from the subsequent order dated 28 th October, 2025, passed by the said court. In view thereof, the petitioner at this stage cannot be allowed to

C.R.No. 70953 of 2025

resile from his offer to decide the matter on oath and to avoid the consequences thereof.

15.For the foregoing reasons, there is no misreading, non-reading, illegality or jurisdictional defect in the impugned orders passed by the appellate court and it is held that the appeal filed by the appellant and application for decision of the appeal on merits instead of statement recorded by respondent on oath were rightly dismissed by the said court as a consequence thereof the decision of dismissal of appellant’s suit for specific performance was rightly maintained. The petitioner through this Civil Revision has failed to make out a case for this Court to warrant interference in the impugned orders passed by the appellate court and the same being devoid of any merits is dismissed.

(Muzamil Akhtar Shabir) Judge Zeeshan Khan

APPROVED FOR REPORTING

Judge

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