Akhtar Hussain Vs Iqbal Hussain & another

JUDGMENT SHEET

PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

J.Cr. A No. 873-P/2025 with Murder Reference No. 17-P/2025

Akhtar Hussain Vs Iqbal Hussain & another

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 09.09.2026

Appellant by: Mr. Shabbir Hussain Gigyani, Advocate

The State by: Mr. Ayub Zaman, AAG Complainant by: Mr. Naeem Ullah, Advocate.

SAHIBZADA ASADULLAH, J.- Through this criminal appeal, appellant Akhtar Hussain has questioned the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge-V/Judge Special Court, Mardan dated 27.08.2025 rendered in case FIR No. 287 dated 26.03.2020 under sections 302/364-A/376 PPC read with section 37 and 53 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa CPA registered at Police Station Sheikh Maltoon Town, District Mardan

whereby, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as under: -

“U/s 302 (b) PPC as Tazir and sentenced to death and to be hanged by his neck till he is declared dead and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,00,000/- (rupees five lacs) within the meaning of section 544-A Cr.PC.

U/s 364-A PPC sentenced to death and to be hanged by his neck till he is declared dead.

U/s 376 PPC sentenced to death and to be hanged by his neck till he is declared dead.

U/s 37 KP Child Protection & Welfare Act to suffer two years simple imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- and in default whereof, to further undergo simple imprisonment for two months.

U/s 53 KP Child Protection & Welfare Act to suffer seven years simple imprisonment and to pay a fine of rupees one million and in default whereof, to further undergo simple imprisonment for two months.

The fine imposed shall be recoverable from the accused as an arrear of land revenue and if realized shall be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased.

All the sentences shall run concurrently. Benefit of section 382-B CrPC is extended to the appellant.

2.According to the prosecution

narrative embodied in the FIR are that on 27.03.2020, Israil Khan ASI Police Station Sheikh Maltoon Town, Mardan alongwith other police officials, on receipt of information, proceeded to the water channel (Khaal/Frab), situated at the thoroughfare of village Jan Abad, Mardan, where complainant Iqbal Hussain son of Said Rahman produced a dead body wrapped in a sack and reported the matter to the effect that the said sack contained the dead body of his minor daughter, namely Mst. Maham, aged about 9/10 years; that on 26.03.2020, the deceased had accompanied him to the shop of one Sheraz, where, after purchasing household articles, he handed over the articles to the deceased with the

direction to proceed to his house, however, the deceased did not reach home and went missing while on her way thereto; that thereafter they were in search of the minor deceased, and on the following day her dead body, wrapped in a sack, was found lying in the water channel; that the clothes and shoes worn by the deceased were visible to the naked eye through the sack and, on the basis thereof, he identified the dead body as that of his minor daughter; that no one were charged for the commission of offence hence, the present FIR.

It is pertinent to mention that on 29.03.2020, complainant Iqbal Hussain, recorded his statement under Section 164 CrPC before the court of learned Civil Judge-II/MoD, Mardan, wherein he charged the accused Akhtar Hussain for the commission of offence.

3.After completion of investigation, complete challan was put in court. Provisions of section 265-C CrPC were complied with and the appellant was charge sheeted, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. In order to prove its claim, the prosecution produced and

examined as many as 20 witnesses. After closure of prosecution evidence, statement of appellant was recorded under section 342 CrPC, wherein he posed innocence, however, neither he wished to be examined on Oath as required under section 340 (2) CrPC, nor wanted to produce evidence in defence. The learned trial Court, after full-fledged trial convicted and sentenced the appellant vide the impugned judgment, hence, this appeal.

4.Arguments heard and available

record scanned through.

5.The unfortunate deceased went

missing, whereupon a search for her recovery was immediately undertaken. When all efforts to trace her proved futile, the matter was ultimately brought to the notice of the local police and entered in the shape of a Daily Diary. The search, however, culminated in a grim discovery when the dead body of the deceased was recovered from a nearby river, concealed in a sack. The recovery of the dead body transformed the missing-person inquiry into an investigation of homicide, and the matter was accordingly reported to the local police. The appellant was

subsequently charged with having committed her murder. The dead body was taken into possession. The injury sheet and inquest report were prepared whereafter, the dead body was forwarded for post-mortem examination. During the course of post-mortem, the doctor collected the requisite biological material, including vaginal swabs and blood samples, while the garments of the deceased were also secured and taken into possession. A blood sample of the deceased was preserved for purposes of subsequent forensic examination. In the course of investigation, the accused was arrested. Soon thereafter, the Investigating Officer recorded the statement of the shopkeeper from whose shop the sack was allegedly obtained. The shopkeeper produced the relevant register maintained in the ordinary course of his business, wherein an entry concerning the borrowing of the said sack had been duly recorded. The sack was consequently taken into possession by the Investigating Officer and incorporated into the chain of investigation.

The investigation thereafter proceeded towards the place of residence of the accused. The

accused led the police party to his house, which, at that time, was found closed. Upon opening the door, the police party entered the premises and effected recoveries therefrom. Of particular significance was the recovery of the trouser of the appellant, which was found hanging from a nail inside the house, besides the slippers allegedly belonging to the deceased. A sketch/site plan of the house was thereafter prepared, depicting the place from where the recoveries had been effected. The various parcels so collected during the investigation were duly forwarded to the forensic laboratory for examination, comparison and chemical analysis and, where required, for DNA profiling. A report was subsequently received from the Punjab Forensic Science Agency/Laboratory. Although certain parcels yielded negative results and no matching profile could be obtained therefrom, the forensic examination of the trouser recovered from the house of the appellant assumed particular significance. The trouser was found to bear bloodstains, and the forensic examination revealed the presence of blood attributable to

both the accused and the deceased. The laboratory had also received the blood samples of the accused and the deceased, and the profiles obtained from the relevant exhibits were found to correspond with those samples. Thus, the forensic material furnished a scientific link between the accused, the deceased and the article recovered from the house of the accused. It is further borne out from the record that, as the physical custody of the accused was sought during the course of investigation, he ultimately expressed his willingness to confess his guilt. He was, accordingly, produced before the Court of competent jurisdiction, where his confessional statement was recorded in accordance with law.

Upon completion of the proceedings relating to his confession, he was remanded to judicial lock- up. The investigation was thereafter brought to its logical conclusion, and the accused was ultimately sent up to face trial before the competent Court. Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court, after appraisal of the evidence brought on record, found the accused guilty of the offence charged and, vide the

impugned judgment, convicted and sentenced him accordingly. It is this judgment of conviction and sentence which has been called in question before this Court through the instant appeal.

6.The learned trial Court, after taking into consideration the material aspects of the case, concluded that the appellant was involved in the commission of the offence and, accordingly, convicted and sentenced him to death. This Court is, therefore, called upon to examine whether such conclusion is borne out from a proper appreciation of the evidence on record. True that the offence alleged is heinous, but the gravity of an accusation can never substitute the proof required to establish it rather, the graver the charge and the more irreversible its consequence, the greater must be the degree of judicial care in evaluating the evidence. Suspicion, however strong, cannot fill a gap in the prosecution case, nor can the gruesomeness of an occurrence lend strength to otherwise deficient evidence. Since the appellant stands condemned to the ultimate penalty of death, this Court considers it its solemn duty to independently and anxiously

reappraise the entire evidentiary record, both individually and cumulatively, and to satisfy itself that the conviction rests upon trustworthy and legally sufficient evidence, free from any reasonable doubt. It is in this perspective that we now proceed to examine the prosecution case and the evidence upon which the learned trial Court founded the conviction.

7.In order to resolve the controversy, this Court considers it appropriate first to trace the chain of events which ultimately led the investigating agency to the appellant. The record reflects that soon after the minor went missing, a search was undertaken in the locality, but without success. Shortly thereafter, information was received regarding the presence of the dead body of a minor lying in the river. The complainant, accompanied by the local police, proceeded to the spot and identified the body as that of his daughter. During investigation, a sack connected with the occurrence provided an important lead.

The police traced it to the shop of one Asad Ullah, who stated that the appellant had purchased it from him on credit, the amount

having been entered in his register with a promise of subsequent payment. His statement under section 161 CrPC was accordingly recorded. It was against this backdrop that suspicion converged upon the appellant and he was arrested. During physical remand, he allegedly led the investigating officer to his house, the place where, according to the prosecution, the occurrence had taken place, and, on his pointation, a trouser attributed to him and a pair of slippers belonging to the deceased were recovered. He thereafter pointed out the place where the dead body had allegedly been disposed of and, at a subsequent stage, opted to confess his guilt, whereupon he was produced before the competent Judicial Magistrate and his confessional statement was recorded. These circumstances assume significance because the appellant was neither nominated nor suspected at the time when the child initially went missing.

The complainant admittedly bore no previous ill- will or animosity towards him. His implication thus did not originate from a pre-existing accusation; rather, according to the prosecution, it

emerged progressively from the circumstances uncovered during investigation, beginning with the recovery of the dead body and the tracing of the sack to the shopkeeper. The scientific evidence, however, requires closer scrutiny.

Several parcels were transmitted to the laboratory, including biological material collected during investigation. The prosecution relied particularly upon the DNA analysis and the biological material detected on the trouser recovered at the instance of the appellant. The laboratory expert, examined as PW-17, testified regarding receipt, examination and profiling of the relevant samples and the result of their comparison. The defence seriously questioned the provenance and safe transmission of the reference samples, contending that merely describing a tube as containing blood of the appellant or the deceased could not, by itself, establish where, when and by whom such blood had been collected. This objection cannot be brushed aside merely on the strength of the label attached to a sample; the evidentiary value of a DNA comparison necessarily depends upon the

prosecution satisfactorily establishing the identity and integrity of the specimens subjected to comparison. At the same time, the expert evidence cannot be rendered meaningless where the biological material was in fact capable of profiling and yielded a scientifically reportable result. Its ultimate weight must, therefore, be assessed in conjunction with the evidence concerning collection, custody and transmission of the samples and the other circumstances appearing on the record. Learned counsel for the appellant further laid considerable emphasis upon the prosecution allegation that, after arrest, the appellant pointed out a water tank near a mosque and disclosed that he had washed the trouser there. It was argued that if the garment had indeed been washed, the subsequent detection of blood upon it was inherently doubtful. The argument, though requiring consideration, cannot be accepted merely as an abstract proposition.

The decisive circumstance is not whether the garment had at some stage come into contact with water, but whether sufficient biological material nevertheless survived upon it to permit forensic

examination and DNA profiling. Once the laboratory actually subjected the garment to examination and reported detectable biological material capable of analysis, the Court cannot substitute conjecture for scientific evidence merely because the garment was stated to have been washed. What remains essential, however, is to determine whether the garment was satisfactorily connected with the appellant, whether its custody remained secure, and whether the reference samples against which the biological material was compared were proved through reliable evidence. The further submission that no injury sheet disclosed any injury upon the appellant, and therefore no blood connected with him could have appeared upon the trouser, also has to be examined in the context of the prosecution case as a whole. The absence of an injury upon the appellant would certainly be relevant if the prosecution sought to attribute the presence of his own blood to an injury sustained during the occurrence; it would not, by itself, answer the separate question whether biological material of the deceased was present upon his

clothing. Likewise, in an occurrence involving the alleged sexual assault and killing of a minor child, the absence of visible resistance injuries upon the assailant cannot, standing alone, be elevated into a circumstance destructive of the prosecution case. A child subjected to overwhelming force, fear or trauma may not necessarily be capable of offering resistance sufficient to leave discernible injuries upon her assailant. The matter must therefore be decided, not upon assumptions as to how the unfortunate child ought to have reacted, but upon the evidence actually brought before the Court.

Viewed thus, the appellant did not surface through a solitary or preconceived accusation.

The prosecution seeks to connect him through a succession of circumstances, the tracing of the sack, the shopkeeper's account, the recoveries allegedly made at his instance, the pointing-out of relevant places, the forensic evidence and, finally, the judicial confession. Whether these circumstances have been individually proved and, when read together, form an unbroken chain

pointing conclusively towards the appellant is the question to which this Court shall now advert.

8.There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves consideration. Having regard to the tender age of the victim and the nature of the assault alleged, some instinctive resistance on her part cannot altogether be ruled out. An assailant, however, overwhelmed by his criminal design and intent upon its accomplishment, may remain indifferent to minor scratches, abrasions or other injuries sustained in the process. Had the appellant been medically examined immediately after his arrest and no such mark or injury been found upon his person, that circumstance might legitimately have furnished an argument to the defence. In the present case, however, no such medical examination was conducted; consequently, the mere absence of a documented injury cannot retrospectively be converted into proof that no injury could possibly have been sustained.

Equally, it would be unsafe to speculate upon the precise source of every bloodstain without examining the scientific evidence through the

safeguards prescribed by law. It is in this context that the DNA evidence assumes considerable significance. The trouser recovered during investigation was subjected to forensic examination; biological material capable of profiling was detected thereon, and the laboratory comparison yielded a positive result connecting the relevant profiles. The expert appeared before the learned trial Court, owned the forensic process and the result thereof, and was subjected to cross-examination. The defence could question the collection, custody and transmission of the samples, but the scientific conclusion recorded after laboratory examination could not be displaced merely by conjecture that a garment allegedly washed with water ought necessarily to have ceased to retain analyzable biological material. Whether sufficient genetic material survives upon a washed fabric is not a matter for judicial intuition; it falls within the domain of forensic science. Once the laboratory succeeded in recovering material of sufficient quality for DNA profiling, the Court cannot substitute an assumption of impossibility for an accomplished

scientific examination. The law itself now accords substantial recognition to such evidence.

In Ali Haider alias Papu v. Jameel Hussain and others (PLD 2021 SC 362), the Supreme Court held that DNA evidence constitutes relevant expert evidence within the contemplation of Article 59 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, while Article 164 expressly accommodates evidence made available through modern scientific techniques. It was further held that a DNA report prepared by an expert of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency enjoys per se admissibility by virtue of section 9 of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency Act, 2007 read with section 510 CrPC. The Supreme Court nevertheless emphasized an equally important safeguard: the reliability of DNA evidence remains dependent upon proper collection, preservation and handling of the samples. Thus, science does not displace the rules of proof;

rather, when its foundational requirements are satisfied, it furnishes the Court with an objective means of testing facts which human perception alone may be incapable of resolving. The

objection raised by learned counsel regarding the precise origin of the reference sample, therefore, has to be examined against the entire prosecution evidence concerning its collection and transmission and not in isolation. A laboratory is neither expected nor competent to prove how a sample came into existence before reaching it; its function is to examine what is received and scientifically report the result. Conversely, the prosecution remains responsible for satisfactorily connecting the sample examined in the laboratory with the person or article from whom or from which it is said to have been obtained. Where that initial link is established through the evidence on record, a scientifically obtained DNA match cannot be discarded merely because the defence proposes an alternative possibility unsupported by any material. Criminal adjudication cannot remain impervious to advances in forensic science. Human recollection is susceptible to lapse, perception to error and testimony to distortion; DNA profiling, when performed upon properly collected and preserved samples through an established forensic protocol, rests upon

objectively ascertainable biological characteristics however, this does not make DNA evidence infallible with proof of its provenance.

Its compelling force lies precisely in the conjunction of two things: integrity of the sample and validity of the scientific comparison. In the present case, once the recovery of the garment, its transmission for examination, the relevant reference material and the testimony of the forensic expert are found trustworthy, the resulting DNA match becomes a circumstance of formidable corroborative value. It would be equally erroneous either to reject such evidence merely because it is scientific or to accept it mechanically without examining its foundations.

We are, therefore, persuaded to hold that the forensic evidence cannot be viewed in isolation but must be placed alongside the other proved circumstances, the manner in which the appellant surfaced during investigation, the recovery attributed to him, the evidence concerning the article purchased from the shopkeeper, the pointing-out and the remaining links in the prosecution chain. Read in that setting, and

subject to the prosecution having established the integrity of the samples sent for examination, the positive DNA result furnishes powerful scientific corroboration connecting the appellant with the deceased and the occurrence. The Court would fail in its duty were it to shut its eyes to scientifically reliable evidence merely because the occurrence itself was not witnessed by human eyes; yet it would equally fail were it to permit science to bridge a foundational gap which the prosecution was legally bound to prove.

9.We now turn to the most crucial

piece of evidence against the appellant, his judicial confession. The record reflects that after his arrest and physical remand, the appellant expressed his willingness to confess and was accordingly produced before the Judicial Magistrate of competent jurisdiction. Before recording the statement, the learned Magistrate afforded him sufficient time for reflection, explained the consequences of making a confession and, after satisfying himself that the appellant was willing to speak of his own free will, put to him a series of relevant questions. We

have ourselves examined the questionnaire, the answers furnished and the certificate appended thereto and find that the safeguards prescribed for ensuring voluntariness were duly observed. The learned Magistrate subsequently appeared before the trial Court as PW-16 and explained the entire exercise, including the time allowed for reflection, the caution administered and the satisfaction reached by him before recording the statement. Despite searching cross-examination, nothing could be elicited to suggest any threat, inducement, coercion or influence upon the appellant. The procedural aspect of the confession, therefore, inspires confidence. The matter, however, does not end with its voluntary character, for the Court must equally satisfy itself that the confession is true. Tested on that touchstone, the statement carries considerable assurance from the surrounding evidence. It is not a bare admission of guilt; rather, the appellant narrated the occurrence in considerable detail, portions whereof correspond with facts independently established on the record. He referred to the minor carrying soap and explained

her familiarity with his household and attachment to his wife, whom she used to call “Mami”. More significantly, he disclosed that during the sexual assault he inflicted teeth-bites upon the chest of the child, a detail finding support from the corresponding marks noticed during medical examination. The confession further contains the circumstances relating to the purchase of the sack associated with disposal of the dead body. This part of the narrative also received independent support from Asad Ullah, the shopkeeper, who appeared before the trial Court and confirmed the purchase from his shop. These are not peripheral details; they are material circumstances independently reflected in the prosecution evidence and lend substantial assurance to the truthfulness of the confession. It is settled that a judicial confession, once found voluntary and true, constitutes substantive evidence and may, in an appropriate case, sustain conviction on its own strength. Here, however, the confession does not stand alone. Its material features find support from the medical evidence, recoveries, forensic material and other circumstances already

discussed. The confession explains those circumstances, while those circumstances, in turn, furnish assurance of its truth. Having examined the manner in which the confession was recorded, the testimony of PW-16, its essential contents and its correspondence with independently established circumstances, we entertain no hesitation in holding it to be voluntary and true.

Read together with the remaining evidence, it completes the chain of circumstances and firmly connects the appellant with the sexual assault and killing of the minor deceased. Reliance is placed on the judgment of Apex Court in a titled case “Shaukat Ali vs the State & others” (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 577) wherein, it has been held as follows:

“Though the appellant when indicted claimed trial and retracted from his confessional statement during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, nonetheless, on a careful examination we have found his confessional statement free from all taints. Seemingly voluntary without duress or inducement;

inculpatory in nature the confessional statement reflects a complete and truthful narration of event leading to deceased's death. The learned Magistrate has taken due care to administer necessary warnings to the appellant and recorded each detail thereof in his own hand. It does not appear to have been fabricated to advance prosecution's case and thus can be squarely relied upon without any reflection on safe administration of criminal justice. It is by now well settled that a retracted confession can form basis for conviction if found voluntary and truthful.”

10.With each passing day, we are confronted with circumstances that compel us to reflect upon the direction in which our society is moving. What is perhaps more disturbing than the occurrence of a particular crime is the gradual erosion of the moral consciousness which enables a society to distinguish between right and wrong, virtue and vice, humanity and brutality. We appear, at times, to have forgotten the very essence of our existence as human beings and the exalted status bestowed upon mankind as Ashraf-

ul-Makhlooqat. The teachings of morality, compassion, dignity, restraint and respect for human life, which were meant to guide our individual and collective conduct, seem increasingly to have been overshadowed by indifference, selfishness and a disturbing disregard for the sanctity of human life. These are not merely isolated incidents of criminality;

rather, they are warning signs of a deeper malaise. Every such occurrence, particularly when directed against the weak, the helpless and those incapable of protecting themselves, strikes at the very conscience of society. If such conduct is allowed to pass without an appropriate response from the law, the distinction between lawfulness and lawlessness would gradually become blurred, and the foundations upon which a civilized society rests would inevitably be weakened. The law, therefore, cannot remain a silent spectator to such moral and social degeneration. The administration of criminal justice carries with it a solemn responsibility, not merely to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused in accordance with law, but also to

ensure that the protection afforded by law to human life, dignity and fundamental societal values is neither diluted nor rendered meaningless. Where guilt is established through reliable and legally admissible evidence, the law must speak with clarity, firmness and authority.

Mercy cannot be permitted to become an instrument for defeating justice, nor can misplaced sympathy towards the perpetrator eclipse the suffering and rights of the victim. A civilized society is ultimately measured by the manner in which it responds to injustice. If the guilty are permitted to escape the consequences of their proved acts, particularly in cases involving the most vulnerable members of society, the resulting injustice is not confined to the victim alone; it wounds the collective conscience of society. Conversely, when the law is applied fairly, fearlessly and in accordance with due process, it reaffirms the fundamental proposition that no person is above the law and that every human life possesses a dignity which the legal order is bound to protect. We must, therefore, pause and ask ourselves: how far may a

society descend before it ceases to recognize the values that make it civilized? The answer lies not in rhetoric, but in the manner in which the institutions of justice discharge their constitutional and legal responsibilities. The courts cannot reverse every moral decline within society, but they can ensure that the law does not become powerless in the face of it. Where an offence is proved, the law must provide an effective and proportionate response; otherwise, the very purpose of the criminal justice system would stand frustrated. It is in this perspective that we approach the present case. The Court is conscious that punishment is not an end in itself, nor is it imposed for vengeance. It is the lawful consequence of a proved transgression and, in appropriate cases, serves the broader purposes of justice, deterrence and the protection of society.

To allow a proved offender to escape merely because society has become accustomed to such conduct would amount to surrendering the authority of law to the very forces that threaten the social order. We cannot afford to permit this moral descent to become the accepted order of

the day. The law must remain a beacon distinguishing right from wrong, justice from injustice and humanity from brutality. If, in a case where guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt, the Court fails to give effect to the mandate of law, it would not merely be an error in the adjudicatory process; it would amount to a failure towards the victim, towards society and towards the very concept of justice. It is for these reasons that, having examined the entire record with the requisite caution and having found the prosecution case established in accordance with law, we are constrained to conclude that the accused must face the consequence which the law prescribes. Justice cannot be meaningful unless it is capable of protecting the innocent, condemning the unlawful and reaffirming, in the clearest possible terms, that the sanctity of human life and dignity shall not be compromised. As such, having examined the matter from every conceivable angle and having found no legal or factual infirmity warranting our interference, we are not persuaded to disturb the judgment impugned herein. Having

affirmed the guilt of the appellant, we are now confronted with the final and equally solemn question: whether the sentence awarded by the learned trial Court calls for any interference. The ultimate penalty can never be maintained merely because an offence evokes horror or indignation.

Even after guilt stands proved, the Court must independently search the record for every circumstance capable of mitigating the sentence, for punishment is the exercise of judicial authority and not an instrument of vengeance. We have undertaken that exercise; yet the facts before us disclose no circumstance of sufficient weight to justify the indulgence sought. At this stage, one is inevitably reminded of the profound account of man's creation in the Holy Qur'an. When Allah Almighty declared, “Indeed, I am going to place a vicegerent upon the earth,” the angels submitted:

“Will You place therein one who will cause corruption therein and shed blood?” (Surah Al- Baqarah, 2:30). The verse presents, in the most solemn terms, the contrast between the dignity with which mankind was entrusted and the depths to which human conduct may descend. Man was

endowed with reason, conscience and the capacity to distinguish restraint from transgression; yet when those faculties are consciously surrendered to unbridled desire, the very apprehension of fasad fil-ard, corruption upon the earth and the shedding of innocent blood assumes a painful human reality. In our considered view, the sentence awarded by the learned trial Court is not merely a formal consequence of the conviction; rather, it represents the solemn response of the law to an act which has crossed the bounds of human conduct and offended the very values which the criminal justice system is ordained to protect.

Justice, after all, cannot remain confined to the mere declaration of guilt; it must, where the law so commands, culminate in a consequence commensurate with the gravity of the wrong committed. A sentence which is legally warranted, proportionate to the offence, and founded upon a careful appreciation of the evidence cannot be diluted merely on considerations of misplaced sympathy. The law must speak where the facts demand that it speaks

and it must speak with that firmness which assures society that the sanctity of human life, dignity and lawful order shall not be surrendered to criminality. Viewed in this perspective, we are of the considered opinion that the sentence awarded by the learned trial Court constitutes an appropriate, lawful and proportionate response to the deed of the accused. The present case brings that contrast into sharp focus. The appellant was not a child incapable of appreciating consequences, but a mature married man with two wives. Yet a helpless minor, entitled to nothing but protection from the adults around her, became the object of his sexual desire. The brutality did not stop at the sexual assault. The medical evidence, read with his confession, speaks of teeth-bites upon the child's chest and of violence culminating in her death. What began with lust ended with the extinguishment of an innocent life. The child lost everything in a moment; her parents were left with a grief that no judgment can repair. An offence against a child of this nature travels beyond the immediate physical injury inflicted upon the victim. It

wounds the sense of security upon which civilized society rests. Children survive upon trust: trust that an adult will protect rather than prey upon them, that a neighbour will provide safety rather than danger, and that their vulnerability will invite compassion rather than exploitation. When that trust is deliberately betrayed, the law cannot remain indifferent. At the same time, courts must guard against allowing public outrage or the prevalence of similar crimes to determine an individual sentence. The appellant must be punished for what has been proved against him, not for the collective failings of society or for offences committed by others.

We have, therefore, examined the question of sentence not through the prism of indignation, but against the proved manner of the occurrence, the age and helplessness of the victim, the conduct of the appellant, the circumstances attending the offence and the absence of any mitigating feature sufficient to outweigh its aggravating character.

The learned trial Court cannot be said to have adopted the harsher course merely because the crime was abhorrent; rather, on the facts

established in this particular case, the gravity of the proved conduct leaves no legally sustainable ground for extending the leniency sought. Human dignity is not measured by the strength of the powerful, but by the protection afforded to the weak. The law could not restore this child to her parents; it could only ensure that her vulnerability did not become a reason for her suffering to pass without lawful consequence. Having

independently reappraised the evidence as well as the question of sentence, we find no justification for interference with the conclusion reached by the learned trial Court. The conviction and sentence are, therefore, maintained and the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.

11.The murder reference No. 17-P/2025 is answered in affirmative.

Announced

JUDGE

JUDGE

*Muhammad Fiaz* *D.B* Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sahibzada Asadullah, J Hon’ble Mr. Justice Inam Ullah Khan, J