Peshawar High Court

Munir Khan Vs The State through Secretary, Home Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar & others

Outcome The writ petitions were allowed in part for the minor-conviction and probation matters, the narcotics petition was dismissed, and directions were issued for future Police Clearance Certificate practice.

Case
W.P No. 8823-P of 2025
Type
Constitutional
Length
9 pages

Summary

AI-generated · quotes checked against the text

The petitions challenged how Police Clearance Certificates reflected minor convictions, FIR entries, and other criminal-record material for ordinary civil purposes. The Peshawar High Court held that routine disclosure of concluded minor convictions was unconstitutional, granted relief in those matters and in one probation case, but dismissed the petition involving a narcotics conviction.

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Written by AI from the judgment's text and may miss nuance. Rely on the full judgment below and the court's official copy. Court's own note: Writ Petition Held: Constitution of Pakistan, Articles 4, 9, 10A, 14 & 18 — Police Clearance Certificate — Distinction between Internal Retention and Outward Disclosure — Minor Convictions & Dignity— The State cannot use a routine administrative document (Police Clearance Certificate) to impose a “civil death” or permanent disability on a citizen for a minor, concluded error. Article 14 (Dignity) is not merely about physical custody; it includes the right to reputation and social reintegration. When the State discloses a minor, spent conviction (e.g., a small fine for a regulatory offence) to an employer or foreign visa officer, it is effectively labeling the citizen as a criminal in perpetuity. This “labeling” is a disproportionate state action that violates Article 9 (Right to Life/Livelihood). While the police may keep records for internal surveillance, they cannot outwardly certify a citizen as having a “criminal record” for ordinary civil purposes (jobs, travel) if the offence was minor and the sentence has been served. Section 243 Cr.P.C. — Article 10A (Fair Trial) — Validity of Guilty Pleas in Petty Cases — A Guilty Plea in a summary trial must be informed and voluntary, especially when it carries long-term civil consequences like a stained police record. Magistrates often record guilty pleas mechanically in petty cases where the accused pays a small fine (e.g., Rs. 500) to end the matter quickly. The Court held that this practice is dangerous if the accused does not realize this \"small fine\" will permanently appear on their Police Character Certificate. Under Section 243 Cr.P.C. and Article 10A, the Magistrate acts as a guardian of fairness. They must ensure the accused understands that the plea might result in a lasting record, not just a momentary fine. Differentiation of Record — FIR vs. Conviction —Adverse Material Defined— For the purposes of issuing Police Clearance Certificates, criminal records must be conceptually divided. An “FIR-only” entry (mere accusation without challan/cognizance) cannot be disclosed as adverse material. Similarly, favourable outcomes (acquittal, discharge, quashment) cannot be treated as adverse. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Probation and Parole Act, 2021 — Section 13 — Effect of Probation— Where a convict has successfully completed their probation period, Section 13 of the Act protects them from disqualifications attaching to a conviction. Executive authorities (Police) are bound by this statutory policy and cannot disclose the conviction as adverse material in a PCC after probation is successfully served. Judicial Review of Executive Action — (i) the competent law making forum consider enacting a rehabilitation or spent convictions framework to regulate retention, disclosure, clean periods, and safeguards, particularly for first time and minor offenders, so that constitutional rights under Articles 9 and 14 do not remain dependent on case by case constitutional litigation. (ii) further recommended that offences be categorised, for certification purposes, into petty or regulatory matters and serious matters, with clear criteria. Minor fines for petty regulatory infractions should not operate as a permanent adverse label in routine certification. Disclosure should be aligned with purpose, and the least restrictive measure should be preferred. (iii) Until such legislation is enacted, the Inspector General of Police, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa shall, within three months, frame standing orders or administrative instructions within his lawful administrative competence, to implement a two tier certification model with purpose limitation, namely: (a) A standard Police Clearance Certificate for ordinary civil purposes which excludes FIR only entries, excludes favourable outcomes such as acquittal, discharge, quashment or lawful compounding from being treated as adverse material, and excludes minor petty fines after a defined clean period, subject to absence of subsequent relevant offending. (b) An enhanced vetting certificate for sensitive positions only, issuable only where authorised by law or competent standing order, with limited disclosure confined to relevant pending proceedings where challan is submitted and cognizance is taken, and with disclosure being time bound and reviewable through a reasoned decision process. (Writ Petition is allowed)

Full judgment

Official copy

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT,

PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

1.W.P No. 8823-P/2025 (Munir Khan v. The State through Secretary, Home Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar & Others)

2.W.P No. 8950-P/2025 (Takasar Hussain v. The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Civil Secretariat & Others)

3.W.P No. 9020-P/2025 (Suhrab Ali v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Home & Tribal Affairs, Peshawar & Others)

4.W.P No. 8528-P/2025 (Habil Hassan v. District Police Officer, Kohat & Others)

5.W.P No. 8489-P/2025 (Syed Shah Rukh v. The State through Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar & Others)

6.W.P No. 8277-P/2025 (Hamid Khan v. District Police Officer, Kohat & Others)

7.W.P No. 5745-P/2025 (Muhammad Shafi v. The State through Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar & Others)

Date of hearing: 09.12.2025.

For petitioner(s): Mr. Shakeel Khan Kundi, Advocate. For respondent(s): Mr. Azhar Rahim, AAG.

JUDGMENT

Dr. Khurshid Iqbal, J.-

1.The questions for determination in these petitions are twofold. First, whether the continuing association of a person with a criminal record of conviction, arising from a guilty plea for a minor offence which stands concluded by payment of fine and or service of a short sentence, Page 1 of 9

and its continued reflection in a Police Clearance Certificate for ordinary civil purposes, violates the constitutional guarantees of dignity and privacy under Article 14, the right to life in its broader meaning under Article 9, and the entitlement to be dealt with strictly in accordance with law under Article 4 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, also impacting Article 18 where access to lawful opportunity is impeded, and engaging Article 10A where fairness of the guilty plea process becomes material. Second, whether, and to what extent, police certification may lawfully treat and disclose other categories of criminal justice record, including FIR-only entries, pending proceedings, and favourable outcomes such as acquittal, discharge, quashment or lawful compounding, as adverse material in a routine Police Clearance Certificate for employment, education and travel, and what constitutional limitations and safeguards must govern such disclosure.

2.The second question is framed because, in practical operation, a Police Clearance Certificate is not confined to the fact of a concluded conviction alone. It is a State-issued communication which typically draws upon an integrated police record system. If constitutional discipline is to be meaningfully applied, the Court cannot correct one category of disproportionate disclosure while leaving the architecture of disclosure otherwise unregulated. The petitions thus illustrate, in a concrete and recurring form, the need to distinguish retention from disclosure, and within disclosure, to distinguish adjudicated guilt from mere accusation, and concluded adverse findings from favourable outcomes.

3.Facts germane to these petitions, stated briefly, are these. In W.P. No. 8277/2025, petitioner Hamid Khan, on a guilty plea, was convicted and sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 500 under section 19 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013. In W.P. No. 9020/2025, petitioner Suhrab Ali, on a guilty plea, was convicted and sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 500 under section 13 of the Arms Ordinance, 1965, and his criminal revision was dismissed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge V, Mardan. In W.P. No. 5745/2025, petitioner Muhammad Shafi was convicted under section 9(c) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 2019 and sentenced to imprisonment for 02 months and 02 days along with fine of Rs. 1,00,000, in default whereof to undergo further simple imprisonment for 09 days, and he was released as the substantive sentence stood undergone. In W.P. No. 8823/2025, petitioner Munir Khan was convicted on a guilty plea and Page 2 of 9

sentenced to fine of Rs. 500 under section 3 read with section 4 of the West Pakistan Regulation and Control of Loudspeaker and Sound Amplifiers Ordinance, 1965. In W.P. Nos. 8528/2025 and 8489/2025, each petitioner was convicted on a guilty plea under section 15 of the Arms Act and fined Rs. 500, which fine stands paid. Lastly, in W.P. No. 8950/2025, petitioner Takasar Hussain was convicted under section 15 of the Arms Act and sentenced to three years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2000, whereafter the sentence was converted into probation for three years under supervision of the Probation Officer, which probation period he has successfully completed.

4.The petitions arise because, upon application for Police Clearance Certificates, the petitioners are confronted with refusal or adverse endorsement on the basis of the above convictions. The petitioners contend that the conviction in each minor matter is long concluded and that continued reflection of such concluded minor conviction, for ordinary civil purposes, operates as a persistent civil disability affecting employment, education, travel, and social participation.

5.The maintenance of police record has its administrative basis in the Police Rules, 1934, and the record management systems maintained by the police. The crucial constitutional distinction, however, is between retention of record for internal policing purposes and disclosure of record through an outward certificate. Retention may be justified for law enforcement functions. Disclosure through a Police Clearance Certificate is a separate State action which has direct legal consequences for the citizen and therefore must satisfy the discipline of legality, purpose limitation, and proportionality.

6.The Police Rules, 1934 are, in their primary character, an administrative code framed under statutory authority for regulating the internal economy, organisation and functioning of the police. Their scheme emphasises operational utility for prevention and detection of crime, and structured administration of the force. They are not, on their face, a charter for permanent public labelling of citizens through routine outward disclosure in perpetuity. Where the State chooses to communicate internal record outwardly, it must demonstrate a lawful basis, a defined purpose, and safeguards against arbitrary or excessive interference.

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7.Article 4 requires that every citizen be dealt with in accordance with law and be protected from arbitrary action.1 Article 9, in its developed constitutional meaning, protects not only the breath of life but the conditions of a meaningful and secure life,2 including access to lawful opportunity and social participation. Article 14 guarantees dignity of man, and its spirit cannot be confined to physical indignity alone. Dignity includes respect for personhood, reputation, privacy, and the freedom from needless State imposed humiliation. 3 Article 18 protects the right to enter upon lawful profession and business, and State action that blocks that pathway must show lawful warrant and rational, proportionate connection to a legitimate end. 4 Article 10A reinforces that fairness is substantive, and where the guilty plea mechanism becomes the gateway to long lasting civil disability, the demands of constitutional fairness become more exacting, not less.5

8.Dignity, in our constitutional order, is not an ornamental aspiration. It is an organising value that shapes how State power may be exercised, particularly where the State speaks about the individual through official instruments. A Police Clearance Certificate is not a private record. It is an official statement which mediates a citizen’s relationship with society, employers, and foreign authorities. When such a certificate carries adverse content, it does not merely inform, it labels. The Constitution does not permit the State to reduce the citizen to an object of permanent suspicion for matters that the criminal law itself has treated as petty and concluded. Article 14 demands that the State treat every person as a bearer of equal worth, capable of rehabilitation and social reintegration. Where the State insists on converting a concluded minor lapse into an enduring badge, it risks creating a form of civil exclusion that is neither authorised by law nor consistent with constitutional morality.

9.The Islamic character of the Republic strengthens, rather than dilutes, this constitutional insistence on dignity and honour. The Holy Qur’an affirms the honour of the children of Adam and grounds human worth in moral responsibility rather than inherited stigma. 6 The Article 4:“no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law”.

Article 9: “no person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law.”

Article 14 declares the “inviolability of the dignity of man”.

Article 18 provides for “freedom of trade, business or profession.” And it states that “Subject to such qualifications, if any, as may be prescribed by law, every citizen shall have the right to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation, and to conduct any lawful trade or business” Article 10-A guarantees “fair trial and due process”.

Qur’an (17:70).

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Prophetic teachings treat honour as inviolable alongside life and property, and condemn the needless harming of reputation.7 These sources converge with the constitutional logic that the State must not transform concluded petty wrongdoing into a lifelong badge, unless law clearly commands it and necessity demonstrably requires it. Dignity, honour, and privacy are not private preferences. They are constitutional goods.

10.Pakistan lacks a general spent convictions statute. Yet the legal order does recognise rehabilitation in specific contexts. Of particular relevance is the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Probation and Parole Act, 2021 which, by Section 13, protects a probationer from disqualification or disability that would otherwise attach to conviction, upon completion of probation. These statutory signals matter. They show that the law does not endorse stigma as an end in itself. Where rehabilitation is legislatively recognised, executive practice must conform.

11.Comparative materials from other jurisdictions may be consulted for guidance, not as binding authority, but as demonstration that modern legal systems frequently distinguish between serious criminality and petty concluded matters for purposes of disclosure. 8 The constitutional relevance is this: where the State inflicts continuing civil consequences through disclosure, the question is not whether the State can retain data internally, but whether outward use is justified, limited, and accompanied by safeguards.

12.These petitions arise from convictions recorded, in several cases, on guilty plea. The petitions illustrate the risk that where a plea is recorded perfunctorily, the constitutional difficulty becomes acute, since the citizen may exchange a small immediate fine for a lasting record consequence which was neither appreciated nor explained. Under Section 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate is obliged to record the admission as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused and may convict only if the accused fails to show sufficient cause against conviction. This language places the Magistrate in the position of a guardian of fairness, not a mere recorder of disposal. Article 10A reinforces that the accused must understand the nature of Sahih al-Bukhari 1739; Sahih Muslim 1679; Riyad as-Salihin 1527 (Book 17, Hadith 17).

See e.g. United States The Federal First Offenders Act (18 U.S.C. § 3607); Section 3 of the Canada Criminal Records Act, 1985; Section 1 of the UK Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974; Section 2 of the Hong Kong’s Rehabilitation of Offenders Ordinance, 1986; Section 7 of the New Zealand’s Criminal Records (Clean Slate) Act 2004; & Section 12 of the Australia’s Spent Convictions Act 2000.

Page 5 of 9

accusation and the consequence of the plea. Where the consequence extends beyond the court room into long lasting exclusion through certification, fairness requires the court to be vigilant that the plea is informed and voluntary, and that the discretion to convict is exercised judiciously rather than mechanically.

13.The State may legitimately pursue public safety, verification of identity, and risk assessment. But constitution demands that such aims be pursued through measures that are lawful, necessary, and proportionate. A routine Police Clearance Certificate is issued for ordinary civil life, not for specialised security vetting. In that setting, the indiscriminate disclosure of concluded minor convictions, without differentiation and without a clear statutory calibration, is not shown to be a necessary means. It operates as a blanket disability. Blanket disability, in the given circumstances, is the opposite of constitutional proportionality.

14.In the context of minor concluded convictions, the continued reflection of such convictions on a routine Police Clearance Certificate for employment, education and travel, without demonstrated necessity and without calibrated safeguards, constitutes a disproportionate interference with dignity and privacy under Article 14, undermines the conditions of a meaningful life protected by Article 9, impedes lawful opportunity under Article 18, and is not shown to be action in accordance with law as required by Article 4. Internal retention for policing may continue. What is constitutionally restrained is outward disclosure in a routine certificate where the impact is punitive in effect and the legal basis and necessity are not established.

15.Police certification, for constitutional purposes, must recognise a principled categorisation of record, and must align disclosure with the purpose and gravity of the matter. For purposes of certification, the record must be conceptually divided into four compartments:

(a)convictions that are final and not set aside,

(b)pending proceedings where challan is submitted and cognizance is taken and proceedings are live,

(c)FIR-only entries where mere registration exists without meaningful progression,

(d)favourable outcomes such as acquittal, discharge, quashment or lawful compounding.

16.A routine Police Clearance Certificate for ordinary civil purposes must not treat an FIR-only-entry as adverse character material.

Page 6 of 9

Registration is accusation, not adjudication. To convert it into stigma through certification is to impose a civil disability without lawful adjudication, contrary to Articles 4, 9 and 14. Likewise, favourable outcomes cannot rationally be published as adverse material, because the legal system itself has resolved them in the citizens favour. The State may retain such information internally for policing, but outward use must be purpose limited and constitutionally restrained.

17.This distinction assumes special importance in public law settings such as elections. Constitutional disqualifications are conviction based and threshold based, not accusation based. A police certificate cannot be permitted to manufacture, through administrative disclosure, a disability which the Constitution itself does not attach to mere registration of a criminal case. Routine certification must not be permitted to become an indirect engine of disqualification or civic exclusion.

18.The petitioners in W.P. No. 8277/2025, W.P. No. 9020/2025, W.P. No. 8823/2025, W.P. No. 8528/2025 and W.P. No. 8489/2025 were subjected to nominal fines of Rs. 500 for minor statutory infractions of a regulatory character. The penalty imposed by law stands satisfied. To continue reflecting such concluded minor convictions on a routine Police Clearance Certificate, for ordinary civil purposes, operates as a continuing civil impediment which disproportionately interferes with dignity and privacy under Article 14, the conditions of meaningful life under Article 9, and access to lawful opportunities under Article 18, and is not shown to be action in accordance with law as required by Article 4.

19.Accordingly, these petitions are allowed to the extent that the respondent authorities shall, for the limited purposes of issuance of Police Clearance Certificates for ordinary civil use such as employment, education and travel, not disclose and not rely upon the above minor convictions as adverse material against the said petitioners. This direction does not require destruction of internal police record. The record may be retained for internal policing functions. The restraint is on outward disclosure for routine purposes in the absence of a lawful and proportionate justification.

20.In W.P. No. 8950/2025, petitioner Takasar Hussain has successfully completed probation. Section 13 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Probation and Parole Act, 2021 embodies a legislative policy that, upon completion of probation, the probationer is protected from disqualification or disability that would otherwise attach to Page 7 of 9

conviction. Executive practice must give effect to this statutory policy. Therefore, for ordinary Police Clearance Certificate purposes, the respondents shall not disclose and shall not rely upon the said conviction as adverse material against this petitioner. This is a direction of non-disclosure and non-reliance for the stated civil purpose, consistent with statute.

21.The case of W.P. No. 5745/2025 stands on a different footing. The conviction is under a narcotics statute and carries, by legislative design, a greater societal gravity and public interest dimension. In such category, the State can demonstrate a stronger legitimate aim in disclosure for certain purposes. On the present material and in the constitutional balance, the petitioner does not fall within the class of petty regulatory infractions for which routine disclosure becomes disproportionate. This petition is accordingly dismissed.

22.The Court reiterates that this judgment is confined, in operative relief, to concluded minor convictions and a probation matter, and the relief is calibrated accordingly. It is not a general declaration of expungement. It is a constitutional restraint on outward disclosure for routine civil purposes, where such disclosure is not shown to have lawful basis and proportionate necessity.

23.In view of the recurring nature of such litigation and to align executive practice with constitutional discipline, the Court issues the following recommendations and directions:

I. It is recommended that the competent law making forum consider enacting a rehabilitation or spent convictions framework to regulate retention, disclosure, clean periods, and safeguards, particularly for first time and minor offenders, so that constitutional rights under Articles 9 and 14 do not remain dependent on case by case constitutional litigation.

II. It is further recommended that offences be categorised, for certification purposes, into petty or regulatory matters and serious matters, with clear criteria. Minor fines for petty regulatory infractions should not operate as a permanent adverse label in routine certification. Disclosure should be aligned with purpose, and the least restrictive measure should be preferred.

III. It is directed that until such legislation is enacted, the Inspector General of Police, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa shall, within three months, frame standing orders or administrative Page 8 of 9

instructions within his lawful administrative competence, to implement a two-tier certification model with purpose limitation, namely:

(a)A standard Police Clearance Certificate for ordinary civil purposes which excludes FIR only entries, excludes favourable outcomes such as acquittal, discharge, quashment or lawful compounding from being treated as adverse material, and excludes minor petty fines after a defined clean period, subject to absence of subsequent relevant offending.

(b)An enhanced vetting certificate for sensitive positions only, issuable only where authorised by law or competent standing order, with limited disclosure confined to relevant pending proceedings where challan is submitted and cognizance is taken, and with disclosure being time bound and reviewable through a reasoned decision process.

24.Copies of this judgment shall be circulated to all District and Sessions Judges for the guidance of Magistrates, emphasising strict adherence to Section 243 Cr.P.C., constitutional fairness under Article 10A in guilty plea matters, and the active consideration of probationary relief where statute permits, so that minor infractions are corrected without producing constitutionally disproportionate long-lasting consequences.

Announced.

*Shahid Ali *JSS*/

Sd x x x x x

JUDGE

Sd x x x x x

JUDGE

D.B: Justice Sahibzada Asad Ullah & Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal

Page 9 of 9

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