Shagufta Parveen Vs State etc

Stereo. H C J D A 38

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

Criminal Appeal No.60078-J of 2024 Shagufta Parveen Versus The State, etc.

JUDGMENT

DATE OF HEARING: 20.10.2026

APPELLANT BY: Barrister Rai Danayal Kharal, Rai Zamir- ul-Hassan and Mr. Faseeh Ullah Khan, Advocates.

STATE BY: Mr. Irfan Sadiq Tarrar, Prosecutor General, Punjab and Dr. Usman Iqbal, & Noshe Malik DPGs with Rana Muhammad Asif Iqbal, ADPP.

Ms. Khalida Parveen, Additional Advocate General, as amicus curiae.

COMPLAINANT BY: Nemo.

MUHAMMAD AMJAD RAFIQ, J:- Shagufta Parveen has challenged the judgment dated 28.06.2024 of the Sessions Judge, Hafizabad, in FIR No. 1028/2022 (PS Saddar Hafizabad). Following her trial for the tragic deaths of her infant sons, Abdul Hadi (3 years) and Abdul Raheem (9 months), she was convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (“PPC”) and sentenced by way of ta’zir to imprisonment for life on two counts, along with Rs. 200,000 compensation per victim (six months additional simple imprisonment in default). Additionally, she received a six-month simple imprisonment sentence for attempted suicide under Section 325 PPC, with the benefit of Section 382B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (“Cr.P.C.”) extended to her.

2.For a year, domestic estrangement had kept Shagufta Bibi away from her husband, Muhammad Shabbir, residing with her parents in Madhrianwala alongside her two helpless, innocent sons, three-year-

old Abdul Hadi and nine-month-old Abdul Raheem, spurning every single plea for reconciliation. Then, at the dead of night on November 9, 2022, at 3:00 a.m., the horrific reality broke through a phone call from cousin Muhammad Irshad: the mother lay wounded and broken in a hospital bed, while her infant children lay slaughtered at home. Rushing to the scene with Muhammad Azam and Muhammad Shafiq, the shattered father confronted the unthinkable nightmare of his little boys lying lifeless and battered, a devastating crime where a mother stand accused of executing the ultimate betrayal against her own flesh and blood before turning upon herself.

3.Following the FIR, investigation culminated in a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., leading to formal charges against the accused, who pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. After the prosecution concluded its evidence, the appellant was examined under Section 342 Cr.P.C., wherein she produced an attested copy of her family suit for dissolution of marriage, maintenance, and dowry articles as Ex-DC, but chose not to produce oral evidence or testify under Section 340(2) Cr.P.C.. and trial ended in conviction of accused/appellant as forecited.

4.In the beginning, it was asked from learned counsel for the appellant as to whether, accused/appellant being mother of the deceased persons could be convicted under section 302 (b) PPC, he had his own version and learned ADPP has no response to counter the arguments nor had any alternative, thus, following order was passed on In the present case, the accused/appellant is suspected of the murder of her two infant sons, Abdul Hadi, aged approximately 3 years, and Abdul Raheem, aged approximately 9 months, followed by an attempted act of self- harm. Notably, the prosecution has not established her alleged criminal liability through direct ocular or forensic evidence. Instead, the case rests primarily upon an alleged extra-judicial confession attributed to her, which, being an inherently fragile species of evidence, warrants the most rigorous and cautious judicial scrutiny.

2.In light of the arguments advanced and the attendant circumstances, a critical question arises: if a woman commits the murder of her own children allegedly due to the harsh and uncooperative conduct of her husband, does such a

circumstance constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing, or does it otherwise furnish a ground for exoneration under the General Exceptions of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, or any other applicable law?

3.The incident occurred within the confines of the home where the accused/appellant resided, and the deceased children were admittedly in her custody. The prosecution relies heavily on legal presumptions to establish her involvement, asserting that the burden shifted to her to explain the circumstances surrounding the unnatural deaths of her children, a burden she has failed to discharge, save for raising the plea that the offence was committed by unknown intruders.

4.This Court has already considered the question of burden upon a person residing in a house within the confines of which a murder has occurred, in the judgment reported as “AYAZ ADIL versus The STATE and others” (2026 P Cr. L J 1582). However, the further question requiring consideration is whether the accused/appellant, being the mother of the victims, must be punished under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 or any other applicable penal provision, or alternatively, if the presumption of guilt fails, what recourse is available to the aggrieved party to establish responsibility for the deaths of the children who were in her custody.

5.For assistance of the Court on the aforesaid questions of law, let notice be issued to the learned Prosecutor General, Punjab, and Ms. Khalida Parveen, learned Additional Advocate General is hereby appointed as amicus curiae. Relist on 20.10.2026

5.Learned counsel for the appellant did not opt to comment upon the questions framed by the Court, rather while relying on “SHAUKAT HUSSAIN Versus The STATE” (2022 S C M R 1358), “Mst. GULNAZ AJMAL Versus The STATE” (2024 P Cr. L J 1054) [Lahore], “MUHAMMAD PERVAIZ Versus THE STATE and other” (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 592), “NAZIR AHMAD Versus The STATE” (2018 S C M R 787), “ASAD KHAN Versus The STATE” (PLD 2017 Supreme Court 681) & unreported judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan & India titled as “Salman Versus The State” (Jail Petition No.565 of 202) & “SHAIL KUMARI Versus STATE OF CHHATTISGARH” passed in Criminal Appeal No.2189 of 2017, respectively, submitted that not an iota of evidence is available against the accused/appellant that could establish her criminal liability, therefore, there hardly remain nay chance for shifting of evidential burden upon her to explain the circumstance in which death of her two

kids occurred, because prosecution has not proved the primary facts as to lay a burden of presumed facts against her. He prayed for acquittal of accused.

6.The Prosecutor General of Punjab argued that because the case relies heavily on an inherently weak extra-judicial confession, all questions must be evaluated in that light. He emphasized that under section 304 PPC, a confession made outside of court does not constitute legal proof, which instead requires a voluntary confession before a court competent to try the offence or proper evidence under Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984.

6.1 The Prosecutor General further argued that Chapter IV of PPC does not recognize domestic unhappiness or marital discord as a General Exception to intentional murder. While a plea of mental incapacity can fall under section 84 PPC, the burden rests squarely on the accused under Article 121 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 to prove that unsoundness of mind existed precisely at the time of the act. He added that Ikrah-i-tam is tightly regulated under specific legal provisions such as sections 299, 303, whereas coercion under section 94 PPC, the latter of which expressly excludes murder from acts done under compulsion by threats.

6.2 Nevertheless, the Prosecutor General conceded that background circumstances are not entirely irrelevant. Citing Supreme Court precedents such as “Sabtain Haider v. The State” (2022 SCMR 2012) and “Muhammad Qasim v. The State” (PLD 2018 Supreme Court 840),, he explained that a killing triggered by grave and sudden provocation without premeditation may fall under section 302(c) rather than 302(b) PPC. However, this principle requires firm evidence of a sudden loss of self-control and an immediate nexus, as prolonged marital unhappiness does not qualify as sudden provocation. While the husband's conduct does not exonerate the accused, it may ultimately influence the assessment of intention, premeditation, and the quantum of the sentence.

6.3 The Prosecutor General noted that under Article 122 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 and “Saeed Ahmad v. The State” (2015 SCMR 710) facts especially within a person's knowledge requires an explanation. However, citing “AYAZ ADIL versus The STATE and others” (2026 P Cr. L J 1582) and “Kashif Nouman alias Kashi v. The State” (2026 Y L R 864), he emphasized that this rule does not displace the prosecution's primary burden under Article 117 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order 1984, override the presumption of innocence, or automatically presume guilt for household inmates. Ultimately, an adverse inference can only supplement established incriminating circumstances rather than cure fundamental deficiencies in the prosecution's case.

6.4 Concluding his arguments on parental liability, the Prosecutor General submitted that even if a mother is proven to have intentionally killed her children, she is exempt from qisas under section 306(b) PPC, particularly since an extra-judicial confession alone cannot establish a qisas offense. He noted that once qisas is barred, the court must consider alternative punishments under section 308 or subsections (b) and (c) of section 302 PPC. Ultimately, he emphasized that the maximum death penalty should be reserved for cases lacking mitigating circumstances, as the familial relationship does not exonerate the offender but simply changes the applicable legal framework.

7.Appearing as amicus curiae, Additional Advocate General Ms. Khalida Parveen submitted that when a mother takes her child's life under intense psychological pressure and severe domestic despair, her case falls squarely under Section 302(c) PPC. In support of this argument, she relied upon a landmark and recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in “Shahzad Liaqat and another versus The State and another” (2026 SCMR 466).

7.1 Expounding on the judgment, the Additional Advocate General submitted that the traditional exceptions under the former Section 300 PPC still serve as a vital window for alternate punishments under

Section 302(c) PPC, chief among them being murder committed in the heat of passion. She highlighted the appellant's harrowing backdrop— marked by her husband's hostility, pending family litigation, and the threat of starvation, as key factors characterizing the case, while also tentatively suggesting exploring whether it could be accommodated within the parameters of Section 306 PPC if permitted by law.

7.2 Invited by the bench to examine the bare text of Section 302(c) PPC, the learned amicus curiae read it aloud, observing that it prescribes a discretionary sentence of imprisonment extending up to twenty-five years, operative exclusively in situations where according to the injunctions of Islam qisas is not applicable. Building on this, she maintained that the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed, most recently in the Shahzad Liaqat ruling, that the doctrine of qisas does not apply to the specific mitigating situations enumerated under the exceptions to the erstwhile Section 300 PPC.

7.3 Yet, as the discussion transitioned from statutory construction to foundational jurisprudence, a notable void emerged in her presentation. When probed for explicit anchors from the Holy Quran or the traditions of the Sunnah to substantiate this statutory interplay from an Islamic legal perspective, the learned Additional Advocate General candidly conceded her inability to cite specific divine texts or traditions at that moment, leaving her compelling humanitarian plea tethered strictly to positive statutory law.

8.Following lengthy arguments, the Court faces a profound judicial task: decoding the statutory architecture of Sections 306, 307, and 302(c) PPC to determine how the law must classify the penal liability of a mother accused of the intentional murder of her two children. The Court must meticulously weigh whether her actions attract the retributive weight of Section 302(b), invite the framework of Section 308, or find a measured balance within the discretionary ta'zir parameters of Section 302(c) PPC.

9.Usually a case of maternal filicide is covered by section 306 PPC and is punishable under section 308 PPC which are as under;

306.Qatl-i-amd not liable to qisas.__ Qatl-i-amd shall not be liable to qisas in the following cases, namely:__

(a)when an offender is a minor or insane:

Provided that, where a person liable to qisas associates himself in the commission of the offence with a person not liable to qisas with the intention of saving himself from qisas, he shall not be exempted from qisas;

(b)when an offender causes death of his child or grandchild, how low-soever; and

(c)when any wali of the victim is a direct descendant, how low-so- ever, of the offender.

308.Punishment in qatl-i-amd not liable to qisas, etc.__ (1) Where an offender guilty of qatl-i-amd is not liable to qisas under section 306 or the qisas is not enforceable under clause (c) of section 307, he shall be liable to diyat :

Provided that, where the offender is minor or insane, diyat shall be payable either from his property or, by such person as may be determined by the court:

Provided further that where at the time of committing qatl-e-amd the offender being a minor, had attained sufficient maturity or being insane, had a lucid interval, so as to be able to realize the consequences of his act, he may also be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to [twenty-five years] as ta'zir:

Provided further that, where the qisas is not enforceable under clause (c) of section 307, the offender shall be liable to diyat only if there is any wali other than offender and if there is no wali other than the offender, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to [twenty-five years] as ta'zir.

(2)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the court, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case in addition to the punishment of diyat, may punish the offender with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to [twenty-five years], as ta'zir.

Section 306(b) of the PPC dictates that an offender who causes the death of their child or grandchild, how low-so-ever, is exempt from Qisas (retribution). The foundational legal maxim behind this rule is that the offender is the root (origin) and the victim is the branch.

9.1 Although the Holy Quran does not contain an explicit verse barring qisas for ascendants, Islamic jurists across all major schools of thought established this rule through consensus (Ijma). This derivation rests upon principles of mercy, paternal authority, and family preservation, and is reinforced by explicit traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

“A father shall not be put to death for (killing) his son.” (Sunan an-Nasa'i (4762) / Sunan Ibn Majah (2661)

Building upon that juristic consensus, Islamic scholars agree that an ascendant, such as a parent or grandparent, is exempt from qisas when killing a descendant, though they remain liable to financial compensation (diyat) or discretionary punishment (ta'zir) depending on the specific school of thought.

9.2 Relying on this framework, Islamic jurisprudence dictates that because qisas is a private right (Haqq al-Abd) belonging to the heirs, a descendant cannot hold the right of retaliation against their own parent or ascendant. The natural obligation of filial respect and lineage preservation fundamentally contradicts the execution of a capital sentence by a child against an ancestor, a principle reinforced by established traditions regarding parental immunity.

“You and your wealth belong to your father.” Sunan Ibn Majah (2291) / Musnad Ahmad)

Classical jurists across all major schools (Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali) deduced that the right of qisas is barred when exercising it would require a descendant to execute capital punishment upon their own direct parent or ancestor.

9.3 Under Islamic jurisprudence, legal capacity (Takleef), which fundamentally requires sanity and maturity (Bulghah), is an absolute prerequisite for enforcing criminal liability like qisas for intentional murder. Neither a minor (saghir) nor an insane person (majnoon) can be subjected to qisas, as they lack the cognitive awareness and capacity to form the requisite intent (qasd).

"And there is no blame upon you for that in which you have erred but [only for] what your hearts intended." (Surah Al Ahzab) (33:5) Reflecting the Quranic emphasis on conscious reasoning, Islamic law dictates that minors and insane individuals lack the legal agency required for premeditated crimes carrying capital retribution. The foundational textual proof exempting both groups from criminal liability and corporal or capital punishments is rooted in an explicit and widely transmitted tradition of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

The Prophetic Hadith of Immunity (Raf' al-Qalam):

Narrated Ali ibn Abi Talib: The Prophet (PBUH) said: "The pen is lifted from three people: from a sleeper until he wakes up, from a child until he reaches puberty, and from an insane person until he regains his sanity." — Sunan an-Nasa'i (3432), Sunan Abu Dawud (4403), and Sunan Ibn Majah (2041)

Because the "pen is lifted" (meaning legal duties, liabilities, and retributive penalties are suspended), an act of killing committed by a minor or an insane person does not legally constitute premeditated murder (Qatl-i-Amd) that invites Qisas.

10.Despite clear command and dictates of Allah, Hadith and opinions of Fuqaha, a deeply flawed judicial regime is prevailing that mechanistically prosecutes a mother or father under Section 302 PPC for the murder of their own child, while entirely ignoring the specific statutory framework designed for precisely such offences. It is an agonizing legal paradox that demands an immediate reckoning.

10.1 The current legal framework highlights a profound legal paradox: to grant a parent the exemption from qisas under Section 306 PPC, the prosecution must first meet the unrealistically high evidentiary standard of proving intentional murder through two eyewitnesses subjected to tazkia-tul-shahood (or a strict judicial confession). Because failing this extraordinary burden defaults the offender to the maximum penalties of death or imprisonment for life under Section 302(b) PPC, the system perversely makes severe punishment the consequence of evidentiary gaps rather than proven culpability, exposing a critical flaw that demands legislative reform.

10.2 Islamic law exempts ascendants from qisas, no court or legal technicality possesses the mandate to resurrect it. Demanding the impossibly stringent evidentiary threshold of tazkia-tul-shahood, which is designed exclusively to guard against capital execution, in cases where qisas is already divinely lifted is described as a profound legal aberration. Instead, once qisas is withheld, the matter shifts to ordinary standards of proof for diyat and ta'zir, and forcing financial and corrective liability through the restrictive evidentiary needle of capital punishment fundamentally subverts both jurisprudence and justice.

10.3 When Allah Himself has granted a concession, demanding tazkia-tul-shahood where life is no longer at stake defies divine logic, as Islamic law grants a concession to ascendants out of a higher mercy, recognizing that the lifelong psychological purgatory of a parent who destroys their own child serves as a severe internal sentence. Rather than imposing qisas, the divine framework decrees diyat and empowers the State through ta'zir (under Section 308(2) PPC) to impose imprisonment of up to twenty-five years.

10.4 There is no sorrow on this earth that compares to the shattered heart of a mother. When a child, born from her flesh, nurtured through sleepless nights, and cradled with unconditional love, is destroyed by the very hand sworn to protect them, the moral fabric of humanity is torn asunder. No earthly compensation, no decree of Diyat, and no prison sentence can ever stitch back a mother's broken heart or fill the hollow silence left in her home. Yet, even in the depths of this unimaginable anguish, our jurisprudence must remain anchored to the immutable truth that Allah's law shall prevail. The Almighty, in His infinite wisdom, decreed that while the parent escapes the finality of the executioner's sword, they can never escape the divine gaze or the torturous ghost of their own deed. That internal torment, the agonizing realization of a parent looking upon the empty bed of the child they slaughtered, is a retribution far more enduring than any earthly judgment.

11.While qisas requires exceptionally stringent evidentiary standards, financial liabilities and compensation like diyat fall under Huqooq al-Ibad and are governed by ordinary evidentiary principles. Consequently, the rigorous formal verification of witnesses' credibility (tazkiya-tul-shahood) is not applied with the same strictness to diyat, allowing credible testimony and standard admissible evidence to establish the financial obligation.

12.It is a well-established principle of law that while mere emotional distress or domestic stress does not meet the strict legal threshold for insanity under Section 84 PPC, expert medical proof of severe postpartum psychosis or a profound puerperal psychiatric breakdown is recognized by courts as a potent mitigating factor. Ultimately, the objective facts of the incident serve as the primary litmus test for evaluating the mother's actual mental state at the time as follows;

• Evidence of Planning: If the act involved cold-blooded preparation, concealment, or deliberate staging, courts interpret this as reflecting cognitive awareness and deliberate intent, leaning toward heavier penal liability.

• Spontaneous / Delusional Break: If the act was chaotic, impulsive, or driven by clear psychiatric delusions (e.g., a psychotic belief that she was "saving" her children from an imagined catastrophe), courts view this diminished capacity as a ground for leniency in sentencing.

12.1 In typical murder trials, a clear motive, such as revenge, property disputes, or hostility, is central to the prosecution. However, in maternal filicide cases, the striking absence of a rational motive, combined with immediate surrender or suicide attempts, often signals a severe psychiatric breakdown rather than malicious criminality. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in “MUHAMMAD QASIM Versus The STATE” (PLD 2018 Supreme Court 840) held that the parameters of provocation under Section 302(c) PPC require an immediate, overwhelming external shock. Therefore, lingering domestic stress or subjective emotional vulnerability shall not be a ground for mitigation.

13.The Court noted that despite the aligned submissions of the Prosecutor General and amicus curiae Ms. Khalida Parveen, it remains bound by the Supreme Court's obiter dicta in “Zahid-ur-Rehman v. The State” (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 77), which restricts Section 306 PPC exemptions strictly to qisas rather than ta'zir. This raises a core judicial dilemma: if a mother intentionally kills her child without sudden provocation, can she still claim the protective threshold of Section 306 PPC when the stringent evidentiary standard for qisas (such as two tazkia-tul-shahood qualified witnesses) fails at trial and the case shifts to ta'zir? To resolve this, the Court must examine three pivotal concepts at the intersection of substantive criminal law and evidentiary thresholds.

(i)Qatl-i-amd not liable to qisas, (section 306 PPC) (ii) Cases in which Qisas for qatl-e-amd shall not be enforced (Section 307 PPC), and (iii) “where according to the Injunctions of Islam the punishment of qisas is not applicable (Section 302 (c) PPC) The text distinguishes between Section 306 PPC, which grants person- specific exclusions from qisas based on status or relationship (such as minority, insanity, or parent-child dynamics), and Section 307 PPC, which addresses procedural impediments to enforcement. It notes that neither section exhaustively defines the circumstances rendering qisas inapplicable under Section 302(c) PPC according to Islamic injunctions. While Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizes that factors like grave and sudden provocation or heat of passion can mitigate culpability and affect the applicability of qisas, the modern statutory inclusion of "knowledge" alongside "intention" means that impaired self-control does not eliminate liability entirely, but instead influences the appropriate form and degree of punishment.

14.The text emphasizes that a proper interpretation of the statutory scheme requires drawing sharp legal distinctions among three concepts often used interchangeably: non-liability to qisas, non-applicability of qisas, and non-enforceability of qisas. Clarifying these differences, particularly when interpreting Sections 306 and 307 of PPC, is

essential, as non-applicability deals with situations where qisas does not apply, whereas non-enforceability concerns procedural impediments where qisas is legally available but barred from being executed. The difference can be expressed through two Islamic legal concepts:

( عدم وجوب القصاصʿAdam Wujūb al-Qiṣāṣ), Qisas is not legally due.

( عدم تنفيذ القصاصʿAdam Tanfīdh al-Qiṣāṣ), Qisas is not carried into effect.

Thus, the expression “Qisas is not legally due” may be understood to signify either non-liability to Qisas or the non-applicability of Qisas, although the two concepts must not be conflated without due regard to their legal context. Applying this distinction to the statutory scheme, where the prosecution establishes through two witnesses duly qualified by Tazkia-tul-Shahood that a parent has committed qatl-i-amd of their child, Section 306(b) PPC renders the offender not liable to Qisas, and the consequential punishment falls to be determined under Section 308 PPC, including diyat and the applicable provision for imprisonment as ta’zir. Conversely, when a case falls outside the scope of qisas, thereby precluding the invocation of Section 308 PPC, the inquiry shifts to whether the ta'zir regime under Section 302(c) PPC may be invoked for a parent against whom, pursuant to the injunctions of Islam, qisas is inapplicable.

15.This interpretation finds support, as a matter of textual argument, in the legislature's choice of the broader expression “where, according to the Injunctions of Islam, the punishment of Qisas is not applicable” in Section 302(c) PPC, rather than wording confined to cases in which qatl-i-amd is “not liable to Qisas.” Had the provision been framed exclusively in terms of non-liability, its scope might arguably have been confined to the specific categories enumerated in Section 306 PPC, leaving other circumstances recognized under the former Section 300 PPC outside its reach. The broader formulation of section 302 (c) PPC may accommodate the person specific exclusions under section 306 PPC as well exceptions to erstwhile section 300 PPC within the ta’zir

regime of qatl-i-amd therefore, be understood as allowing consideration of circumstances in which Qisas is inapplicable under Islamic injunctions, notwithstanding the continued existence of criminal liability.

15.1 Nevertheless, this statutory construction must be reconciled with Supreme Court interpretation of Sections 302, 304, 306 and 308 particularly the Supreme Court's treatment of cases punishable as ta’zir where the prescribed forms of proof for Qisas are unavailable. Because the legislature left the full scope of non-applicability under Section 302(c) PPC undefined, and omitted tazkia-tul-shahood from the definition clause of Section 299 PPC despite its prominence in the 1979 Hudood laws, this legislative asymmetry warrants reconsideration. Greater statutory clarity is ultimately needed to harmonize the substantive grounds excluding qisas, evidentiary thresholds, and applicable ta'zir punishments.

15.2 This Court has already embarked upon the issue in “AYAZ ADIL versus The STATE and others” (2026 P Cr. L J 1582) while dealing with offences committed within the confines of a home; therefore, it is urged that the Government shall refer the matter to the Council of Islamic Ideology for a comprehensive thematic deliberation on the evidentiary contours of qatl-i-amd liable to Qisas and the scope, application, and underlying rationale of Section 306 PPC, with a view to reconciling the demands of Islamic injunctions with the statutory scheme and ensuring that the law speaks with clarity, coherence, and substantive justice.

16.Before entering into discussion of the case in hand, it is observed that neither the learned counsel(s) for the appellant nor the learned Prosecutor General or the learned amicus curiae has responded to the query raised by this Court in its order dated 05.10.2026, which reads as follows:

... if the presumption of guilt fails, what recourse is available to the aggrieved party to establish responsibility for the deaths of the children who were in her custody.

The response to above query has already been settled in cases reported as “AYAZ ADIL versus The STATE and others” (2026 P Cr. L J 1582) and “TARIQ IRSHAD versus SPECIAL JUDGE and others” (2022 P Cr. L J 1050) which suggest that even a civil action on the same cause of action is not barred by a criminal law and such remedy is available under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855. Section 1 of the said Act makes a person liable in damages where death is caused by his “wrongful act, neglect or default”, even though the death may have been caused under circumstances amounting in law to a crime.

Case in Hand

17.The prosecution sought Shagufta Parveen's conviction by presenting her alleged extra-judicial confession, forensic reports, and circumstantial evidence linking her to the homicide of her children and her self-inflicted injuries. These measures were reportedly taken to conceal her actions and evade criminal liability by fabricating a false narrative involving unknown perpetrators.

17.1 The incident allegedly occurred around 2:00 a.m. on November 9, 2022. While information regarding the event was reportedly leaked by the appellant’s mother to Muhammad Irshad, the complainant's cousin who passed it to complainant Muhmmad Shabbir, appellant's husband. Appellant’s mother did not testify for either the prosecution or the defence. Consequently, this communication was not proved and remained neutral, pending corroborating circumstances. However, hospital treatment records (Ex. PCC, pp. 184–185 of paper book) establish that the appellant was transported to the hospital in an injured condition by her father, Akbar Ali, and PW-3 Muhammad Irshad. As the private first responder who was alerted by the appellant's mother, PW-3 arrived at the scene and witnessed the bodies of the two children in the room where the appellant resided at her parents' home. This active involvement, alongside his established residence in Mohala Sharifpura, Hafizabad, firmly places the appellant at the scene during the occurrence.

18.Complainant Muhammad Shabbir (PW-1) established that he received a call from Muhammad Irshad (PW-3) at 3:00 a.m., reached the scene of the occurrence at 4:00 a.m., and observed the bodies of his children at the appellant's residence. At 5:00 a.m., he arrived at the Trauma Center in Hafizabad, where the appellant, in the presence of PW-3, the complainant, and others, confessed to her guilt before the complainant proceeded to register the FIR. While the defence strongly assailed this extra-judicial confession, they failed to shake the complainant's testimony on this point. PW-3 corroborated this sequence of events; although confronted with his previous statement (Ex.DB), which solely concerned receipt of the victims' bodies by the complainant and their clothing by the investigating officer, the defence neither challenged the absence of any other recorded statement nor requested the court to examine a separate statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. regarding the appellant's transportation to the hospital or the confession. Consequently, the defence's strategy ultimately miscarried. In the “THE STATE versus MINHUN alias GULL HASSAN” (PLD 1964 Supreme Court 813), Supreme Court has held as under;

“............that retracted confessions, whether judicial or extra-judicial, could legally be taken into consideration against the maker of those confessions himself, and if the confessions were found to be true and voluntary, then there was no need at all to look for further corroboration. It is now well settled that as against the maker himself his confession, judicial or extra-judicial, whether retracted or not retracted, can in law validly form the sole basis of his conviction, if the Court is satisfied and believes that it was true and voluntary and was not obtained by torture or coercion or inducement.”

In this case, the extra-judicial confession was spontaneous, truthful, and free from any duress, reflecting genuine repentance. Having realized her guilt after committing the murders, the appellant attempted to take her own life by cutting her wrist. Left with nothing further to conceal, she openly confessed her actions to complainant Muhammad Shabbir (PW-1) and Muhammad Irshad (PW-3). While extra-judicial confessions are typically made at a later stage, this confession was contemporaneous with the event, thereby attaining the status of res

gestae. Under Article 19 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, declarations, pronouncements, and actions of an accused immediately before or after an occurrence are rendered admissible in evidence as res gestae.

19.The appellant’s attempt to take her own life, driven by remorse over the brutal killing of her two children, is substantiated by her medical treatment record (Ex.PCC) and medico-legal examination report (Ex.PK) dated November 12, 2022. This evidence is further corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Nudrat Hussain (PW-4), who observed a "0.8 cm x 0.5 cm stitched wound on the left arm, 4 cm below the wrist joint." Collectively, these medical records and the doctor's expert opinion confirm that the injury was self-inflicted, thereby exposing the falsity of the appellant’s trial stance when she retracted her extra-judicial confession and claimed the injury was caused by unknown perpetrators.

20.Testifying as PW-12, Ali Aqeel from the Punjab Forensic Science Agency detailed how crime scene evidence, including buccal swabs, blood samples, and a knife, was collected and transmitted for analysis. The resulting DNA and Serology report on items No. 14.2, 15.1, & 19.7 established that the victim Abdul Hadi’s profile matched with blood on dari, while DNA mixtures of the victims and the accused, Shagufta Parveen, were found on the knife handle and the accused's shirt. These empirical findings, reinforced by uniform injury pattern below the wrists of both children, and on the body of accused, conclusively place her at the crime scene and establish her physical contact with the victims.

21.Although an extra-judicial confession is weak evidence, legal presumptions can shift the burden of proof. Under this rule, proving a primary fact establishes a presumed fact unless the opposing party rebuts it. While the accused is not required to disprove the charge entirely, an evidential burden rests upon them to provide a reasonable explanation of the circumstances. If a credible explanation is offered,

the presumption disappears, and the normal burden of proof reverts to the prosecution, as held in "AYAZ ADIL versus The STATE and others” (2026 P Cr. L J 1582). In the case at hand, the presence of the accused- appellant at the house of the occurrence during the relevant time is firmly established. She was found touching the dead bodies of her children, yet her subsequent conduct defies normal human behavior: she neither raised an alarm to ward off alleged unknown attackers nor arranged medical aid for her injured children. Furthermore, while she sustained injuries herself, they were restricted to a clean cut on her wrist mirroring the exact pattern found on the deceased. Forensic analysis of the crime scene revealed biological stains and blood containing the DNA of both the accused and her children, with no foreign DNA detected to substantiate the presence of any third parties. Her deliberate inaction, allowing the children to perish while inflicting a superficial, and delayed injury upon herself on realizing her mistake strongly points toward her criminal liability.

21.1 A clear motive stemming from an ongoing marital dispute is further supported by the record. This is evidenced by the maintenance suit instituted by her, the admissions found in witness testimonies regarding an impending reconciliation and her expected return to the complainant's home within a week, and the unfolding consequences of this fragile patch-up. Although the complainant was proceeded against ex-parte in the maintenance suit (Ex.DC), the matter was fixed for the plaintiff-appellant’s evidence on November 7, 2022, just two days prior to the occurrence, yet she willfully failed to appear in court. Moreover, her own plaint explicitly avers that she harbored deep-seated hatred toward the complainant due to his harsh demeanor, a sentiment reiterated in her statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C., where she cited severe financial and social distress resulting from his uncalled-for behavior.

21.2 Collectively, these established primary facts give rise to the irresistible presumption that while residing alone with her children in the room of occurrence, the accused maintained full and exclusive

control of the situation. Driven by a strong motive or a severe psychological breakdown, she inflicted identical injuries upon both herself and her children. This, combined with the presence of her DNA on the handle of the knife and other recovered articles, squarely points toward her active and complete involvement in the charged crimes. Consequently, the evidential burden shifted to her under Article 122 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, which she failed to discharge through any sound or credible explanation, leaving her legally accountable for the consequences of her actions.

22.For the foregoing reasons, the prosecution has successfully established the charge against the accused-appellant beyond a reasonable doubt, meeting the requisite standard of proof. The appellant, a 23-year-old mother, was being pressured into a reconciliation with her husband, whom she had grown to despise. Driven by extreme distress and a desire for vengeance, she tragically took the lives of her two young children. Such an act is unforgivable under the law and constitutes qatl-i-amd (intentional murder) in every respect. It has been conclusively proven that the murders of Abdul Hadi and Abdul Raheem were committed solely by the appellant. While her actions stemmed from profound annoyance toward her husband, severe depression, and a mental breakdown, these circumstances do not amount to legal insanity and cannot justify an acquittal under Section 84 of PPC regarding general exceptions. Nevertheless, such extreme emotional turmoil is recognized as a mitigating factor warranting a more lenient sentence.

22.1 It is established that the prosecution did not prove the murders to be liable to qisas. Consequently, the appellant cannot be sentenced under Section 308 PPC to diyat or imprisonment extending to twenty- five years. Furthermore, as the mother of the deceased victims, she is exempt from qisas pursuant to Section 306(b) PPC. This statutory non- liability aligns with the non-applicability of qisas under Section 302(c) PPC, as detailed in paragraphs 13, 14, and 15. Accordingly, where a mother responsible for filicide is to be convicted under the ta'zir

regime, the appropriate legal provision is Section 302(c) PPC. This section mandates that where the punishment of qisas is not applicable under the Injunctions of Islam, the offender shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term extending up to twenty- five years

23.Accordingly, this is not a case where punishment should be awarded under Section 302(b) PPC. Thus, her conviction is altered from Section 302(b) PPC to one under Section 302(c) PPC. As regards the quantum of sentence, it is observed that in cases involving maternal filicide, the absence of a rational motive, coupled with circumstances such as immediate surrender or attempted suicide, may indicate a severe psychiatric breakdown rather than malicious criminality and may constitute a mitigating factor in determining the appropriate sentence. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the present case, particularly the mitigating circumstances, the appellant is sentenced to ten (10) years’ rigorous imprisonment on two counts under Section 302(c) PPC. However, the compensation awarded by the learned trial Court, as well as the conviction and sentence under Section 325 PPC, along with the consequence of default, shall remain intact. All the substantive sentences shall run concurrently, and the appellant shall also retain the benefit of Section 382B Cr.P.C.

24.Consequently, the instant criminal appeal is partly allowed with the above modification in conviction and sentence. The record of the learned trial Court be sent back immediately and the case property, if any, shall be dealt with as directed by the learned trial Court.

(MUHAMMAD AMJAD RAFIQ)

JUDGE

Approved for Reporting

Judge Signed on 28.10.2026.

M. Umar