Muhammad Raqeeb Vs District Police officer, Haripure and other

Judgment Sheet

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, ABBOTTABAD

BENCH

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Writ Petition No. 1287-A/2025

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing...................24.03.2026.................................

Petitioner (Muhammad Raqeeb) By Ms. Fatima Bibi, Advocate.

Respondents (District Police Officer, Haripur and others) By Mr. Wajahat Hussain Shah, Assistant Advocate General.

AURANGZEB, J.- Through this constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner seeks the following relief: - “It is, therefore, humbly prayed that on acceptance of this writ petition, the impugned judgments and orders of learned courts below dated 27.06.2019 and 08.07.2025 may graciously be set-aside and petitioner be acquitted in case FIR No.450 dated 06.06.2019 U/S 21-AA PS Saddar and respondents be directed to issue Police Clearance Certificate by removing the said words/remarks “convicted”. Any other relief which this honorable court deems proper in the circumstances of the case.”

2.The relevant facts, in brief, are that FIR No.450 dated 16.06.2019 under section 21 of the

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013 was registered against the petitioner at Police Station Saddar, District Haripur. Upon his production before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Haripur, he pleaded guilty to the charge, whereupon, vide order dated 27.06.2019, he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the Court coupled with a fine of Rs.500/-. The matter appears to have rested there; however, the controversy re-surfaced when the petitioner subsequently applied for a Police Clearance Certificate through the Dastak App and came to know that the said conviction was being reflected in his character record. Feeling aggrieved, he first approached the learned Revisional Court, but his revision petition was dismissed through judgment dated 08.07.2025, which constrained him to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was charged under Section 21 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013, and was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate, where he pleaded guilty. The learned Judicial Magistrate, vide order dated 27.06.2019, convicted the petitioner and sentenced him to imprisonment till the rising of the Court along with a fine of Rs. 500/-.

Thereafter, the petitioner applied for the issuance

of a Police Clearance Certificate; however, the police authorities refused to delete the remarks “convicted” and declined to issue the certificate without reflecting the said conviction. The learned counsel further contended that the impugned refusal is contrary to the settled law on the subject and infringes the fundamental rights of the petitioner, and thus prayed for acceptance of the petition.

4.Conversely, the learned Assistant Advocate General (AAG), after due consultation with the competent police authorities, placed reliance upon Rule 24.2-A of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Rules (as amended in 2016), Notification dated 08.04.2025, letter dated 30.04.2025, Notification No. 3491/A-3, and the Standard Operating Procedure for Police Sahulat Markaz Abbottabad dated 27.08.2025. It was contended that, in view of the amended legal framework, the relevant record is now required to be maintained in digital form on a centralized server. On this premise, it was argued that the criminal record, including details of involvement of an accused in any FIR, cannot be expunged or removed, even in cases where the accused has been acquitted or discharged by a competent Court, or where the matter pertains to a petty offence, or where the conviction is based on a plea of guilty. Learned

AAG, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the petition.

5.Arguments heard and record perused.

6.From the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the following questions emerge for determination of this Court:-

1.Whether, in the context of criminal law, a plea of guilty or plea bargain carries any effect on the retention and disclosure of a person’s criminal record, particularly where the offence is minor, results in a nominal penalty, or does not involve moral turpitude; and if so, to what extent such pleas should influence the information reflected in official records.

2.What is the proper scope and nature of disclosure in a Police Clearance Certificate issued for civil or official purposes, and whether such certificates should reflect only concluded convictions of serious offences, or also include minor offences, acquittals, and cases based on a plea of guilt, especially in light of the digitized centralized record-keeping under the amended Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Rules.

7.To answer the first question, it is necessary to elaborate upon the concept of pleading guilty, as recognized both internationally and within our own legal framework. The act of an accused to plead guilty in criminal law is a procedural course whereby he accepts the commission of an offence before a court of law, thereby obviating the necessity of a full-fledged trial. In its practical operation, the act of pleading guilty may, in

appropriate cases, be accompanied by certain understandings or expectations regarding the nature of the charge, the extent of punishment, or the manner of presentation of facts, though such matters remain subject to judicial scrutiny.

8.The underlying rationale of permitting an accused to plead guilty lies in the expeditious disposal of cases, reduction of judicial backlog, and facilitation of efficient administration of justice. It is premised on the understanding that where the accused does not contest the accusation, the insistence upon a full trial may not serve any meaningful purpose, provided that the process remains fair, transparent, and voluntary.

9.To plead guilty, in its strict legal sense, constitutes an unequivocal admission of guilt by the accused before a court of law. Such admission, when made voluntarily, consciously, and with full understanding of its consequences, dispenses with the requirement of recording evidence and may form the basis of conviction.

However, the Courts are under a solemn duty to ensure that the act of pleading guilty is not the result of coercion, inducement, or

misapprehension, and that the accused is fully aware of the legal implications thereof.

10.The law recognizes that the act of pleading guilty is not a monolithic concept but admits of

certain classifications. An unqualified plea of guilty is one where the accused admits all ingredients of the offence without reservation. A qualified plea of guilty may involve admission of the act coupled with explanation or mitigation, which may bear upon the extent of culpability.

There may also arise situations of implied or constructive admission, though such forms are to be treated with caution, as criminal liability cannot ordinarily be fastened on anything short of a clear and unambiguous acknowledgment of guilt.

11.In addition to the foregoing, modern criminal jurisprudence demonstrates that the act of pleading guilty may operate through distinct mechanisms which relate to the resolution of charges, sentencing, or facts. In a plea of guilt on charge, the accused may admit to a lesser or alternative offence than that originally framed, thereby limiting exposure to more serious penalties. In a plea of guilt on sentence, the accused may agree to admit the offence in exchange for an understanding that the Court may impose a reduced or mitigated punishment.

In a plea of guilt on facts, the accused may admit certain factual elements while leaving other factual or legal questions for judicial determination. These forms of admission facilitate expeditious resolution of cases while

safeguarding the rights of the accused and maintaining the integrity of the judicial process.

12.It is a settled principle that before acting upon a plea of guilty, the Court must satisfy itself that the accused understands the nature of the accusation, the consequences of such admission, and the rights being relinquished, including the right to trial and to confront evidence. Any ambiguity or hesitation must dissuade the Court from acting upon such admission, necessitating a regular trial. The Court must also ensure that any implicit or explicit expectation of leniency, whether as part of admission on charge, sentence, or facts, does not undermine the administration of justice.

13.Closely allied to, yet doctrinally distinct from, the act of pleading guilty is the concept of nolo contendere, meaning thereby “I do not wish to contend.” Historically, this doctrine traces its roots to early common law practice, where it was occasionally permitted as a matter of grace, enabling the accused to accept punishment without making a formal confession. Over time, it evolved into a recognized procedural device, particularly within American jurisprudence.

14.The essential characteristic of nolo contendere is that the accused neither admits nor disputes the charge. For the purposes of the

criminal proceedings, it results in conviction;

however, it does not operate as an express admission of guilt and, therefore, does not ordinarily carry evidentiary value in collateral or subsequent proceedings. This distinction assumes importance in cases where civil liability or reputational consequences may arise from the same set of facts.

15.In the United States, the system recognizes the act of pleading guilty, not guilty, and nolo contendere, each carrying distinct legal consequences. The practical operation of criminal justice demonstrates that a plea of guilty may be accompanied by admissions on charge, sentence, or facts, though always subject to judicial approval. The Courts are constitutionally bound to ensure that such admission is entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, with full awareness of the rights being waived.

16.In the United Kingdom, the criminal justice system recognizes only two formal positions, namely, to plead guilty or not guilty. An act of pleading guilty leads to conviction without trial, provided it is clear and unequivocal. Although the doctrine of nolo contendere does not exist as a distinct plea in modern English jurisprudence, the Courts do take into account the act of pleading guilty at an early stage as a mitigating factor in

sentencing. While formal arrangements on charge, sentence, or facts are limited, early admissions are recognized as influencing sentence considerations.

17.In India, the law recognizes the act of pleading guilty both under general criminal procedure and within a structured statutory framework. The provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, particularly under Chapter XXI-A, enable resolution of cases where the accused opts to plead guilty in specified categories of offences. The Court is required to ensure that such act is voluntary, fair, and free from coercion, and that the accused fully understands its consequences. Practical application often reflects admission on charge, sentence, or facts.

18.In so far as our jurisprudence is concerned, the legal position is governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, read with special statutes and constitutional mandates. Section 242 provides that where the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate may record such plea and convict him thereon, while Section 243 delineates the stage of defence in the absence of such admission. Similarly, Section 265-E empowers the Court to record conviction on the basis of an accused pleading guilty, subject to satisfaction as

to voluntariness and clarity. These provisions collectively demonstrate that conviction on the basis of pleading guilty is an exception to the normal rule of trial and must be exercised with judicial caution. Courts, while considering admission on charge, sentence, or facts, must ensure fairness, voluntariness, and legal propriety.

19.The concept of an accused opting to plead guilty finds further manifestation in Section 25 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, which provides for a form of negotiated resolution through voluntary return. While such arrangement facilitates expeditious disposal of accountability matters and recovery of alleged gains, it carries significant legal and civil consequences, including disqualification. The Court must ensure that such course is adopted voluntarily and in accordance with law.

20.The entire framework governing the act of pleading guilty must be examined in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Article 4 mandates that every individual shall be dealt with in accordance with law. Article 9 guarantees security of person, which includes the right to fair and dignified legal process. Article 10-A enshrines the right to fair trial and due process, thereby imposing a

constitutional obligation upon Courts to ensure that any conviction based on pleading guilty meets the standards of fairness and transparency. Article 37 further obligates the State to promote social justice, reinforcing that criminal justice mechanisms must operate in a fair, equitable, and non-oppressive manner.

21.In matters of homicide and bodily injury, Islamic criminal law, as incorporated in the Pakistan Penal Code, recognizes the doctrines of qiṣāṣ, diyat, and daman. Qiṣāṣ, as envisaged under Section 304 PPC, embodies the principle of retributive justice, allowing the victim or legal heirs to seek punishment equivalent to the harm caused, subject to strict proof. Diyat represents monetary compensation payable to the heirs, either as a substitute for qiṣāṣ or upon waiver thereof, reflecting the principles of reconciliation and mercy.

22.A comparative analysis thus reveals a convergence of principles across jurisdictions.

Whether under statutory law, constitutional mandate, or Islamic jurisprudence, the act of pleading guilty is valid only when it is voluntary, informed, and subject to judicial scrutiny. The classification of admission on charge, sentence, or facts further demonstrates the evolving nature

of criminal procedure, aimed at balancing efficiency with fairness.

23.In conclusion, it emerges that while the act of pleading guilty serves as a tool for expeditious disposal of cases, its acceptance must be approached with utmost caution. The Courts are under a constitutional, statutory, and moral obligation to ensure that such admission is not the result of coercion, inducement, or ignorance, and that it conforms to the requirements of fair trial and due process. Any mechanical or uncritical acceptance of an accused pleading guilty would undermine the administration of justice and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

24.While our criminal procedure does not formally recognize nolo contendere, a voluntary plea of guilt in minor offences functions similarly.

The accused does not contest the charge, the Court imposes proportionate punishment, and the matter is resolved expeditiously, promoting efficiency and judicial economy. Such minor convictions should not be treated as permanent disqualifications or indicators of moral turpitude, as doing so would undermine the reformative and pragmatic objectives of summary procedure.

25.The essence of a voluntary plea lies in ensuring that legal and social consequences are

proportionate, fair, and consistent with constitutional principles, protecting the rehabilitative and social interests of the accused.

In conclusion, voluntary pleas in petty offences serve as a practical mechanism to expedite justice while maintaining fairness and proportionality, without imposing undue or lasting collateral consequences.

Reference may be made to the case of “Ali Muhammad Vs. The State” reported as PLD 2009 Lahore 312, wherein it was held that:- “A simple and convenient solution to this problem is offered by the North American experience of introduction of the plea of nolo contendere (pronounced as noh-loh kuhn-ten- duh-ree) which, literally speaking, means that the accused person does not contest the charge but he also does not accept any responsibility for the outcome. That plea authorizes a court to sentence an accused person as if he is guilty even though the accused person does not admit the guilt. Nolo contendere is a legal term that comes from the Latin for "I do not wish to contend." It is also referred to as a plea of "No Contest." Derived from English Common Law, several Common Law jurisdictions, including the United States, also adopted the nolo contendere concept. In criminal trials, and also in some other common law matters, it is a plea whereby the accused person or the defendant neither admits nor disputes a charge, serving as an alternative to pleading guilty or not guilty. A no contest plea, while not technically a guilty plea, has the same immediate effect as a guilty plea, and is often offered as a part of a plea-bargain. In an essay on the origin of the nolo contendere plea

Anthony J. Fejfar argues that the nolo contendere plea has biblical origins. Fejfar maintains that it entered English Common Law "based upon English Eccliastical Law which is modeled after the encounter of Jesus with Pilate during Holy Week". In the encounter Jesus neither agreed nor denied guilt to the charge of calling himself the messiah, effectively pleading "no contest".

31.Introduction of the plea of nolo contendere in our criminal jurisprudence does not appear to be offensive to the relevant statutory provisions existing in our country. Dealing with trials before a Magistrate section 242, Cr.P.C. provides as follows:-- "When the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, a formal charge shall be framed relating to the offence of which he is accused and he shall be asked whether he admits that he has committed the offence with which he is charged." (underlining has been supplied for emphasis) Section 243, Cr.P.C. goes on to provide that???

"If the accused admits that he has committed the offence with which he is charged his admission shall be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by him; and if he shows no sufficient cause why he should not be convicted, the Magistrate may convict him accordingly." (Underlining has been supplied for emphasis) Similarly, dealing with trials before a High Court or a Court of Session section 265-E, Cr.P.C. provides as under:

"(1) The charge shall be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he is guilty or has any defence to make.

(2)If the accused pleads guilty the Court shall record the plea, and may in its discretion convict him thereon." (Underlining has been supplied for emphasis) While taking the plea of nolo contendere an accused person

neither admits that he has committed the offence with which he is charged nor he pleads guilty and, thus, taking of such a plea may not amount to confession for the purposes of Qisas in terms of section 304, P.P.C. read with Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and may also not attract the consequences contemplated by section 243, Cr.P.C. or sub-section (2) of section 265-E, Cr.P.C. It can, therefore, be concluded with some degree of confidence that the plea of nolo contendere may not be incompatible with the pre-existing statutory law in our country. We are, thus, persuaded to hold that offering no contest for the purpose of m avoiding a full trial may be recognized as different from admission of guilt and in all cases of hurt if the only punishment to be awarded to an accused person upon his conviction would be payment of the requisite amount of Arsh or Daman to the victim and if the accused person agrees to pay the requisite amount to the victim without pleading guilty to the charge and at the same time without contesting the charge so as to avoid a trial then ordinarily he should be convicted and sentenced accordingly straightaway without holding a full trial.

32.The manner of disposition of trial of hurt cases proposed above is likely to fulfil the obligation of the State under clause (d) of Article 37 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 regarding ensuring inexpensive and expeditious delivery of justice inasmuch as through this process the victim shall receive the requisite compensation promptly, the accused person shall be handed down his lawful punishment without unnecessary loss of time and the trial court shall be saved of the time and effort likely to be consumed in the trial which is to end in that result in any case. It may be added in this context that the ever-growing volume of criminal cases before our

courts is already stretching the capacity of our courts to its limits and the capability of our Judges to its edge and the issue, therefore, abegs ingenuity and necessitates innovative approaches to deal with the problem. It is proverbial that those shy of innovation and experimentation are condemned to the dustbin of history.”

26.Having examined the nature of plea based disposal, it is now necessary to consider the legal framework governing police record and its disclosure, both prior to and after digitization. The controversy relates to the scope of disclosure in a Police Clearance Certificate, which in its proper legal sense should reflect only concluded convictions derived from verified police records.

The material on record, however, shows that the prevailing practice does not adequately distinguish between mere accusation and proven guilt, nor between conviction and acquittal. With the digitization of police records, all entries, including FIR involvement and minor convictions based on a plea of guilt, continue to subsist and may be reflected without regard to their nature or outcome, thereby raising serious concerns of fairness and relevance.

27.Under the pre amendment regime of the Police Rules, 1934, particularly Rule 22.59, Register No. 9 and allied forms were maintained primarily for surveillance and preventive

purposes. Even untraced cases and acquittals were recorded, reflecting an internal intelligence based system rather than a mechanism for public disclosure. These records, supported by information sheets under Rule 23.17, formed a structured database of suspected and known offenders for policing purposes. This framework was essentially administrative and surveillance oriented, lacking any standardized or citizen centric mechanism for issuance of Police Clearance Certificates. Records maintained for internal use could therefore adversely affect individuals without adequate safeguards or contextual evaluation.

28.A shift occurred through the insertion of Rule 24.2 A by notification dated 16th March, 2017, establishing the Police Assistance Line, followed by further regulation through notification dated 8th April, 2018 and the establishment of Police Sahulat Markaz. This introduced a service oriented regime, formalizing the issuance of certificates as a regulated public function, supported by digitized systems and procedural safeguards. The transition from a surveillance based system to a citizen centric framework signifies that Police Clearance Certificates are no longer mere reflections of internal records, but official instruments requiring accuracy, relevance,

and fairness. Consequently, indiscriminate disclosure of all entries, including acquittals or minor offences, is inconsistent with the scheme of law and the purpose of such certificates.

29.The maintenance of police record derives its authority from the Police Rules, 1934, however, a clear constitutional distinction exists between retention for internal purposes and disclosure through an outward certificate. While retention may serve legitimate law enforcement objectives, disclosure constitutes a separate State action having civil consequences and must satisfy the requirements of legality, purpose limitation, and proportionality. The Police Rules, 1934, being an administrative code, regulate the internal functioning of the police and do not authorize permanent public labelling of citizens.

Any outward communication of such record must therefore be supported by lawful authority, a defined purpose, and safeguards against arbitrariness.

30.The constitutional framework reinforces these limitations. Article 4 mandates lawful and non arbitrary treatment, Article 9 protects the right to a meaningful life, Article 14 guarantees dignity including reputation and privacy, Article 18 safeguards lawful livelihood, and Article 10 A ensures substantive fairness. Where a plea of

guilt in a minor offence results in continuing civil consequences, the requirement of proportionality becomes more stringent. Dignity, as a constitutional value, governs the manner in which the State represents a citizen through official instruments. A Police Clearance Certificate, when carrying adverse material, operates not merely as information but as a form of labelling. The Constitution does not permit perpetual stigma for minor and concluded matters and requires recognition of the individual’s capacity for rehabilitation.

31.The Islamic principles of dignity, honour, and protection of reputation further reinforce this position, discouraging unnecessary stigmatization and supporting reintegration rather than exclusion. Although no comprehensive law on spent convictions exists, statutory recognition of rehabilitation is evident in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Probation and Parole Act, 2021, particularly Section 13, which removes disqualifications upon successful completion of probation. This reflects a legislative intent against perpetual stigma.

32.Comparative jurisprudence similarly distinguishes between serious offences and minor concluded matters, emphasizing that disclosure must be justified, proportionate, and limited to

legitimate purposes. In consequence, while the State may retain comprehensive records for internal use, disclosure in Police Clearance Certificates must be confined to relevant and final convictions of a serious nature. Inclusion of acquittals, minor offences, or matters resolved through a plea of guilt resulting in nominal penalties is neither lawful nor proportionate and results in undue prejudice.

Reliance is placed on the consolidated judgment dated 09.12.2025 of this court delivered in writ petition bearing No.8823-P of 2025 and six others connected writ petitions, the operate part is reproduced as under:-

“13. The State may legitimately pursue public safety, verification of identity, and risk assessment. But constitution demands that such aims be pursued through measures that are lawful, necessary, and proportionate. A routine Police Clearance Certificate is issued for ordinary civil life, not for specialised security vetting. In that setting, the indiscriminate disclosure of concluded minor convictions, without differentiation and without a clear statutory calibration, is not shown to be a necessary means. It operates as a blanket disability. Blanket disability, in the given circumstances, is the opposite of constitutional proportionality.

In the context of minor concluded convictions, the continued reflection of such convictions on a routine Police Clearance Certificate for employment, education and travel, without demonstrated necessity and

without calibrated safeguards, constitutes a disproportionate interference with dignity and privacy under Article 14, undermines the conditions of a meaningful life protected by Article 9, impedes lawful opportunity under Article 18, and is not shown to be action in accordance with law as required by Article 4. Internal retention for policing may continue. What is constitutionally restrained is outward disclosure in a routine certificate where the impact is punitive in effect and the legal basis and necessity are not established.

15.Police certification, for constitutional purposes, must recognise a principled categorisation of record, and must align disclosure with the purpose and gravity of the matter. For purposes of certification, the record must be conceptually divided into four compartments:

(a)convictions that are final and not set aside,

(b)pending proceedings where challan is submitted and cognizance is taken and proceedings are live, (c) FIR-only entries where mere registration exists without meaningful progression,

(d)favourable outcomes such as acquittal, discharge, quashment or lawful compounding.

16.A routine Police Clearance Certificate for ordinary civil purposes must not treat an FIR-only-entry as adyerse character material. Registration is accusation, not adjudication. To convert it into stigma through certification is to impose a civil disability without lawful adjudication, contrary to Articles 4, 9 and 14. Likewise, favourable outcomes cannot rationally be published as adverse material, because the legal system itself has resolved them in the citizens favour. The State may retain such information internally for policing, but outward use must be purpose limited and constitutionally restrained.

17.This distinction assumes special importance in public law

settings such as elections. Constitutional disqualifications are conviction based and threshold based, not accusation based. A police certificate cannot be permitted to manufacture, through administrative disclosure, a disability which the Constitution itself does not attach to mere registration of a criminal case. Routine certification must not be permitted to become an indirect engine of disqualification or civic exclusion.

Moreover, in supra-Judgment, this court also recommended that “In view of the recurring nature of such litigation and to align executive practice with constitutional discipline, the Court issues the following recommendations and directions:

I. It is recommended that the competent law making forum consider enacting a rehabilitation or spent convictions framework to regulate retention, disclosure, clean periods, and safeguards, particularly for first time and minor offenders, so that constitutional rights under Articles 9 and 14 do not remain dependent on case by case constitutional litigation. II. It is further recommended that offences be categorised, for certification purposes, into petty or regulatory matters and serious matters, with clear criteria. Minor fines for petty regulatory infractions should not operate as a permanent adverse label in routine certification. Disclosure should be aligned with purpose, and the least restrictive measure should be preferred. III. It is directed that until such legislation is enacted, the Inspector General of Police, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa shall, within three months, frame standing orders or administrative instructions within his lawful administrative competence, to implement a two-tier certification model with purpose limitation, namely:

(a)A standard Police Clearance Certificate for ordinary civil purposes which excludes FIR only entries, excludes favourable outcomes such as acquittal, discharge, quashment or lawful compounding from being treated as adverse material, and excludes minor petty fines after a defined clean period, subject to absence of subsequent relevant offending.

(b)An enhanced vetting certificate for sensitive positions only, issuable only where authorised by law or competent standing order, with limited disclosure confined to relevant pending proceedings where challan is submitted and cognizance is taken, and with disclosure being time bound and reviewable through a reasoned decision process.

24.Copies of this judgment shall be circulated to all District and Sessions Judges for the guidance of Magistrates, emphasising strict adherence to Section 243 Cr.P.C., constitutional fairness under Article 10A in guilty plea matters, and the active consideration of probationary relief where statute permits, so that minor infractions are corrected without producing constitutionally disproportionate long-lasting consequences.

Similarly, the Lahore High Court in a recent judgment titled Abdul Rehman Faryad versus Government of Punjab reported as PLD 2026 Lahore 84), has held that:- “A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the petitioner, along with his co-accused Muhammad Osama, was named in the First Information Report (FIR) for allegedly being found in possession of kites and related material on 06.04.2024 at about 8:00 a.m., while traveling in a rickshaw. After the investigation, the case was placed before the Magistrate Section 30, Lahore. Upon

a thorough review of the evidence and case file, the learned Magistrate found no incriminating material against the petitioner or his co- accused. Consequently, in exercise of powers under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C., the Magistrate acquitted both individuals of the charges through an order dated 20.12.2024. It is pertinent to note that the allegations levelled against the petitioner do not involve moral turpitude, nor do they relate to any offence against the State. Furthermore, the case record is completely silent as to any appeal or revision filed by the State challenging the acquittal. Therefore, the acquittal order has attained finality in the eye of law. In these circumstances, it would be legally unjustified to draw any adverse inference or attach any stigma to the petitioner merely based on the registration of an FIR or the fact that a trial was conducted, when such proceedings have conclusively ended in an unchallenged acquittal. Hence, the presumption of innocence which stands supported by the acquittal must be given full effect.

2.Learned law officer, while referring to the Punjab Amendment to Rule 5 of Chapter XXIV of the Police Rules, 1934, introduced through Notification No.14/EXEC-III dated 2nd of January 2024, contended that the First Information Report Register is now required to be maintained in digital form on a central server, located at a place designated by the Provincial Police Officer. On this basis, it was argued that the criminal record, including details of involvement of an accused in any FIR, cannot be removed even in cases where the accused has been acquitted. In addressing this submission, it ought to be noted that law enforcement agencies have the administrative authority to maintain internal records of reported incidents, including FIRs, for various legitimate purposes. These purposes include, but are not limited

to, preserving institutional memory, conducting statistical or trend analysis, and facilitating coordination and information-sharing between various government and law enforcement entities. The retention of such data, so long as it is confined to lawful administrative use and is not disclosed or misused in a manner prejudicial to the rights of the individual, cannot be construed as a violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. This view finds further support from the case reported as Zulfiqar Ali v. Ex-officio Justice of Peace and others (PLD 2023 Lahore 512), wherein this Court gave certain guidelines for presenting the criminal history of an accused in the courts, the relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below for reference:- “(i). While producing the record pertaining to the criminal history of any petitioner/accused, the list must show the status of criminal case(s) against him. Status connotes whether such case is still pending or had culminated in acquittal, conviction, discharge or withdrawal. (ii). Fate of every criminal case must be entered in the relevant Police Register maintained under the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, immediately after the pronouncement of judgment/order and the same should also be entered in PSRMS.

(iii). The final fate of a criminal case is always decided by the court, therefore, better coordination mechanism must be evolved/improved to promptly convey the judgment/order of the court to the police station concerned for its entry in the relevant record. (iv). Instructions issued to the District Heads of Punjab Police regarding the submission of criminal history of the petitioner/accused by the Additional Inspector General of police (Investigation) shall be strictly complied with.”

Thus, the preservation of digital FIR record is permissible under the law, such record must be used strictly within the confines of legality, ensuring that no adverse inference is drawn against an individual who has been acquitted, unless such use is justified by a lawful purpose and supported by due process.

6.The petitioner’s sole grievance, as voiced in the present petition, is that the respondents be directed to issue a Police Character Certificate that accurately reflects his present legal status specifically, that he stands free from any criminal liability. In this context, it is essential to observe that once an accused has been acquitted by a competent court of law, he is to be considered, in the eye of law, entirely absolved of the allegations levelled against him. In such eventuality, any continuous reference or inclusion of the relevant FIR in official documents such as a character certificate, despite a conclusive acquittal of an accused is unwarranted. Such a practice not only violates the individual’s constitutionally protected right to human dignity under Article 14 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 but also imposes a lasting and unjust stigma upon a citizen who has been exonerated through due judicial process. This position finds judicial endorsement in the case reported as Waqas Khan and 2 others v. The State (PLD 2025 Peshawar 67), wherein the learned Peshawar High Court made the following observation:- “It may also be noted that though the petitioners were charged in the FIR but once he was acquitted by the competent Court of law then all the allegations levelled in the FIR are considered to be no more in existence and they are to be presumed, treated and regarded as innocent persons under the law, therefore, the factum of mentioning of the FIR and acquittal order on the basis of compromise in the impugned character certificates for police clearance are neither legal

nor justifiable rather the same would amount to defeat the very purpose and effect of the acquittal order.”

From above, it can be gathered that once a person has been acquitted and the order has attained finality, any act by public authorities that continues to associate that individual with a criminal allegation undermines not only the acquittal itself but also the foundational principles of fairness, dignity, and presumption of innocence.

Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to a Police Character Certificate that reflects his acquittal and the absence of any subsisting criminal liability.”

This court in a similar cases i.e W.P.No.1125-A/2024 decided on 23.10.2024 and 1165-A/2016 have held as under:- “In view of the above, and in view of the judgment of this court dated 20.03.2012 in case titled Waqas Vs State (W.P.No.755 of 2011), it is deemed appropriate to issue a declaration to the above effect, instead of touching merits of the case disposed of by the court of competent jurisdiction long ago in the year 2011.

Consequently, the SHO Police Station, Nara, Abbottabad is directed to verity antecedents of the petitioner in the light of the fact that he has not been involved in a case of moral turpitude, therefore, it should not have adverse effect on his service carrier. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly in the above, terms.”

The superior courts have consistently maintained a clear distinction between petty offences and those involving moral turpitude, recognizing that both categories cannot be placed

on the same legal footing. In this context, the case reported as PLD 2024 Lahore 502, titled Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi v. The Returning Officer for NA-122 Lahore-VI and another, decided by the Lahore High Court, provides an authoritative exposition on the concept of moral turpitude. It underscores that all convictions are not alike in their nature, gravity, or legal consequences. The Court categorically held that a conviction, by itself, does not automatically amount to an offence involving moral turpitude;

rather, the surrounding circumstances, nature of the allegation, intent of the accused, and the societal impact of the act must be carefully evaluated before attaching such stigma.

Consequently, minor or technical infractions cannot be equated with offences that entail elements of depravity, dishonesty, or moral delinquency, and therefore must not be treated alike for the purposes of adverse legal or administrative consequences. In the aforementioned case, the Honourable Lahore High Court held that:

“According to Major Law Lexicon the phrase "Moral Turpitude" is defined as infra:- "Anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileneess of depravity in private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary

rule of right and duty between man and man."

Similarly as per Advanced Law Lexicon 4th edition, volume 3 at page 3126 the phrase "Moral Turpitude" is defined as "The expression 'moral turpitude' means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doinf of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society in general." [Baleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate, AIR 1959 All 71, 74] This phrase has also been defined in Merriam-Webster Dictionary as "An act or behavior that gravely violates the sentiment or accepted standard of the community" "A quality of dishonesty or other immorality that is determined by a court to be present in the commission of a criminal offense" And in Black's Law Dictionary it is defined as;

"Term that is applied to an offense or a crime that is illegal but also shows a person's baseness and depravity" Similarly in the case-law titled as "Imtiaz Ahmed Lali v. Returning Officer and 3 others" [2008 PLC (C.S.) 934], the Supreme Court of Pakistan defined the phrase Moral Turpitude as under:- "The expression "moral turpitude" in the plain words means the act of baseness, vileness or the depravity in private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. Moreover in the case-law titled as "Ghulam Hussain v. Chairman, P.O.F. Board, Wah Cantt and another" (2002 SCMR 1691), the Supreme Court of Pakistan also

referred definitions of Moral Turpitude as under:- The expression "moral turpitude" has been explained in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition 27-A, which is as follows:-- "In determining whether crime is one involving "moral turpitude", the test is whether the act denounced by the statute offend generally accepted moral code of mankind."

"Moral turpitude" is a vague term, and its meaning depends to some extent on the state of public morals; it is anything that is done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals; and act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man; it implies something immoral in itself, regardless of fact whether it is punishable by law."

Above expression has also been explained in Legal Terms and Phrases (Judicially defined) by M. Ilyas Khan, Advocate, which is as follows:-- .

"The term moral turpitude is not defined anywhere but in general parlance it connotes anything done against justice, honesty, modesty or 'good morals. It is deprivation of character, and devoid of morality. " In the case-law titled as "Muhammad Shabbir Abbasi v. Abdur Rashid Mughal" (1984 CLC 270), Moral Turpitude was defined and referred by Lahore High Court as under;

We have given our anxious consideration to this case. First and foremost, the main question that arises is what is meant by the expression "moral turpitude" with particular reference to the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, wherein this expression occurs.

7.Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, page 910 defines moral turpitude as follows :-- "The act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social

duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. State v. Adkins, 40 Ohio App. 2d 473 ; 320 N. E. 2d 308, 311 ; 69 0.0. 2d 416. Act or behaviour that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present in some criminal offences as distinguished from others. Lee v. Wisconsin State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 29 Wis-2d 330: 1.39 N. W. 2d 61,65. The quality of a crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished from statutory mala prohibita. People v. Ferguson, 55 Miscellaneous 2d 711 ; 286 N.Y.S. 2d This Court in its recent dictum reported as 2025 PLD Peshawar titled Waqas Khan and 2 others vs. The State has held as under;

“Even otherwise, the nature of allegations which were made against the present petitioner in the FIR were not of moral turpitude or any allegations against the State or which effecting the society at large as it was only a dispute between the two individuals which was ended up with a happy note as a good conscious and truthfulness prevailed among them and as such they entered into a compromise and accordingly the present petitioners have been acquitted”

Further reliance in this regard is also placed on the reported judgment of this court delivered in case titled Inamullah versus Government of Khyber Pakutnkhwa (2017 PLC

(CS)926), wherein it was held that:- “From perusal of the available record it transpires that the petitioner was otherwise qualified for his

appointment as constable, however, he was refused on the ground of his conviction under section 13 A.O. by EAC/Illaqa Qazi Babozai vide order dated 25.1.2007. No doubt, those citizens are debarred under the Constitution from their appointment to superior positions who are convicted in cases that fall into one of moral turpitude, of scandalizing the judiciary and the Armed Forces, of undermining the ideology and security of Pakistan and other offences of the like nature, however, case of the petitioner does not fall in any of the aforementioned categories. In this regard opinion of the District Public Prosecutor, Shangla and request of Regional Police Officer/DIG Malakand Region are available on case file which show that the petitioner is not involved in any case of moral turpitude and he has duly been recommended by them for his appointment on merit. Moreso, the petitioner had been convicted for possessing .12 bore live cartridges ten in number and he was sentenced to pay Rs.100/- as fine. Keeping in view the quantum of sentence, the appointing authority has taken quite harsh view in case of the petitioner which in simple terms is 100 rupees fine versus lifelong ban against government appointment which fact surely offends against his most fundamental right to life which has cherishly been guaranteed by the Constitution. Moreso, it seems that the petitioner had confessed his guilt before the Court in the criminal case registered against him just to avoid the Court proceedings as is the general practice of the public which is very common and natural. Therefore, keeping in view the facts and circumstance of the previous criminal case against the petitioner, it would be quite unjust to keep him debarred for ever to enter upon government service. Thus, the respondent No.2 has not acted in accordance with law while refusing appointment to the petitioner as constable on the same reason alone.”

33.For the foregoing reasons, the instant petition is partially allowed. It is observed that the minor conviction of the petitioner in FIR No. 450 dated 16.06.2019, which resulted only in the imposition of a nominal fine, shall neither be treated nor reflected as an adverse character entry in the police clearance certificate in a manner that stigmatizes the petitioner or impairs his lawful prospects. Consequently, the respondents are directed to issue a police clearance certificate to the petitioner after expunging the word “convicted” in relation to the aforesaid case, provided that the petitioner is not involved in any other criminal case. In the event of any such involvement, the respondents shall be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law.

Announced.

JUDGE

JUDGE

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Syed Mudasser Ameer Hon’ble Mr. Justice Aurangzeb Aftab PS*/