Khaista Rahman Vs The State

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT,

MINGORA BENCH (DAR-UL-QAZA), SWAT

(Judicial Department) J. Cr.A No. 11-M/2025 With Murder Reference No.1-M/2025

Khaista Rahman .......Appellant/Convict Versus The State .......Respondent Present: Mr. Aftab Hussain Butt, Advocate for Appellant. Mr. Naeem Khan, A.A.G. for State.

Dates of hearing: 22.04.2026

JUDGMENT

Dr. Khurshid Iqbal, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

1.This Criminal Jail Appeal, preferred by Khaista Rahman (hereinafter ―the appellant‖), is directed against the judgment, dated 09.12.2024, passed by the learned trial Court after remand, whereby the appellant was convicted on multiple counts arising from a charge of incestuous rape upon his own minor daughter, Mst. Lubna (hereinafter ―the victim‖), and related offences. The convictions and sentences are as follows:

(a)Under section 376, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (PPC), sentenced to death, to be hanged by neck till declared dead, with fine of Rs. 50,000/-, in default whereof to further undergo one month of simple imprisonment (SI). The sentence of death stands subject to confirmation by this Court;

(b)Under section 53 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Child Protection & Welfare Act, 2010 (CPA), sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment (RI), with fine of Rs. 10,00,000/-, in default to further undergo SI for one month;

(c)Under section 506, PPC, sentenced to RI for 02 years, with fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default to further undergo SI for 30 days;

(d)Under section 15 of the KP Arms Act, 2013 (AA), sentenced to SI for 03 years, with fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default to undergo SI for 10 days;

(e)Compensatory fine of Rs. 100,000/- under section 544-A, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.), awarded to the victim for mental and physical suffering, payable in the form of saving certificates in her name through the Civil Nazir of the District Courts, to be receivable upon her attaining majority; upon failure of the appellant, recoverable as arrears of land revenue.

The learned trial Court ordered that all sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently, with benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C. It further directed that the judicial proceedings shall not be published in the media in any manner as to disclose the identity of the victim.

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2.Simultaneously, the learned trial Court made a Death Reference under section 374, Cr.P.C., which is before this Court for confirmation or otherwise. The appeal and the Death Reference are being disposed of together by this consolidated judgment, which proceeds upon a fresh and independent reappraisal of the entire evidence on the record.

II. THE PROSECUTION CASE

3.On 19.09.2021, the victim, then aged 17 years 5 months and 15 days, approached her local police station in the company of her mother, Mst. Taslim Bibi (PW8), and her maternal uncle, one Muhammad Ishaq. She reported that her father, the appellant, had been subjecting her to rape continuously for approximately three years and had criminally intimidated her with threats upon her life should she disclose his conduct to anyone. She stated that owing to such threats and the fear they instilled, she had remained silent throughout. She further stated that while she had been raped repeatedly on different occasions, the last instance had occurred two days prior to the report. She ultimately found the courage to disclose the crime to her mother. She charged the appellant for the offences in hand. The case was accordingly registered under sections 376/506, PPC, as FIR (Ex PA).

4.Upon registration of the FIR, the Investigating Officer (I.O.) visited the house of the victim on the very day of the report. At the pointation of the victim, he prepared the site plan (Ex PB), identifying the bedroom where the offences had been committed. On the same day, the I.O. took the victim to the local hospital for medical examination. The Medical Officer, Dr. Neelam (PW10), examined the victim and returned her report on 20.09.2021, the essential findings of which are reproduced below:

Q.1. Whether rape has been committed with the victim and penetration has been done or not?

A. Intercourse is done. Hymen is not intact, but according to her statement it was rape.

Q.2. Whether the hymen of the victim has been ruptured or not? A. I did not find hymen. It was broken/not intact.

Q.3. Whether there are stains of human sperm on her clothes? A. Last attempt of rape was 4 days back. No stains found. Q.4. Whether there are bruises on the thighs of the victim or not? A. 2x2 cm bruise was found on her Rt. thigh.

Q.5. Whether the victim is pregnant or not?

A. UPT u/pelvis turned out negative.

5.High Vaginal Swabs (HVS) were taken and handed over to the police. The swabs, placed in parcel No. 1, were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) under application ExPW11/9, which returned a negative report for human semen (Ex.PK/1). The I.O. also obtained a copy of Form ―B‖ (ExPW11/8) of the family of the victim, which records the victim as the eldest child of the appellant, born on 04.04.2004. The appellant has five other children: three sons and two other daughters, the youngest shown as born in 2016. In view of the information contained in Form ―B‖, establishing the minority of the victim, section 53 of the CPA was added to the charge.

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6.The appellant was arrested on 19.09.2021, the date of the report. His card of arrest, however, did not record the time of arrest. He was produced before the Judicial Magistrate on 20.09.2021, who granted police custody for two days. On 21.09.2021, during custody, on the alleged pointation of the appellant, the I.O. recovered a bedding mat (Pashto: tolai) lying upon a box, a portion of which bore stains of semen; that portion was cut and secured in parcel No. 2 under recovery memo ExPW5/1. On further pointation, the I.O. also recovered a dagger from a wooden box, allegedly used by the appellant to intimidate the victim. The FSL returned a positive report for human semen on the bedding mat (Ex Pk). With the recovery of the dagger, section 15, AA, was also added to the case.

7.On 22.09.2021, the third day after the report and arrest, the appellant recorded a confessional statement before the Judicial Magistrate. He stated that due to strained relations, his wife would frequently visit and stay at the house of her parents for extended periods. He further stated that there was a single toilet/bathroom in his house with a curtain used as its door, through which he could see the victim while she bathed or attended to the call of nature, and that this aroused him. He confessed that during the absences of his wife, he committed the immoral act with the victim for approximately three years. He further admitted having committed sodomy with the victim on approximately 12 to 13 occasions and having used a condom on a couple of those occasions, which he would purchase from a local shop. He added that 13 to 14 days prior to the report, he had committed an unnatural offence against the victim. He expressed remorse for his acts and stated that he recorded his confession voluntarily and in his proper senses. He did not, however, admit his guilt in respect of using the dagger as a weapon for criminal intimidation.

III. PROCEEDINGS AT THE TRIAL

8.Upon completion of investigation, the final report (challan) was submitted before the trial Court. Copies of the relevant documents were supplied to the appellant in compliance with section 265-C, Cr.P.C. Charge was framed against the appellant under sections 376/506, PPC; section 53, CPA; and section 15, AA, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

9.At the close of the prosecution evidence, the appellant was examined under section 342, Cr.P.C. He was afforded the opportunity to make a statement on oath under section 340(2), Cr.P.C. and/or to produce evidence in defence. He availed neither opportunity. When confronted with his confessional statement per Question No. 10, he replied: ―It is incorrect hence denied.‖ 10. On 30.11.2022, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as set out above. On appeal, this Court, vide judgment dated 25.09.2024, remanded the case to the trial Court for the reason that the I.O. had not been afforded opportunity of cross-examination. After remand, the learned trial Court examined the I.O., and cross-examination was afforded to the learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant was again examined under section 342, Cr.P.C. In that statement, the appellant maintained his retraction from the judicial confession. However, he introduced for the first time a plea of mala fide on the part of his wife, attributing the complaint to strained conjugal relations. He stated: ―I cannot imagine to commit sexual act with my real daughter. Due to strained relation Mst. Taslim Bibi instigated her daughter to lodge a false report Page 3 of 20

against me, which has been admitted by the I.O. and other witnesses in their court statements.‖ The learned trial Court, after hearing both sides, again convicted and sentenced the appellant in the same terms.

IV. SYNOPSIS OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE

11.Given the nature of the charges and the centrality of the account of the victim, it is pertinent to reproduce verbatim the depositions of the victim (PW9) and her mother Mst. Taslim Bibi (PW8):

PW9, Mst. L. (the victim) Stated on oath that I am complainant in the instant case. I reported the matter to police in the shape of FIR already Ex PA. At the time of registration of FIR my mother was with me in the police station. I.O. prepared site plan on my pointation. Police also took me to medical officer for my medical examination. I.O. recorded my statement under section 161, Cr.P.C. I charge accused/my father for commission of offence.

Cross-examination: When I was reporting the matter to the police my mother also accompanied me. My father used to threaten me of killing me if I would tell someone about the matter. My mother tried to make him understand but accused used to beat my mother as well as me. It is incorrect to suggest that I am deposing falsely.

PW8, Mst. Taslim Bibi (mother of the victim) Stated on oath that the victim is my daughter. I went to police station with her while she was recording her report against accused. I am also seconder of FIR already Ex PA. I.O. recorded my statement in this regard. Cross-examination: I have not seen accused while committing the offence. However, accused always in my absence from home committed zina with my daughter. This fact was told to me by my daughter. However, due to our dignity, I remained silent but accused was not ready to quit his habit. It is incorrect to suggest that I am charging my husband/accused on mala fide ground and due to grudges with him. It is incorrect that I am deposing falsely.

12.The medical evidence was furnished by Dr. Neelam (PW10), who deposed in accordance with her report as already reproduced in paragraph 4, above. Under cross-examination, she admitted that hymenal rupture may have causes other than sexual intercourse, including horse riding, abdominal trauma, heavy lifting, or congenital factors. As regards the bruise on the thigh of the victim, she maintained that it was indeed a bruise, not a scratch, but acknowledged that a bruise can be caused by multiple reasons. She reiterated under cross-examination that the victim told her that the last intercourse was four days prior and that the appellant had used a condom. She denied the suggestion of false deposition.

13.The I.O., in his statements both before and after remand, detailed the steps of his investigation: preparation of the site plan at the pointation of the victim; collection of the swabs of the victim from the Medical Officer and their dispatch to the FSL; recovery of the semen-stained bedding mat and the dagger on the Page 4 of 20

pointation of the appellant during custodial interrogation; the medical examination of the victim; obtaining Form ―B‖ of the victim; arrest of the appellant and procurement of his custody; and the production of the appellant before the Judicial Magistrate for recording of confession. All documents and articles were duly exhibited.

14.Under cross-examination, the I.O. testified that the FIR reported continuous rape for the preceding three years and did not name an eyewitness. He admitted not collecting Call Data Records (CDRs) of the cell phones in the use of the victim and the appellant, including to ascertain whether the victim had contacts with other persons. He confirmed that the victim was accompanied by her mother and Muhammad Ishaq at the time of lodging the report. He admitted not recording a separate statement of the victim under section 161, Cr.P.C., explaining that being herself the complainant, he did not consider it necessary. He confirmed the preparation of the site plan at the behest of the victim on the date of the report. He further disclosed that during investigation, he discovered that the appellant had strained relations with his wife and that she and the children would often reside at the house of her parents. As regards the confessional statement, the I.O. stated that the appellant remained in police custody for two days preceded by 24 hours of initial custody. He denied the suggestion that the appellant was at hospital at 11:00 hours, the time of production for confession, but admitted that at 14:45 hours, after recording of the confession, the appellant was handed over to him for dispatch to judicial lock-up.

15.The prosecution also examined formal police witnesses who served as marginal witnesses to the recovery and pointation memos, the scribe of the FIR, and the official who transported the parcels to the FSL. Their evidence, being formal in character, does not require separate analysis.

V. THE STATEMENT AND STANCE OF THE APPELLANT

16.In his first examination under section 342, Cr.P.C., recorded prior to remand, the appellant denied all charges and refuted the evidence in short answers. He denied commission of the offences, repudiated the recoveries as not having been made in his association, and rebutted the suggestion that articles were recovered on his pointation. When confronted with his confessional statement, he simply termed it ―incorrect.‖ In reply to the question as to why he was charged, he claimed innocence and pleaded false involvement. He stated that the charges are false and baseless and that the complainant did not appear before the Court. He did not avail the opportunity to make a statement on oath or to produce defence evidence.

17.After remand, the appellant was examined more thoroughly. While terming the charges as incorrect, he introduced for the first time a substantive defence: that after his marriage, his relations with his wife became strained; that she would leave his home and stay at the house of her parents; that he ―cannot imagine to commit sexual act with his real daughter‖; and that his wife ―instigated her daughter‖ to lodge a false report against him, which, he contended, had been ―admitted by the I.O. and other witnesses in their court statements.‖ He retracted his judicial confession, asserting that he made no confession and that it was not properly certified under sections 164 read with Page 5 of 20

364, Cr.P.C. When asked about the reason for the charge, he reiterated that it was at the instigation of his wife with whom his relations were strained.

VI. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

18.Learned counsel for the appellant advanced the following contentions: first, there is an unexplained delay of approximately three years in reporting the offence; second, there is no independent or corroborative evidence in support of the charge, and the mother of the victim herself admitted she was never an eyewitness; third, the charge is prompted by mala fide, as the spousal relations between the appellant and PW8 are strained; fourth, the sole testimony of the victim is inherently sketchy and deficient because she did not reiterate the mode and manner of the commission of rape as originally narrated in the FIR; fifth, the recoveries of the semen-stained bedding mat and the dagger on the pointation of the appellant are inadmissible since the I.O. had already visited the spot while preparing the site plan; and sixth, the appellant has retracted from his judicial confession.

19.Learned Assistant Advocate General (AAG) made the following submissions in reply: first, given the nature of the offence and the grave social consequences of disclosure for the victim, delay in reporting cases of incest is no longer considered fatal; second, no independent or eyewitness testimony can realistically be expected where the offence is committed by a father upon his daughter within the confines of his own house; third, the strained spousal relations have not been substantiated by any evidence and constitute a bare assertion; fourth, the sole statement of a rape victim is sufficient for conviction if it is direct, cogent, and confidence-inspiring, and the deposition of the victim must be read with her FIR which was duly exhibited; fifth, the articles recovered on the pointation of the appellant were not visible or available at the time of the earlier spot inspection and their discovery amounts to information leading to recovery under articles 39 and 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (QSO); and sixth, the judicial confession is voluntary and true, and the retraction is bare and unsupported. The learned AAG further submitted that the victim, being an underage girl subjected to the most abhorrent form of abuse at the hands of her own father, could not be expected to narrate the naked facts of the offence in open court.

VII. POINT FOR DETERMINATION

20.Whether, upon a fresh and independent reappraisal of the entire evidence on the record, the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant: (i) committed rape upon the victim, his own minor daughter; (ii) sexually abused a child within the meaning of section 53, CPA; (iii) criminally intimidated her; and (iv) kept and used an unlicensed dagger as a weapon for criminal intimidation. Arising from the Death Reference, this Court must further determine whether the sentence of death is warranted by law and the facts.

VIII. GOVERNING LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. General Principles of Criminal Adjudication

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21.The foundational principles governing criminal trials are well-established and need not be elaborated beyond restating their operative force. An accused person stands clothed with the presumption of innocence unless and until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt.1 The burden of establishing the criminal charge rests exclusively upon the prosecution, and that burden never shifts to the accused. Delay in reporting a crime is a relevant consideration and may, depending upon the circumstances, be fatal to the prosecution case unless plausibly and satisfactorily explained. Proof of a criminal charge demands cogent, credible, and confidence-inspiring evidence. It is the paramount duty of the appellate court to independently reappraise and re-evaluate the prosecution evidence in its entirety, without being bound by the conclusions of the trial Court.2 B. Principles Specific to Sexual Offences

22.Alongside the general principles, the law recognizes certain qualifications that arise from the inherent nature of sexual offences. Delay per se in reporting sexual abuse is not treated as fatal; rather, the explanation offered for the delay must be assessed against the realities of the situation of the victim.3 The sole testimony of a rape victim, provided it is direct, internally consistent, materially concrete, and confidence-inspiring, is legally sufficient for recording conviction.4 Medical evidence is corroborative, not determinative, of the charge. Sexual history and virginity are legally irrelevant to the question of consent or the The classic statement is Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462 (HL), per Viscount Sankey LC (the ―golden thread‖ of the presumption of innocence). See also Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn, OUP 2013) ch 3.

On the duty of independent reappraisal in capital cases, see R. v. Sheppard, 2025 SCC 29, https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2025/2025canlii34830/2025canlii34830.html (accessed 13 April 2026). In Pakistan, the same course was expressly adopted in Shakeel v. The State PLD 2010 SC 47 and Atif Zareef v. The State PLD 2021 SC 550.

See Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) s 52, https://classic.austlii.edu. au/au/legis/vic/ consol_act/jda2015197/s52.html (accessed 13 April 2026), directing juries that delay in complaint is ―a common occurrence‖ and that ―there may be good reasons‖ for it; and the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Criminal Justice Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2017) Recommendation 69. In Pakistan, delay of several days was held immaterial in Habibullah v. The State 2011 SCMR 1665 and Hamid Khan v. The State 1981 SCMR 448. The fullest articulation is in the minority opinion of Nasir-ul-Mulk J in The State v. Abdul Khaliq PLD 2011 SC 554 (the Mukhtar Mai case), paras 8–12: ―it is quite normal that crimes of rape are not reported promptly‖; ―the devastating effects of rape on the victim and her family itself furnish explanation for delay‖; and, crucially, that rural victims are ―not free agents‖ and typically require the permission of their menfolk before any report can be made. The dissent collects Mehboob Ahmad v. The State 1999 SCMR 1102, Nasreen v. Fayyaz Khan PLD 1991 SC 412, Muhammad Umar v. The State 1999 PCrLJ 699 (FSC), and Azhar Iqbal v. The State 1997 PCrLJ 1500. See also the dissent of Ayesha A. Malik J in Muhammad Imran v. The State PLD 2025 SC 662, paras 9 and 10.

The sufficiency of the sole, confidence-inspiring testimony of the prosecutrix is firmly settled: Shakeel v. The State (supra, fn 2), paras 5–7; Muhammad Akram v. The State PLD 1989 SC 742; Shahzad alias Shaddu v. The State 2002 SCMR 1009; Atif Zareef (supra, fn 2), para 5, per Syed Mansoor Ali Shah J, holding that a rape victim ―stands on a higher pedestal than an injured witness.‖ The minority opinion of Nasir-ul-Mulk J in Abdul Khaliq (supra, fn 3), para 19, collects the line, including Bhupinder Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh AIR 2003 SC 4684 (―to insist on corroboration is to add insult to injury‖). The majority in Abdul Khaliq, at para 17, while reaching a different factual conclusion, expressly accepted that ―in such a class of cases, usually independent ocular evidence is not available, therefore due weight should be attributed to the statement of the victim buttressed by medical evidence, and strong attending circumstances.‖ See also Muhammad Imran (supra, fn 3), para 7 (dissent); State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh AIR 1996 SC 1393; State of U.P. v. Munshi AIR 2009 SC 370.

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occurrence of the offence.5 Stereotyped assumptions regarding expected resistance, prompt complaint, or continued contact with the offender must be rigorously excluded from the assessment of credibility.6 C. The Lived Reality Approach: A Method of Judicial Reasoning

23.The phrase lived reality, in judicial reasoning, is not a license to replace proof with sympathy, nor a permission to relax the criminal standard. It is, rather, a method of reading evidence accurately.7 Courts decide facts through inference from recorded material. If the Court begins with an unrealistic model of how people must behave, it will misread record material and draw unsound inferences, thereby either convicting where doubt exists or acquitting where proof exists. The lived reality approach therefore operates as an epistemic discipline: it disciplines the assumptions through which evidence is interpreted, so that the burden and standard of proof are applied to the facts as they really are, and not to the facts as a stereotype imagines them to be.8

The leading authority is Atif Zareef (supra, fn 2), holding that sexual history and character are irrelevant, that the two-finger test and virginity test have no evidential value, and that the omission of Article 151(4) of the QSO by the Criminal Law (Amendment) (Offences Relating to Rape) Act 2016 operates as a statutory prohibition on questions impugning the general moral character of the complainant. See also Sadaf Aziz v. Federation of Pakistan 2021 PCrLJ 205 (Lahore), per Ayesha A. Malik J, declaring virginity testing unconstitutional; Shakeel (supra, fn 2), para 6 (―even if it is admitted that she was a girl of easy virtue, no blanket authority can be given to rape her‖); Shahzad alias Shaddu (supra, fn 4); and, on the repugnancy of the erstwhile Article 151(4) QSO to the Injunctions of Islam, Mukhtar Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2009 FSC 65. For the common-law counterpart, see R. v. Seaboyer [1991] 2 SCR 577, https://www.canlii.org/en/ ca/scc/doc/1991/1991canlii76/1991canlii76.html (accessed 13 April 2026); R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33 at paras 196–204, https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2019/2019scc33/2019scc33.html (accessed 13 April 2026); and in England and Wales, s 41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, as construed in R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25, https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL /2001/25.html (accessed 13 April 2026).

The constitutional foundation in Pakistan lies in Articles 4(2)(a) and 14(1): Atif Zareef (supra, fn 2), paras 11–12 (―human dignity hovers over our laws like a guardian angel‖; the right to dignity is ―the crown of fundamental rights‖; ―in a criminal trial relating to rape, it is the accused who is on trial and not the victim‖). See also Sadaf Aziz (supra, fn 5); Muhammad Imran (supra, fn 3), paras 13–14 (dissent). The minority opinion of Nasir-ul-Mulk J in Abdul Khaliq (supra, fn 3), paras 9–10, observes that a rape victim ―is deterred by the embarrassment and humiliation she would have to suffer in narrating the incident,‖ and that ―a rape victim relives the trauma every time she narrates the incident.‖ At the international level, see Karen Tayag Vertido v. The Philippines, CEDAW Communication No. 18/2008, UN Doc CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (16 July 2010), https://juris.ohchr.org/casedetails/1700/en-US (accessed 13 April 2026), holding that reliance on rape myths—that a victim must escape at every opportunity, must physically resist, must be timid or easily cowed—violated articles 2(c), 2(f) and 5(a) of the Convention; and Simone Cusack and Alexandra S.H. Timmer, ―Gender Stereotyping in Rape Cases: The CEDAW Committee’s Decision in Vertido v The Philippines,‖ (2011) 11(2) Human Rights Law Review 329, https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngr004 (accessed 13 April 2026).

On social-context evidence operating without disturbing the burden or standard of proof, see R. v. Lavallee [1990] 1 SCR 852, https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1990/1990canlii95 /1990canlii95.html (accessed 13 April 2026) (battered woman syndrome); and Lori Haskell and Melanie Randall, The Impact of Trauma on Adult Sexual Assault Victims (Department of Justice Canada, 2019), https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/trauma/index.html (accessed 13 April 2026). In Pakistan, the recognition that victims may respond with ―fight, flight or freeze‖ reactions, so that no uniform behavioural template can be imposed as a touchstone of credibility, is found in Muhammad Imran (supra, fn 3), para 8 (dissent of Ayesha A. Malik, J.).

The classical articulation of judicial fact-finding as inferential reasoning grounded in the ordinary experience of human conduct is found in John Henry Wigmore, The Principles of Judicial Proof: As Given by Logic, Psychology, and General Experience and Illustrated in Judicial Trials (Boston: Little, Brown, 1913), and his Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law (3rd edn, Little, Brown, 1940). The subtitle of the Principles is itself revealing: Wigmore grounded judicial proof not in abstract syllogism but in the Page 8 of 20

24.The method has three logically distinct steps, each controlled and anchored in law. First, identification of what the record actually proves: who said what, what documents exist, what medical and forensic findings exist, what contradictions exist, and what remains unproved. Second, construction of the permissible inferences from that material in light of ordinary human behaviour. Third, testing those inferences against the burden and standard of proof. Lived reality enters at the second step only: it informs what is ordinary and probable in the particular social setting, so that the Court does not import an abstract stereotype as a rule of evaluation. It does not enter at the first step, where the question is what the record contains, nor at the third step, where the question is whether the evidence satisfies the criminal standard. So confined, the method preserves the juridical discipline that every finding must rest upon the record and satisfy the degree of proof required by law.9

25.In domestic and kinship-based offences, especially where the alleged offender is a parent, several realities affect the shape of evidence. The venue is private. Independent eyewitnesses are ordinarily absent.10 The victim is structurally dependent upon the offender for shelter, sustenance, mobility, and social permission. The mother, even if morally willing, may be economically dependent and physically vulnerable. Disclosure is not merely disclosure of a crime; it is disclosure of family collapse. In such a setting, silence and delay are not neutral facts. They may be produced by fear, threats, violence, dependency, and social stigma.11 The Court must therefore ask a concrete question: was interaction of logic, psychology, and general experience. As he put it in the Treatise, the foundation of every inference drawn from conduct ―is our experience of the operation of human nature,‖ and the process of constructing an inference consists in adding together a number of circumstances so that ―the total combination of circumstances,‖ and not any single element in isolation, determines the weight of the proof. See Andrew Porwancher, John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law (University of Missouri Press, 2016) at pp. 103 and 131.

On the tripartite structure of appellate review of factual findings, see Edwards v. Bairstow [1956] AC 14 (HL); Benmax v. Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] AC 370 (HL). On the disciplined use of social context at the inferential stage, see Lavallee (supra, fn 7); Barton (supra, fn 5) at paras On the inherent characteristics of intra-familial sexual abuse, see R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 SCR 424 at paras 50–85, https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2020/2020scc9 /2020scc9.html (accessed 13 April 2026). The same principle—that rape ―is a crime that is usually committed in private, and there is hardly any witness to provide direct evidence‖—is authoritatively stated in Atif Zareef (supra, fn 2), para 5. To like effect, the minority opinion of Nasir-ul-Mulk J in Abdul Khaliq (supra, fn 3), para 29, observes bluntly that ―it is a rare phenomenon to find an eye-witness of the very act of rape.‖ See further Roland C. Summit, ―The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome,‖ (1983) 7 Child Abuse & Neglect 177, identifying the five behavioural phases of secrecy, helplessness, entrapment and accommodation, delayed disclosure, and recantation.

On structural dependency and silencing, see Leslie Feiner, ―The Whole Truth: Restoring Reality to Children’s Narrative in Long-Term Incest Cases,‖ (1997) 87 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1385; Haskell and Randall (supra, fn 7), Part II (―disclosure is a process, not a one-time event‖). The concern that the act of disclosure is itself an additional harm has a deep doctrinal pedigree: see Wigmore, Treatise (supra, fn 8), discussed in Porwancher (supra, fn 8) at p. 68, recognizing that ―the witness-stand is to-day sufficiently a place of annoyance and dread‖ and that the reluctance to enter it must not be lightly increased—a concern applying with particular force to victims of intra-familial sexual abuse, for whom public narration of the offence is itself a second site of injury. The structural dimension is authoritatively recorded in the minority opinion of Nasir-ul-Mulk J in Abdul Khaliq (supra, fn 3), paras 10–14, holding that rural victims ―are not free agents‖ and require the permission of their menfolk before any report can be made; recording the evidence that after the occurrence the complainant party was threatened ―Hashar kar dengey‖; and recording the telling reply of the maternal uncle, when asked why he had not intervened during the attack, ―I saved my life, not respect.‖ Page 9 of 20

earlier complaint realistically possible, and what would earlier complaint have cost the victim and her family? That question does not prove guilt, but it prevents a false inference that delay necessarily indicates fabrication. Equally, events occurring within the privacy of family life seldom leave behind the kind of detached and independent evidence that may more readily be expected in commercial or public disputes; the presence of related witnesses is, in such cases, not an exceptional feature but a natural one, and their testimony is not to be discarded merely on account of relationship.12

26.Equally, the Court must not treat restrained narration as a defect. In incest cases, a victim may speak in minimal language, avoid explicit detail, and rely upon earlier recorded versions. This is not an absence of truth. It is often the only way a victim can speak at all. Judicial evaluation must therefore focus on the core factual constituents: identity, occurrence, threats, and the chain of corroboration. A requirement that a minor must repeat humiliating particulars in open court as a condition of belief is not a legal standard; it is a stereotype.13 So too, the language employed by lay persons in moments of distress is not always technically exact, and the Court must look beyond literal phrasing to ascertain the real substance of the grievance disclosed by the evidence and the surrounding circumstances. Judicial fact-finding miscarries when it mistakes socially conditioned behaviour for falsity, or when it elevates stereotypes of ―natural conduct‖ into fixed rules of appreciation.14

27.It is essential to add that the lived reality approach cuts both ways. It is not an instrument operating in one direction only. Just as domestic settings can produce silence, delay, and restrained narration that should not be mistaken for fabrication, so also domestic settings can produce false implication arising from family conflicts, matrimonial discord, property disputes, or collateral motives. The Court must, therefore, test whether a motive for fabrication is concrete and proved by material on the record, and not merely asserted from the bar.15 Where such a motive is alleged, the Court must equally test whether the allegation is supported by independent indicia of truth, such as, contemporaneous disclosure, On the admissibility of related-witness testimony in domestic settings, see Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1953 SC 364; R v Spencer [1987] AC 128 (HL). The principle is well established in Pakistani jurisprudence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.

On the rejection of stereotyped assumptions about victim narration, see Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 329 of 2021 (SCI, 18 March 2021), per Ravindra Bhat J, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/13024806/ (accessed 13 April 2026). In Pakistan, Atif Zareef (supra, fn 2), paras 11–12, holds that intrusive expressions such as ―habituated to sex,‖ ―woman of easy virtue,‖ and ―non-virgin‖ are unconstitutional and illegal and must be discontinued by the courts even where the charge of rape is not proved. See also Gurmit Singh (supra, fn 4) on the rejection of a hyper-technical approach to the evidence of a rape victim.

On imprecise lay language not being equated with falsity, see Friesen (supra, fn 10) at paras 75–85; Aparna Bhat (supra, fn 13), paras 41–46, cataloguing prohibited stereotypes drawn from the Bangkok General Guidance for Judges on Applying a Gender Perspective in South-East Asia (International Commission of Jurists).

That motive for false implication must be proved by material on the record, and not merely asserted, is long-settled: see Sahib Singh v. State of Haryana (1997) 7 SCC 231; State of UP v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102. See further the dissenting opinion of Ayesha A. Malik J in Muhammad Imran (supra, fn 3), paras 10–12 and 15, holding that a bare plea of false implication unsupported by evidence, not put to the victim in cross-examination, and not advanced through the statement of the accused under section 340(2), Cr.P.C. or through defence evidence, does not dislodge a trustworthy and corroborated prosecution case.

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medical history, forensic support, or judicial confession.16 Lived reality, properly applied, does not make conviction easier; it makes reasoning more accurate. The Court still insists upon internal consistency, material coherence, absence of fatal contradictions, and the presence of corroboration where the nature of the evidence reasonably supplies it. The discipline of the criminal standard remains undisturbed.17 D. Incest: The Judicial Challenge

28.An allegation of incest arises in a setting that generates powerful but competing social instincts: disbelief that a father could commit such an act, and disbelief that a daughter would falsely level such an accusation. Neither instinct is a rule of evidence. Neither may be permitted to serve as the starting point of judicial inquiry.18 Their relevance lies only in explaining why the Court must proceed neither on reflexive disbelief nor on uncritical acceptance, but through disciplined and dispassionate appraisal of the record, attentive to the lived realities of fear, dependence, coercion, shame, and delayed disclosure that characterize the domestic sphere.19 With these principles firmly in mind, we now turn to the reappraisal of the evidence.

IX. REAPPRAISAL OF EVIDENCE

(a)Foundational Facts: Relationship and Age

29.It is common ground that the victim is the biological daughter of the appellant and of Mst. Taslim Bibi (PW8), the wife of the appellant. It is equally undisputed that the victim was a minor at the time of lodging her report on 19.09.2021. Form ―B‖ (Ex PW1/8) records the date of birth of the victim as 04.04.2004. She was, therefore, 17 years, 5 months and 15 days old on the date of the FIR. According to the allegation of the victim, and indeed, according to the admission of the appellant in his judicial confession, she was continuously subjected to rape for approximately three years, placing the commencement of On independent indicia of truth—contemporaneous disclosure, medical history, forensic support, judicial confession—as the counterweight to a bare plea of false implication, see Friesen (supra, fn 10) at paras 50–85; Barton (supra, fn 5) at paras 198–204. On DNA evidence as ―the gold standard‖ in rape cases, see Atif Zareef (supra, fn 2), paras 3 and 5; Ali Haider v. Jameel Hussain PLD 2021 SC 362; Salman Akram Raja v. Government of Punjab 2013 SCMR 203; and Muhammad Imran (supra, fn 3), para 6 (dissent). The corroboration framework is functionally aligned with Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.

On the proposition that trauma-informed and contextual reasoning does not lower the criminal standard but enhances the accuracy of fact-finding, see Randall and Haskell (supra, fn 7); Barton (supra, fn 5) at paras 196–204. The same position is reflected in Pakistan: the State owes an affirmative duty under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution to ensure that gender stereotyping does not undermine the rule of law, and no woman should be stigmatized for seeking access to justice: Muhammad Imran (supra, fn 3), para 13 (dissent). See further Dominic Willmott et al., ―The Impact of Rape Myth Education on Jury Decision-Making: A Systematic Review,‖ PMC On the duty of judicial neutrality between competing social instincts in incest cases, see Friesen (supra, fn 10) at para 5 (sexual offences against children ―are violent crimes that wrongfully exploit children’s vulnerability‖); Feiner (supra, fn 11); Summit (supra, fn 10).

On the rejection of both reflexive disbelief and uncritical acceptance as twin failures of judicial reasoning, see Vertido (supra, fn 6); Aparna Bhat (supra, fn 13). The disciplined approach is reflected in Pakistan in Atif Zareef (supra, fn 2), para 12 (intrusive expressions and character- based assumptions must be discontinued ―even if [the courts] find that the charge of rape is not proved‖); and in Muhammad Imran (supra, fn 3), para 15 (dissent): ―consent has to be established and it cannot be assumed.‖

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the abuse at approximately 141⁄2 years of age. The crime was committed within the four walls of the family home by the one person in whose care, custody, and protection the victim was placed by nature and by law. These foundational facts are fully established on the strength of the prosecution evidence, and would remain so even if the judicial confession were excluded from consideration.

(b)Delay in Disclosure and Reporting

30.The principal attack mounted by the defence is the delay of approximately three years in reporting the offence. This submission, though understandable in its forensic logic, disregards the lived reality in which the crime was committed and endured.

31.The venue of the crime was the four walls of the family home. The scene of the offence was the body of the unfortunate victim herself. The perpetrator was not a stranger against whom the victim could have sought the protection of her father; the perpetrator was her father. Had any other man attacked her honour, she would have turned to her father for protection. But when the father himself is the source of violation, the child victim is left without a natural protector. The very person upon whom a minor daughter depends for her safety, sustenance, and guidance became the instrument of her destruction. In such a setting, silence is not consent; it is the product of trapped helplessness.

32.Read through the lens of lived social reality, the reasons for the prolonged silence of the victim are neither mysterious nor improbable. The domestic setting is a realm governed by kinship, parental authority, financial dependency, and community expectations. The parent-child relationship is inherently unequal, spanning a wide spectrum from emotional attachment to instinctive obedience and a deeply ingrained tendency to preserve the family structure. The mother of the victim, Mst. Taslim Bibi, despite occupying a relatively senior position in the household, was herself a subordinate figure. The evidence discloses that when she attempted to intervene, the appellant resorted to physical violence against her. The victim has testified that the appellant threatened her with death, and the recovery of a dagger corroborates the instrument of that threat. In these circumstances, the child victim faced a triple coercion: parental authority, physical violence, and the threat of death. Each of these forces, standing alone, would suffice to explain protracted silence. Together, they render the delay of three years not merely explicable but entirely consistent with the human condition as actually experienced in such settings.

33.Furthermore, reporting a crime of this nature is not merely a matter of legal complaint; it is an act that exposes the honour and dignity of the victim and her entire family to public scrutiny and lasting social stigma. In the society from which the parties come, such disclosure carries devastating consequences for the future of the victim. That she endured in silence for as long as she did, and ultimately found the courage to speak only to her mother, is a sequence of events that is entirely natural, psychologically intelligible, and consistent with established patterns of behaviour in cases of prolonged intra-familial sexual abuse. The delay, accordingly, far from being fatal to the prosecution, is in fact corroborative of the truth of the allegation.

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(c)Evidence of the Victim

34.The victim (PW9), in her deposition at the trial, identified the appellant as the perpetrator and affirmed the contents of the FIR (Ex PA). The contention of the defence that she did not narrate the detail in open court is legally misplaced. The FIR is exhibited and forms part of the record. The proper evidential question is whether the in-court testimony of the victim remains consistent on the material constituents of the charge, namely identity, occurrence, threats, and the chain of corroboration, and whether cross-examination has exposed any fatal contradiction. To this question we now turn. We may add, by way of context, that in the lived social reality of incest, the disinclination of a child victim to reiterate the sordid details of the abuse in open court is not a weakness but a mark of genuineness. The abused daughter of a sexually predatory father cannot, in any humane or realistic assessment, be expected to narrate in graphic detail and under the gaze of the courtroom the intimate violations perpetrated upon her by the one person who should have been her first protector.

35.Under cross-examination, the victim stood firm. She confirmed the accompaniment of her mother at the time of reporting. She testified to the death threats employed by the appellant and the physical violence inflicted upon her mother. She categorically denied the suggestion of false deposition. No material contradiction or inherent improbability was elicited. Her testimony is direct on the issue of the identity of the perpetrator, it is consistent with the FIR and the medical evidence, it is corroborated by the judicial confession, and it remains unshaken in cross-examination. We are satisfied that her testimony is cogent, internally coherent, and confidence-inspiring. The contention that her evidence is ―sketchy‖ because she did not restate the detailed narration of the FIR is without merit; the FIR was exhibited and its contents are part of the record.

(d)The Conduct and Evidence of the Mother

36.Mst. Taslim Bibi (PW8), the mother of the victim, deposed that the victim is her daughter, that she accompanied her to the police station, and that she seconded the FIR. Under cross-examination, she candidly admitted that she had never personally witnessed the commission of the offence but stated that the appellant committed zina with her daughter ―always in her absence.‖ She further testified: ―due to our dignity, I remained silent but accused was not ready to quit his habit.‖ She denied the suggestion of mala fide or grudges against the appellant.

37.The question that arises is whether the delay or apparent inaction on the part of PW8 necessarily falsifies the version of the victim. Read in its lived social context, the answer is plainly in the negative. The very words of PW8, ―due to our dignity, I remained silent,‖ lay bare the social forces at work: shame, family honour, and the desire to preserve the appearance of normalcy. That she ultimately supported the complaint, rather than suppressing it to save the reputation of the family, is itself an act of considerable courage that lends credibility to the charge. Her testimony, while that of a related witness, is natural, consistent with the surrounding circumstances, and cannot be discarded merely because of her relationship with the victim.

(e)Medical Evidence

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38.The medical examination conducted by Dr. Neelam (PW10) on the date of the report established the following: the hymen of the victim was not found intact; a bruise measuring 2×2 cm was present on her right thigh; the urine pregnancy test was negative; and no semen stains were found on the clothing of the victim, which the victim explained by stating that the last intercourse had occurred four days earlier and that the appellant had used a condom.

39.Under cross-examination, Dr. Neelam candidly acknowledged that hymenal rupture may be attributable to causes other than sexual intercourse, and that the bruise could have multiple causes. These candid admissions, while reflecting the inherent limitations of medical science in providing conclusive proof of sexual penetration at an interval of several days, do not detract from the corroborative value of the medical evidence. The loss of hymenal integrity in a 17-year-old girl, read together with the bruise, the consistent and specific account of the victim to the Medical Officer regarding the timing and circumstances of the last assault (including the use of a condom, a detail that could not realistically have been fabricated), constitutes meaningful corroboration of the charge.

40.The negative FSL report on the vaginal swabs and the negative pregnancy test do not advance the defence. Given the four-day interval and the account of the victim, confirmed by the appellant in his own confession, that a condom was used on at least some occasions, the absence of semen on the swabs is scientifically expected and is of no avail to the accused. Medical evidence, in the established jurisprudence, is corroborative and not determinative. The direct ocular evidence, comprising the testimony of the victim and the judicial confession, remains the primary material for determination of guilt.

(f)Forensic and Recovery Evidence

41.Two significant recoveries were effected during investigation: (i) a portion of a bedding mat containing stains of semen, and (ii) a dagger. Both were recovered on the pointation of the appellant during custodial interrogation, as deposed by the I.O. and confirmed by the marginal witnesses of the respective memos. The FSL returned a positive report for human semen on the bedding mat (Ex Pk).

42.The learned counsel for the appellant contended that these recoveries are inadmissible because the I.O. had already visited the house while preparing the site plan at the pointation of the victim. This contention is misconceived. The site plan was prepared at the pointation of the victim, who identified the room where the offence occurred. At that stage, no specific incriminating articles were pointed out or recovered. It was the appellant who, during subsequent custodial interrogation, identified the bedding mat and the dagger, being articles that were not visible, apparent, or previously recovered. The earlier visit of the I.O. to the house does not, by that fact alone, render all subsequent recoveries from the same premises inadmissible. The critical question is whether the information leading to the recovery was fresh and attributable to the accused. We are satisfied that the recovery of these articles on the specific pointation of the appellant amounts to discovery within the meaning of articles 39 and 40 of the QSO, and that the mere fact that the premises had been visited earlier does not vitiate their admissibility.

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(g)The Judicial Confession and its Retraction

43.A judicial confession must satisfy two tests: whether it is voluntary, and whether it is true.

44.As to voluntariness: the record reflects that the appellant was produced before the Judicial Magistrate on 20.09.2021. On 22.09.2021, two days later, he expressed his intention to confess. The Judicial Magistrate introduced himself; informed the appellant that he was not bound to confess; warned him that any confession would be used as evidence against him; gave him 30 minutes to reflect upon his decision; informed him that he would not be handed back to the police even if he declined to confess; and caused all police officials including the Naib Court to be removed from the courtroom. These safeguards meet the statutory threshold prescribed under section 164 read with section 364, Cr.P.C. The grant of adequate reflection time, the administration of the statutory warning, and the exclusion of police presence combine to establish that the confession was voluntary and was not the product of inducement, threat, or promise.

45.As to truth: the contents of the confession are striking in their specificity. The appellant did not merely admit to an act of rape; he described the circumstances in which the absences of his wife created opportunity, identified the bathroom curtain through which he observed the victim, confessed to approximately 12 to 13 instances of sodomy, admitted to using a condom on some occasions, and described an unnatural offence committed 13 to 14 days before the report. These details, namely the use of a condom, the description of the bathroom arrangement, and the approximate chronology, are internally consistent with the account of the victim to the Medical Officer and with the FSL findings. They carry the hallmark of personal knowledge. A fabricated or coerced confession rarely exhibits such granular and corroborated detail. We are, therefore, clear in our mind that the confession is not only voluntary but is also true.

46.As to retraction: the appellant, in his first statement under section 342, Cr.P.C., simply termed the confession ―incorrect.‖ After remand, he elaborated upon his retraction, attributing it to the strained spousal relations and alleging instigation by his wife. However, retraction from a judicial confession, standing alone and unaccompanied by any material, does not destroy its evidential value. A retracted confession may sustain conviction if the Court is satisfied that it was voluntarily made and is true, and if it receives sufficient corroboration from other evidence on the record. In the present case, the retraction is bare, belated, and unsupported by any evidence. Not a shred of material has been placed on the record to demonstrate either that coercion was applied or that the contents of the confession are untrue. On the contrary, the confession stands corroborated by the testimony of the victim, the medical evidence, and the forensic recovery.

47.We may further observe that pursuant to the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2006, offences of rape and fornication have become ta’zir offences. Consequently, unlike hudood cases, a confession to a rape charge recorded in a single sitting before the Judicial Magistrate, in compliance with the prescribed safeguards, is sufficient in law.

(h)The Defence of False Implication

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48.The sole substantive defence of the appellant is that the charge is the product of mala fide, prompted by the enmity of his wife arising from their strained conjugal relations. This plea must be examined with care.

49.Although the deposition of the I.O. does disclose that the appellant had strained relations with his wife, no evidence has been placed on the record to substantiate the assertion that the complaint was instigated by PW8 as an act of matrimonial vengeance. The claim of the appellant that this fact was ―admitted by the I.O. and other witnesses‖ is not borne out by the record. The I.O. confirmed the existence of strained relations but did not admit, nor did any other witness testify, that the complaint was false or instigated. Moreover, the appellant did not put this specific plea to any of the prosecution witnesses in their cross-examination in a manner sufficient to discharge the obligation of confrontation. He did not avail himself of the opportunity to depose on oath under section 340(2), Cr.P.C. He produced no evidence in defence. Above all, no motive has been attributed to the victim herself. Even accepting, arguendo, that the wife of the appellant harboured ill-will against him, it defies common sense and every norm of human experience that a mother would subject her own minor daughter to the stigma, trauma, and lifelong social consequences of a false allegation of rape, and that the daughter would voluntarily participate in such a fabrication, merely to settle a matrimonial score. The defence of false implication is, accordingly, a bald assertion that does not raise a reasonable doubt on the record.

(i)Cumulative Assessment

50.Drawing together the threads of the foregoing analysis, the prosecution case rests upon the following convergent body of evidence:

(i)The direct, consistent, and confidence-inspiring testimony of the victim, who unequivocally identified the appellant as the perpetrator and stood firm under cross-examination;

(ii)The corroborative testimony of PW8, the mother of the victim, who accompanied the victim to the police station and supported the complaint;

(iii)The medical evidence, establishing loss of hymenal integrity, a bruise on the thigh of the victim, and the contemporaneous disclosure of the victim to the Medical Officer of the timing, circumstances, and details (including the use of a condom) of the last assault;

(iv)The forensic recovery of a semen-stained bedding mat from the scene, tested positive by the FSL, recovered on the pointation of the appellant;

(v)The recovery of a dagger on the pointation of the appellant, corroborating the charge of criminal intimidation;

(vi)The voluntary and true judicial confession, rich in specific and corroborated detail, the retraction of which is bare and unsubstantiated;

(vii)The absence of any credible motive for false implication on the part of the victim, who is the own daughter of the appellant.

51.No single piece of evidence stands in isolation. Each strand reinforces and is reinforced by the others. The delay in reporting, when understood in the lived social context of incestuous abuse within a patriarchal household, is satisfactorily Page 16 of 20

explained and is itself consistent with the truth of the charge. The defence of mala fide instigation is unsupported, implausible, and does not create a reasonable doubt. We are, accordingly, satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution has proved its case.

X. PRIOR UNCHARGED ACTS

52.The appellant was charged in respect of his previous acts of rape upon the victim, extending over a period of approximately three years. Those earlier acts, however, cannot be treated as distinct counts for the purpose of separate conviction. For each repeated offence, the prosecution must establish with reasonable specificity the date, time, place, and mode and manner of each individual incident. Such specificity has not been provided in respect of the earlier acts.

53.Nevertheless, the evidence of prior acts serves an important, though strictly limited, evidential function. It furnishes the contextual background against which the pattern of fear, silence, coercion, and delayed disclosure becomes intelligible. It explains the mechanism by which the appellant exercised sustained dominion over the victim and suppressed her ability to seek help. The prior acts, while not individually prosecutable, are part of the evidential fabric that renders the account of the victim of the charged offence natural, probable, and credible.

54.It is pertinent to observe that in 1983, Child Psychologist Roland Summit studied the pattern of behaviour in sexually abused children and identified what he termed the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), comprising five behavioural phases: secrecy, helplessness, entrapment and accommodation, delayed disclosure, and recantation. While CSAAS, being a therapeutic model, cannot be used as a legal test of proof of the occurrence of sexual abuse, it has been recognized across jurisdictions as an explanatory framework for understanding the apparently counterintuitive behaviour of child victims, including prolonged silence, accommodation to the abuse, and delayed or tentative disclosure.20 The behaviour of the victim in the present case, consisting in years of enforced silence followed by disclosure to her mother, is entirely consistent with the recognized behavioural pattern of child sexual abuse victims and reinforces, rather than undermines, the credibility of her account.

XI. FINDINGS ON EACH CHARGE

(a)Section 376, PPC, Rape

55.The essential ingredients of the offence under section 376, PPC, are: (i) sexual intercourse; (ii) with a woman; (iii) against her will or without her consent, or where consent is immaterial by reason of the victim being under 16 years of age. In the present case, the victim was below 18 years of age at the time of the charged offence and was, in any event, the own daughter of the appellant over whom he exercised total parental and domestic control. The direct testimony of the victim, corroborated by the medical evidence showing loss of Leslie Feiner, ―The Whole Truth: Restoring Reality to Children’s Narrative in Long-Term Incest Cases‖, (supra fn.11)

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hymenal integrity and bruising, by the forensic recovery of semen-stained bedding, by her disclosure to the Medical Officer of the use of a condom, and by the judicial confession of the appellant in which he admitted to repeated sexual intercourse, establishes the offence of rape beyond reasonable doubt. We hold that the conviction under section 376, PPC, is sustainable and is hereby confirmed.

(b)Section 53, Child Protection & Welfare Act, 2010, Child Sexual Abuse 56. Section 53 of the CPA criminalizes sexual abuse of a child, defined as a person below 18 years of age. The victim, born on 04.04.2004, was indisputably a minor on 19.09.2021, the date of the last charged offence, being 17 years, 5 months and 15 days old. The same evidence that establishes the offence of rape establishes, a fortiori, the offence of child sexual abuse. The relationship of father and daughter, far from mitigating the offence, constitutes a severely aggravating circumstance, as the statute was enacted precisely to protect children from abuse by persons in positions of trust and authority. We hold that the conviction under section 53, CPA, is sustainable and is hereby maintained.

(c)Section 506, PPC, Criminal Intimidation

57.The offence of criminal intimidation under section 506, PPC, requires proof that the accused threatened another person with injury to the body, reputation, or property of that person with intent to cause alarm. The victim has testified that the appellant threatened to kill her if she disclosed the crime to anyone. Her mother, PW8, confirmed that the appellant would beat both the victim and herself when confronted. A dagger was recovered on the pointation of the appellant, corroborating the instrument of intimidation. The appellant himself, while denying the use of the dagger in his confession, did not deny the act of threatening the victim; the remaining evidence is sufficient. The criminal intimidation was the mechanism by which the appellant maintained the silence of the victim over the entire period of abuse. We hold that the conviction under section 506, PPC, is sustainable and is hereby maintained.

(d)Section 15, KP Arms Act, 2013, Possession of Unlicensed Weapon 58. A dagger was recovered from a wooden box on the pointation of the appellant during custodial investigation. The recovery memo (ExPW5/1) and the testimony of marginal witnesses confirm the recovery. The appellant has failed to produce any licence or lawful authority for possession of the said weapon. The recovery of the dagger is further relevant to the charge of criminal intimidation, as the evidence establishes that the appellant used it to threaten the victim. We hold that the conviction under section 15, AA, is sustainable and is hereby maintained.

XII. SENTENCE

59.Having confirmed the convictions on all counts, we now address the question of sentence, with particular reference to the sentence of death imposed under section 376, PPC, which stands before this Court in Death Reference for confirmation.

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60.The aggravating circumstances attending this case are of the gravest character:

(i)The victim is the biological daughter of the appellant, a child who was approximately 141⁄2 years old when the abuse commenced;

(ii)The appellant occupied the position of the highest trust and authority in the life of the victim, that of her father and the head of the household;

(iii)The abuse was not an isolated act but a sustained and repeated pattern extending over approximately three years;

(iv)The appellant used criminal intimidation, including the threat of death and the wielding of a dagger, to ensure the silence of the victim;

(v)The appellant used physical violence against the mother of the victim when she attempted to intervene;

(vi)The appellant exploited the absences of his wife from the home, being absences caused by the very domestic discord he himself created, to prey upon his daughter;

(vii)The confession of the appellant reveals not merely the commission of rape but also sodomy and unnatural offences upon the victim, demonstrating a pattern of comprehensive sexual degradation of a child by her own father.

61.We have considered whether any mitigating circumstance genuinely arises. None has been placed on the record by the defence. The appellant did not depose on oath, produced no evidence, and offered no material in mitigation beyond the bare assertion of false implication. The gravity of the offence, namely the sexual destruction of one own minor child over a sustained period, maintained through coercion and violence, represents one of the most profound violations of human dignity, parental duty, and the natural order conceivable. The childhood of the victim was stolen; her innocence destroyed; her trust in the one person who should have protected her above all others was violated in the most fundamental manner. A father who transforms the family home from a sanctuary into a chamber of abuse, and his parental authority from a shield into a weapon, has committed an offence that the law rightly regards with the utmost severity.

62.In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the sentence of death imposed by the learned trial Court under section 376, PPC, is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and is warranted both by the law and by the facts of this case. The Death Reference is accordingly answered in the affirmative and the sentence of death is confirmed.

63.The sentences imposed on the remaining counts, namely section 53, CPA (10 years RI with fine of Rs. 10,00,000/-); section 506, PPC (2 years RI with fine of Rs. 10,000/-); section 15, AA (3 years SI with fine of Rs. 1,000/-), are proportionate and appropriate having regard to the nature and gravity of the respective offences. The compensatory fine of Rs. 100,000/- under section 544- A, Cr.P.C., awarded for the mental and physical suffering of the victim, is likewise just and warranted.

XIII. FINAL ORDER

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64.In light of the foregoing analysis and for the reasons recorded above, we pass the following order:

(a)The Criminal Jail Appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

(b)The convictions and sentences passed by the learned trial Court in its judgment dated 09.12.2024 on all four counts, namely section 376, PPC; section 53, CPA; section 506, PPC; and section 15, AA, are hereby MAINTAINED in their entirety.

(c)Death Reference No. 01-M of 2025 is ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. The sentence of death imposed upon the appellant Khaista Rahman under section 376, PPC, is CONFIRMED.

(d)All sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently, as directed by the trial Court.

(e)The appellant shall receive the benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C., as already directed by the trial Court.

(f)The compensatory fine of Rs. 100,000/- under section 544-A, Cr.P.C., payable through saving certificates in the name of the victim through the Civil Nazir of the District Courts, is MAINTAINED.

(g)The direction of the trial Court prohibiting publication of the judicial proceedings in a manner disclosing the identity of the victim is MAINTAINED. All courts, authorities, and media organizations are directed to ensure strict compliance with this direction. The name of the victim and her identifying particulars shall not be disclosed in any published version of this judgment.

(h)The case file shall be transmitted to the learned trial Court for execution of the sentence in accordance with law, subject to the provisions of sections 375 to 379, Cr.P.C.

--Sd--

JUDGE

-Sd-

JUDGE

Announced in open Court on 22.04.2026

(D.B) Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal & Justice Salah-ud-Din Page 20 of 20