Ali Haider Shinwari & others Vs Muhammad Qubais & others

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

Civil Revision No.351-P/2026

Ali Haider Shinwari & others Vs Muhammad Qubais & others

Date of hearing: 17.03.2026

Petitioner (s) by: Mr. Zia-ur-Rehman Khan, Advocate.

Respondent (s) by: Nemo (In motion).

JUDGMENT

FARAH JAMSHED, J:-Impugned herein the judgment and order dated 06.02.2026 passed by the learned Additional District Judge-VI, Peshawar. By this order, the appeal filed by the petitioners was dismissed, thereby upholding the order 04.12.2024 rendered by the learned Civil Judge-XVI, Peshawar.

2.Briefly, respondent No.1 instituted a suit for declaration, permanent injunction, and possession before the learned Civil Judge, Peshawar. Upon service of summons, the petitioners appeared before the trial court and submitted their written statement, raising both factual and legal objections. During the proceedings, the parties reached a compromise and filed a joint statement,

leading the trial court to decree the suit through judgment and decree dated 20.06.2023. The petitioners later alleged that respondent No.1 had made unauthorized alterations in the compromise deed and presented it before the court, thereby obtaining a summary decree under Order XV-A of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), 1908. Subsequently, respondent No.1 filed an execution petition on 05.12.2023, while the petitioner’s sought dismissal of the same through an application, which was declined by the learned Civil Judge-XVI, Peshawar, vide order dated 04.12.2025. The petitioners' appeal against this order was also dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge-VI, Peshawar, through the judgment and order dated 06.02.2026, leaving no alternative but to approach this Court via the instant civil revision petition.

3.Arguments heard and record perused.

4.The petitioners contend that the execution proceedings lack maintainability as the compromise occurred outside the court and neither oral nor documentary evidence was produced before the court.

The record, however, indicates otherwise; it demonstrates that the compromise deed dated 20.06.2023 was duly brought before the trial court during the proceedings, and a joint statement from the attorney

for the appellants and respondent No.1 was recorded on the same day. Based on this joint statement, the learned trial court proceeded to pass a summary judgment and decree dated 20.06.2023.

5.Before, reviewing the merits of the instant petition, it is necessary to consider the established legal principles and relevant jurisprudence on the subject.

6.The term “compromise” refers to an agreement resolving a real or alleged claim, wherein each party makes concessions. Although the terms “compromise decree” and “consent decree” are sometimes used interchangeably, they are distinct concepts, despite certain similarities.

7.Both consent decrees and compromise decrees involve voluntary agreements requiring court approval.

A compromise decree generally reflects a negotiated settlement between litigating parties who resolve disputes through mutually acceptable terms. In both scenarios, the court examines the agreement to confirm its legality, fairness, and the preservation of the interests of parties.

8.The phrases "agreement or compromise" appearing in Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC are not specifically defined within the CPC itself. Such an

agreement or compromise, as contemplated by this provision, must be complete and unconditional, enabling the immediate passing of a decree without dependence on future contingencies.

9.A consent decree encompasses not only a decree directly pronounced with consent of the parties but also one based on an agreement or compromise recorded under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC. As such, a consent decree is not appealable in accordance with section 96(3) of the CPC. Nevertheless, if the validity of the compromise is challenged or denied, such a decree becomes appealable under Order XLIII Rule 1(m) CPC.

10.The question whether a particular term of compromise relates to the subject matter of a suit, has been considered in several judicial pronouncements and notable decisions including the Peer Dil1 case which is not the first decision to broach the subject of enforcement of compromise decrees. In Messrs.

Country Products Export Ltd2, it was observed that:

The words “that relates to suit” in Order XXIII rule 3 C.P.C. are sufficiently wide to embrace the terms and conditions which constitute consideration of the compromise, and in all such cases the Court cannot refuse to record the compromise merely on the ground that certain Peer Dil & others vs. Dad Muhammad (2009 SCMR 1268) Messrs. Country Products Export, Ltd. vs. Messrs. Bawany Sugar Mills, Ltd. (1968 PLD Karachi, 115)

terms and conditions are not strictly within the scope of the suit. It is not the policy of the Code of Civil Procedure to discourage compromises of litigation. The Courts are under duty to record lawful compromises and a decree based on compromise, though it includes terms and conditions which were not initially within the scope of the suit but are considerations for compromise, would, nevertheless be the decree of the Court, and unless there is express legal prohibition, such a decree would be executable under Order XXI C.P.C.

[emphasis added]

11.Similarly, in the Diamond Vacuum Bottle Manufacturing Co. Ltd 3 ., the Sindh High Court held that:

Where a compromise involves matters outside the suit’s scope as part of the consideration for settling issues within the suit, the entire compromise should be recorded and decreed as related to the suit, regardless of whether some matters independently relate to the suit or not.

12.Furthermore, in Ghulam Muhammad 4 case, the Lahore High Court held that:

A property or right forming consideration for the subject-matter of litigation as per terms of compromise would be considered as the subject of litigation resulting in the compromise for all intents and purposes, and such subject-matter of consideration would not be treated as an extraneous property for purposes of execution proceedings.

Nooruddin Hussain and another vs. Diamond Vacuum Bottle Manufacturing Co (1981 PLD Karachi, 720)

Ghulam Muhammad vs Zubaida Begum and 12 others (1984 CLC, Lahore, 874)

13.While referring to Hemanta Kumari Debi vs.

Midnapur Zamindari Co., (AIR 1919, P C, 79), the high court in Idris Mia vs. Abdul Matleb Mia and others, (PLD 1966, Dacca, 234) has clarified the questions relating to execution and enforcement of compromise decrees in the following manner:

The correct position is that under Order XXIII, rule 3, a compromise decree may contain matters extraneous to the suit or relating to properties other than the subject-matter of the suit. A decree passed in accordance with a compromise petition which contains matters not related to the suit properties is not invalid; terms which go beyond the subject-matter of the suit may be incorporated in the decree which is passed in the suit. The decree can only be enforced by way of execution insofar as it appertains to the subject-matter of the suit. A compromise decree can, however, be enforced in a manner other than by way of execution.”

14.Based on these judicial pronouncements, the following parameters for the enforcement of compromise decrees can be safely derived:

 A compromise decree is enforceable only if it pertains to the subject matter of the suit; entirely unrelated matters cannot be enforced via execution and require independent action.  Compromise terms extending beyond and lacking integral connection to the suit may constitute a separate contract, enforceable through a fresh suit for specific performance.  Matters not encompassed by the compromise cannot be enforced through execution.  Where adherence to time is essential and material terms are unfulfilled, particularly if

third-party rights are implicated, the decree may become unenforceable.

 Third parties not privy to the compromise are not bound by its terms.

15.These principles underscore that each case warrants determination on its own facts. A consent decree may be rendered inexecutable if it leaves significant issues unresolved or requires further adjudication. Furthermore, limitations applicable to execution of decrees following full adjudication similarly apply to compromise decrees.

16.Nevertheless, a compromise decree holds no lesser weight or effectiveness than one passed on merits.

Its sanctity is reinforced by section 96(3), CPC, which provides that “no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the court with consent of the parties” (save in cases of fraud or misrepresentation). Permitting parties to initiate new proceedings for every apparent breach of compromise would undermine the intent and efficacy of consent decrees, depriving the decree-holder of the benefits conferred by a valid compromise which goes against the legislative intent.

17.In the present case, upon reviewing the terms of compromise and the corresponding decree, it is evident that the decree is executable. Therefore, for what has

been discussed above, the appellate court, after examination of the pleadings and record, correctly found the decree enforceable and dismissed the appeal, observing that their objections lacked merit.

18.I find no illegality, irregularity, or jurisdictional defect in the impugned judgment and order dated 06.02.2026 issued by the learned Additional District Judge-VI, Peshawar, which would warrant interference by this Court.

Announced.

JUDGE

Date of hearing & announcement of judgment:

Date of writing & signing of judgment:

(SB)Hon’ble Ms. Justice Farah Jamshed Usama, JSS