Ali Azim Afridi Vs Syed Wiqar Shah & others

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

Writ Petition No.5588-P/2025 “Ali Azim Afridi vs. Syed Wiqar Shah & others” Date of hearing: 22.01.2026.

For petitioner: Mr. Ali Azim Afridi, Advocate (in person). For Provincial Govt: Mr. Wiqar Orakzai, AAG. For respondents: M/S Shumail Ahmad Butt, Bashir Khan Wazir, Barrister Ibrahim Khan Afridi, Waqar Ahmad Khan, Advocates.

Research Assistance: Riaz Aslam Daavi, SRO, PHCP

JUDGMENT

FARAH JAMSHED, J.- This constitutional petition, filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (“the Constitution”), seeks a writ of quo warranto against Respondent No. 1, challenging his appointment and subsequent promotions to the positions of Special Secretary in Basic Pay Scales BPS-20 and BPS-21 within the Secretariat of the Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The petitioner prays for the following relief(s):

1.An order in the nature of quo warranto may be issued against Respondent No. 1 regarding his holding of the position of Special Secretary (BPS-20), as notified by Order No. PA/KP/Admn:2024/6405 dated 25.05.2024 and based on Letter No. PA/KP/Admn/2022/10762 dated 22.04.2022, as well as his position as Special Secretary (BPS-21) according to Office Order No. PA/KP/Admn:2025/1356 dated 17.01.2025, since these appointments allegedly contravene applicable law and constitute unauthorized occupation of public office.

2.Any further orders deemed appropriate by the Court for the attainment of justice may also be issued.

02.The petitioner is an advocate enrolled with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council. He describes himself as a public spirited citizen and a diligent taxpayer who regularly brings matters involving the enforcement of fundamental rights before the superior courts. The petitioner is principally aggrieved by the appointment of Respondent No. 1, Syed Wiqar Shah, in the Secretariat of the Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Respondent No. 1 initially joined the Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on deputation as Special Secretary, BPS-19, from the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation. The said deputation and the subsequent absorption of Respondent No. 1 were challenged by the petitioner before this Court through Writ Petition No. 2512-P of 2018, titled Ali Azim Afridi v. Syed Wiqar Shah. This Court, vide judgment dated 13.11.2018, allowed the writ petition and declared the deputation and consequential absorption to be unlawful, void ab initio, coram non judice, and without lawful authority. The petitioner now calls in question the subsequent appointment and progression of Respondent No. 1 as Special Secretary in BPS-20 and BPS-21, pursuant to various notifications and correspondence issued between 2019 and 2025. It is alleged that such appointment and progression were marked by a lack of transparency in the recruitment process, the creation of a supernumerary post, and continued administrative favoritism.

03.Notwithstanding the aforesaid judgment, the petitioner alleges that the authorities continued to extend undue favour to Respondent No. 1 by facilitating his reappointment through a fresh advertisement and selection process. The petitioner, however, contends that the essential particulars relating to the eligibility criteria, the composition of the selection panel, the merit list, and the procedure governing direct recruitment in BPS-19 were not disclosed in a transparent manner.

04.The petitioner maintains that respondent No. 1 served as Consultant and Advisor with Sustainable Housing Solutions Private Limited while simultaneously holding public office as Special Secretary, BPS-19, Provincial Assembly, pursuant to administrative approval granted through a No Objection Certificate dated 24.02.2020. It is alleged that, although respondent No. 1 was dismissed from service vide notification dated 07.10.2020 on account of unsatisfactory performance, he was subsequently reinstated vide notification dated 14.12.2020 with retrospective effect from 07.10.2020, the very date of his termination. It is further asserted that his probationary period was extended vide notification dated 15.12.2020 and that a supernumerary post of Special Secretary, BPS-19, was created through notification dated 14.12.2020, which, according to the petitioner, amounted to special administrative accommodation indicative of favoritism. The petitioner further states that, through notifications dated 15.12.2020

and 01.02.2021, respondent No. 1 was relieved of his duties as Special Secretary, BPS-19, in order to enable him to serve on deputation for a period of three years as Director General Research, OG-II, at the Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services, Islamabad. It is averred that, although he was later repatriated by the Board of Governors through notification dated 31.08.2021, the said decision was suspended by letter dated 03.09.2021 issued by the Speaker of the National Assembly, and the notification was ultimately withdrawn through another notification dated 10.09.2021. Upon his return to the Provincial Assembly Secretariat, further administrative and judicial proceedings ensued with regard to his posting, arrival reports, promotion hierarchy, and compliance with the relevant recruitment and promotion rules. The petitioner asserts that official correspondence discloses irregular administrative practices, including the withdrawal of powers from the senior most officer, Mr. Amanullah, Secretary, Provincial Assembly, BPS-21, delegation of authority to junior officials, and repeated service related disputes. It is further stated that respondent No. 1 was designated as Special Secretary, BPS-20, through office order dated 27.05.2024 on the basis of letter dated 22.04.2022, and was thereafter promoted to Special Secretary, BPS-21, vide notification dated 17.01.2025. The petitioner has challenged both

the office order dated 27.05.20241, whereby the Speaker accepted the arrival report of respondent No. 1 for the BPS-20 post, and the notification dated 17.01.2025 relating to his promotion to BPS-21.

05.The petitioner further asserts that the multiple appointments and promotions granted to respondent No. 1 were made in violation of the applicable recruitment rules, upgradation policies, promotion guidelines, and the constitutional rights of other officers.

06.The petitioner, who formerly served as Legal Advisor to the Assembly, contended that the continued administrative facilitation extended to Respondent No. 1 constitutes an arbitrary exercise of discretion, misuse of public office, and unlawful retention of a public post. He further submitted that the procedural irregularities, administrative favoritism, and breach of statutory requirements render the appointments void in law and warrant judicial scrutiny under Article 199 of the Constitution through a writ of quo warranto, which is the appropriate remedy for determining the legality of the appointment of a public office holder and preventing unauthorized occupation of public office.

07.Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents raised comprehensive preliminary objections with regard to the maintainability of the petition, contending that although a private individual may institute a writ of quo warranto, the law imposes a Notification No 6405 dated 27.05.2024 whereby arrival report of respondent No 1 was accepted and he was posted as special secretary (BPS-20) with effect from

stringent burden upon the petitioner to establish, through clear and irrefutable evidence, that the office holder is occupying a public office in direct violation of statutory provisions or is otherwise lacking the essential legal qualifications for such office. It was further contended that, notwithstanding his claim of being motivated by public spirit, the petitioner had failed to demonstrate any specific legal disqualification attaching to Respondent No. 1.

The petition, according to the respondents, is founded upon allegations alone and does not disclose any proven statutory violation that would render the impugned appointment void ab initio. Learned counsel further submitted that Respondent No. 1 possesses the requisite qualifications, was appointed through a lawful and duly sanctioned process, and presently holds the office under valid administrative authority. It was thus argued that no violation of any mandatory statutory provision has been shown so as to vitiate his appointment or render it void ab initio.

08.Arguments heard and record perused.

09.Before examining the merits of the case, it is considered appropriate to first refer to the applicable constitutional and jurisprudential framework governing the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Article 199 of the Constitution, so as to address the grievance of the petitioner in the light of settled legal principles.

10.The writ of quo warranto is one of the oldest prerogative remedies recognized by common law, with origins dating back to

medieval England. Its Latin meaning is "by what authority" or "by what warrant 2". It is designed to inquire by what authority a person holds a public office. Its object is to determine whether the holder of a statutory or constitutional office is in lawful occupation of that office or is usurping it without authority. A writ of quo warranto is provided under Article 199 (1)(b)(ii) of the Constitution of Pakistan, which gives the Judiciary a weapon to control the Executive from making the appointment to public office against law and to protect a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he has a right. These proceedings also tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office, who might be allowed to continue either with the connivance of the Executive or because of its apathy. It will, thus, be seen that before a person can effectively claim a writ of quo warranto, he has to satisfy the Court that the office in question is a public office and is held by a usurper without legal authority and that inevitably would lead to the inquiry as to whether the appointment of the alleged usurper has been made under law or not. At the same time, it is settled law that even in a writ of quo warranto if such a petition is filed by an interested person, the same is not maintainable.3

11.The superior courts have, over time, clarified the nature and scope of quo warranto, holding that such proceedings are Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 1, para 140 Mukhtiar Ahmed Abro v. P.O Sindh C. P. No. D–1058 of 2020 decided on 17.05.2022 (2022 SHC 939 [Sindh High Court])

fundamentally inquisitorial4, as they are directed towards an inquiry into the legality of the authority under which a public office is held, rather than the determination of private disputes. The core inquiry is confined to examining the legality of the office holder’s title.5 It is well settled that a writ of quo warranto is not to be issued as a matter of course. It is in the discretion of the court to refuse or grant it according to the facts and circumstances of the case. The foremost obligation of the court while hearing a quo warranto petition is to inquire into the conduct and motive of the relater and may, in its discretion, decline to issue a writ where it would be vexatious to allow the same. The court must be satisfied that the petitioner is a bona fide and not motivated by any malice against the person whose appointment is under challenge. A writ of quo warranto should be refused where it is an outcome of malice and mala fide. The court has to see whether the attack in the guise of public interest is really intended to unleash a private vendetta, personal grouse or some other mala fide object. It is, therefore, to be determined at the first instance as to whether the conduct of the petitioner, in the present case, has gone to such an extent that this court should, in view of that conduct, consider him to be worthy of being entrusted with a writ in the form of quo warranto.6 The issuance of writ of qua Pakistan Tobacco Board v. Tahir Raza (2007 SCMR 97), Malik Nawab Sher v. Ch.Muneer Ahmed ( 2013 SCMR 1035).

Hafiz Hamdullah v. Saif Ullah khan (2007 PLD SC 52), Saira Rubab Nasir v. Federation of Pakistan (2023 PLC (CS) 103).

Farhan Khan v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2025 Islamabad 382), Muhammad Aslam v. Govt of KPK (2023 PLC (CS) 1561 Peshawar), Ayaz Ahmed khan v.

warranto is discretionary in nature and as held in Sabir Ali Shah's case (PLD 1994 SC 738), such a writ cannot be issued in collateral proceedings.7 A heavy burden rests upon the petitioner to produce clear, cogent, and convincing evidence establishing a patent illegality at the root of the appointment, and to show that the respondent does not possess the requisite qualifications for the office.8 The writ would (unless withheld at the court's discretion) be issued if the court is satisfied that any one or more of the following elements are, missing:

a) the respondent holds the public office by order or decision of an authority competent to so appoint him;

b) he was appointed in the prescribed manner (and if the appointment is at the discretion of the appointing authority, that discretion was lawfully exercised);

c) he could have been appointed to the office (e.g., that he had the requisite qualifications and was not otherwise disqualified); and d) he was entitled to continue holding the office.9

12.A writ in the form of quo warranto is an extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction and the Court is not bound to exercise such jurisdiction in each and every case specially where on account of laches the matter has lost its significance or in cases of minor discrepancies, sheer curable technicalities or where the approach is Federation of Pakistan (2021 PLC (CS) 1394), Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Jahangir khan tareen (PLD 2018 SC 114).

Qazi Hussain Ahmed v. Gen. Pervaiz Musharaf (2002 SCMR 970) Riaz Hussain v. Province of Sindh (2024 PLC (CS) 1097 Karachi), Gul Muhammad Hajano v. Federation of Pakistan (2000 PLC (CS) 46 Karachi), Munawar Ali Pathan v. Province of Sindh (2011 PLC (CS) 785 Karachi).

doctrinaire unless it is shown that non-interference would result in grave in justice or would amount to endorsing the retention of illegal gains.10

13.Likewise, it is clarified that the writ of quo warranto is not available as a general remedy to assail routine transfers, postings, promotions, or policy decisions in service matters, especially where a specialized statutory forum, such as the Service Tribunal, exists for redress. The existence of an adequate alternate remedy ordinarily restrains the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction in such matters. Such writ is maintainable only in cases where the appointment of an incumbent is shown to be in patent violation of statutory provisions or where the incumbent is demonstrably lacking in an essential qualification prescribed by law. Matters relating to service grievances and internal administrative disputes must, therefore, ordinarily be pursued before the competent forums in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

14.Moreover, Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan empowers the High Court to issue appropriate directions, orders, and writs, including a writ of quo warranto, in cases where no other adequate remedy is available. Although the jurisdiction so conferred is wide in scope, it remains extraordinary and discretionary in nature, and is to be exercised with due care, caution, and circumspection. The Superior Courts have consistently Asif Hassan v. Sabir Hussain (2019 SCMR 1720)

held that such constitutional jurisdiction is not intended to supplant the ordinary remedies provided by law, nor is it to be invoked on the basis of conjectural allegations or for collateral purposes. The Court must, therefore, be satisfied that a clear legal breach has been established so as to justify its intervention. A writ of quo warranto is a discretionary relief, which can be denied by the Court if it thinks that it will not be proper to issue the same.11 In Jawad Ahmad Mir v. Prof. Dr. Imtiaz Ali Khan (2023 SCMR 162), the Supreme court elaborated the writ of Quo warranto in the following words:

8.The writ of quo warranto is in the nature of setting forth an information before the High Court against a person who claimed and usurped an office, franchise or liberty. The rationality of the writ of quo warranto is to settle the legality of the holder of a statutory or Constitutional office and decide whether he was holding such public office in accordance with law or against the law. The writ of quo warranto can be instituted by a person though he may not come within the meaning of words "aggrieved person". For the purpose of maintaining a writ of quo warranto there is no requirement of an aggrieved person, and a whistle blower need not to be personally aggrieved in the strict sense and may relay the information to the court to enquire from the person holding public office. The purpose of the writ of quo warranto is to pose a question to the holder of a public office: "where is your warrant of appointment by which you are holding this office?" In the writ of quo warranto no special kind of interest in the relator is needed, nor is it necessary to explain which of his specific legal rights is infringed. It is enough for this issue that the relator is a member of the public and acts bona fide. This writ is more in the nature of public interest litigation where undoing of a wrong or vindication of a right is sought by an individual for himself, or for the good of the society, or as a matter of principle. The conditions necessary for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto are that the office must be public and created by a statute or Constitution itself; the office must be a substantive one and not merely the function of an employment of a servant at the will during the pleasure of others; there has been contravention of the Constitution or a statute or statutory instrument by appointing such person to that office. The essential grounds for issuing a writ of quo warranto are that the holder of the post does not possess the prescribed qualification; the appointing authority is not the competent authority to make the appointment and that the procedure prescribed by law has not been followed. The burden of proof is then upon the appointee to Dr Bushra Ashiq Siddiqui v. Muhammad Aslam (1989 MLD 1351)

demonstrate that his appointment is in accordance with the law and rules. It is clear that before a person can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by a usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not. The concept and aftermath of the writ of quo warranto has been articulated in different jurisdictions with the following approach and frame of mind:- Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition), Volume 11, page Quo warranto. An information in the nature of a quo warranto took the place of the obsolete writ of quo warranto which lay against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to enquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order that the right to the office or franchise might be determined. An information in the nature of quo warranto lay only if the office was substantive in character, that is, an office independent in title, and if the holder of the office was an independent official, not one discharging the functions of a deputy or servant at the will and pleasure of others. An information in the nature of a quo warranto lay in respect of an office held at pleasure, provided the office was one of a public and substantive character.

Halsbury's Laws of India, Volume 35, Page 145:

Quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial remedy by which any person, who holds an independent substantive public office or franchise or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty so that his title to it may be duly determined, and in case the finding is that the holder of the office has no title, he would be ousted from that office by judicial order in other words, the procedure of quo warranto gives the judiciary a weapon to control the executive from making appointments to public office against law and to protect a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he has a right. These proceedings also tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office, who might be allowed to continue either with the connivance of the executive or by reason of its apathy.

American Jurisprudence (Second Edition), Volume 16, page 578: Quo warranto is intended to prevent the exercise of powers that are not conferred by law, and is not ordinarily available to regulate the manner of exercising those powers. It cannot be used to test the legality of official actions of public corporations or officers, though it has been held that it may be used to determine whether a constitutional officer is attempting to usurp power not granted him by the constitution or laws.

Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume LXXIV, page 174-175 The writ of quo warranto is an ancient common law, prerogative writ and remedy. Indeed, it is one of the most ancient and important writs known to the common law. The ancient writ was in the nature of a writ of right for the king, against him who claimed or usurped any office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order to determine the right, or, in the case of nonuser, long neglect, misuser, or abuse of a franchise, a writ commanding defendant to show by what warrant he exercised such franchise, never having had any grant of it, or having forfeited it by neglect or abuse.

Black's Law Dictionary (Tenth Edition), page 1447: Quo warranto 1. A common-law writ used to inquire into the authority by which a public office is held or a franchise is claimed. "Quo warranto means 'by what warrant?' - or authority? - and was a proceeding to inquire whether authority existed to justify or authorize certain acts of a public character or interest. Originally the proceeding of quo warranto was a criminal one instituted by the crown, the purpose of which was to find out, in the course of a formal inquiry, whether or not persons or corporations were exercising a privilege or franchise, illegally, or if persons who had no right to do so were occupying some public office. If it were found that the person or corporation was in fact illegally interfering with the prerogative power of the crown, or was in fact doing some other illegal act, it was ousted from the illegal practice or office. Accordingly, it can be seen at once that the proceeding on quo warranto was not one to be used by private parties in the conduct of ordinary litigation." Charles Herman Kinnane, A First Book on Anglo-American Law 662 (2d ed.

9.In our jurisdiction, compliant with the dictum laid down by this Court in various judgments, such as the case of Masudul Hassan v. Khadim Hussain and another (PLD 1963 SC 203), it was held that writ of quo warranto was in its nature an information lying against a person who "claimed or usurped an office, franchise or liberty" and was intended to enquire by what authority he supported his claim in order that the right to the office may be determined. In the case of Capt. (Retd.) Muhammad Naseem Hijazi v. Province of Punjab and others (2000 SCMR 1720), this Court held that in the writ of quo warranto, under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan the High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction is competent to enquire from any person, holder of a public office to show that under what authority he is holding the said office. Whereas in the case of Hafiz Hamdullah v. Saifullah Khan and others (PLD 2007 SC 52), it was held that the object of writ of quo warranto is to determine legality of the holder of a statutory or Constitutional office and decide whether he was holding such office in accordance with law or was unauthorizedly occupying a public office. For issuance of a writ of quo warranto, the person invoking the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution is not required to fulfill the stringent conditions required for bringing himself within the meaning of an aggrieved person. Likewise, in the case of Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi v. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (PLD 2017 SC 265), this Court held that Constitutional petition in the nature of a writ of quo warranto was maintainable against a Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), if he was disqualified or did not possess or had lost his qualification, in such behalf. Power to disqualify a member in cases where for some reason he escaped disqualification at the time of filing his/her nomination papers but such fact/event was discovered subsequently, could, in appropriate cases and subject to availability of admitted facts or irrefutable evidence be exercised by the High Court under Article 199 and by the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution.

10.At this juncture, it is quite interesting to quote an excerpt from the case of Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India and others, reported as (2004) 3 SCC 363, in which it was held that only a person who comes to the court with bona fide and public interest can have locus standi. Coming

down heavily on busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit, either for themselves or as a proxy for others, or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity. The court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; and (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike a balance between two conflicting interests: (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the executive and the legislature. The court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busybodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect.

11.The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of this nature is required to determine at the outset as to whether a case has been made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or a writ of quo warranto or it is motivated by mala fide intention to gain some undue advantage as a proxy and driving force for others.

15.The ratio of the above-referred judgment is that, in quo warranto proceedings, strict proof of personal aggrievement is unnecessary, and any person may invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the Court to challenge the lawful authority under which a public office is held. Nevertheless, this liberal rule governing locus standi is not without limitation. The petitioner must act bona fide and in genuine public interest. As observed in preceding para No.11 of this judgment, if the petition is found to be motivated by mala fides, personal gain, collateral purposes, or any other ulterior consideration under the cloak of public interest, the Court is fully justified in refusing relief and dismissing the petition.

Thus, the writ of quo warranto is a discretionary and inquisitorial

remedy intended to ensure that public offices are held under the authority of law. It is not an alternative to ordinary legal remedies and cannot be invoked through collateral attacks or based on hypothetical and conjectural allegations. The Court must be satisfied that a clear legal breach such as lack of prescribed qualification, incompetence of the appointing authority, or violation of prescribed procedure exists to warrant intervention.

16.As to locus standi, a person invoking a writ of quo warranto is not required to satisfy the stringent “aggrieved person” test ordinarily applicable under Article 199. Any person may, in public interest, move the Court to challenge usurpation or unauthorized occupation of a public office. Nevertheless, the relaxation of the rule of locus standi in quo warranto proceedings does not dispense with the essential requirements governing the grant of such relief, nor does it absolve the Court of its obligation to examine the bona fides, conduct, and motive of the petitioner in the exercise of its equitable and discretionary constitutional jurisdiction, as reaffirmed in the later decision in Muhammad Hanif Abbasi12 case. The relevant part is reproduced below:

There can be no cavil with the principle that to grant the relief in the nature of quo-warranto is within the discretionary power of the superior Courts, it should not be allowed as a matter of course, rather the conduct and the bona fides of the relator, the cause and the object of filing such petition is of considerable importance and should be examined; it should be ascertained if the petition has been filed with some mala fide intent or ulterior motive and to serve the purpose of someone else. We are of the considered view that quo warranto remedy should not be allowed to be a tool in the hands of the relators, Muhammad Hanif Abbasi vs Jahangir Khan Tareen and others (PLD 2018 SC 114)

who approach the Court with mala fide intentions and either have their own personal grudges and scores to settle with the holder of the public office or are a proxy for someone else who has a similar object or motive. This remedy surely cannot be allowed to serve as a sword hanging over the heads of the Parliamentarians (members of the Provincial Assemblies) who are the chosen representatives of the people under the mandate of the Constitution (Article 2A) "wherein the State shall exercise its power and authority through the chosen representatives of the people".

17.Thus, while it is not necessary for the petitioner to be an aggrieved person in the conventional sense, it remains incumbent upon him to approach the Court with clean hands, in good faith, and for the vindication of a genuine public wrong. The Court, in turn, is fully competent to scrutinize the intention of the petitioner and to refuse relief where the proceedings are found to be actuated by mala fides, collateral considerations, or an attempt to misuse the process of the Court under the guise of public interest.

18.In proceedings seeking a writ of quo warranto, it is incumbent upon the petitioner, in the first instance, to establish clear legal and factual grounds showing that the appointment or occupation of the public office is contrary to law. It is only upon the disclosure of such prima facie illegality that the onus shifts to the respondent to justify his claim to the office. Bald or general allegations, unsupported by reference to any specific statutory violation or lack of an essential qualification, do not furnish a sufficient basis for invoking the quo warranto jurisdiction of this Court.

19.In the light of the foregoing jurisprudence, the following essential preconditions for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto may be identified:

(i)The office must be a public, substantive office created by or under law;

(ii)The respondent must be in actual occupation of, and functioning in, such office;

(iii)There must be a clear, demonstrable violation of a mandatory statutory provision governing the appointment, or the respondent must lack an essential qualification prescribed for that office;

(iv)The petition must be bona fide and not filed for collateral or personal purposes, since the jurisdiction is equitable and discretionary.

20.While examining the instant case, on the touchstone of the above referred principles, the record shows that respondent No. 1 was appointed as Special Secretary, BPS-19, vide Notification dated 11.10.2019, and was thereafter deputed to PIPS as Director General, Research, through Notification dated 01.02.2021. Subsequently, the post of Special Secretary in the Assembly Secretariat was upgraded to BPS-20, and through letter dated 22.04.2022 the Secretariat sought his repatriation in order to fill the upgraded post after actualization of salary. Upon his return, his arrival report was accepted and, in due course, he was promoted to BPS-21 against a sanctioned vacant post. Admittedly, the post of Special Secretary in the Provincial Assembly Secretariat is a public statutory office, and respondent No. 1 is presently serving as Special Secretary, BPS-21, pursuant to notification dated 17.01.2025, following acceptance of his arrival report in BPS-20 vide notification dated 27.05.2024.

However, in the present petition, and having regard to the prayers made therein, no orders relating to his initial appointment, upgradation of the post, deputation, or repatriation have been specifically challenged before this Court, except the notifications dated 27.05.2024 and 17.01.2025.

21.Although the petitioner relies heavily on the earlier judgment of this Court in WP No. 2512-P/2018 dated 13.11.2018, whereby the earlier deputation/absorption of respondent No. 1 was declared illegal, and pursuant to that order the services of respondent No. 1 were dispensed with vide Notification No. 9674 dated 30.11.2018, but respondent No. 1 was subsequently appointed afresh vide Notification No. 9275 dated 11.10.2019 after having applied for the post when it was advertised in the newspapers dated 8 and 9 May 2019. Petitioner has neither directly assailed the fresh appointment made thereafter nor pointed to any specific statutory provision that was violated in the subsequent recruitment and promotion processes now under challenge. At best, these assertions amount to allegations of procedural and administrative impropriety. Besides, the petitioner has not identified violation of any specific recruitment rule, statutory requirement, or mandatory condition at the time of appointment or promotion of respondent No. 1 to BPS-20 and BPS-21. The mere fact that an earlier arrangement concerning respondent No. 1 was struck down by this court in earlier W.P No.

2512-P of 2018 does not, by itself, render every later appointment

or promotion defective in law, unless a separate and distinct illegality is demonstrated.

22.As discussed above, the writ of quo warranto is maintainable only where an appointment is shown to have been made in patent violation of a statutory provision or where the incumbent lacks an essential qualification prescribed by law. It does not extend to ordinary service matters, discretionary re-employment policies, or subjective considerations pertaining to suitability. The remedy has thus remained confined to cases in which the very appointment is rendered unlawful on the face of the record. In the instant case, the petitioner has failed to point out with requisite specificity any provision of law or rule that was violated either at the time of appointing respondent No. 1 or in the matter of his promotion. In the absence of such specific legal foundation, the issuance of a writ of quo warranto is wholly unwarranted.

23.Thus, upon a thorough examination of the record before us, we are unable to find that the appointing authority lacked the requisite jurisdiction to appoint or promote respondent No. 1; that respondent No. 1 did not possess any essential educational or professional qualification prescribed for the post; that any express statutory bar or mandatory rule relating to appointment, promotion, or upgradation stood violated; or that the impugned notifications were issued in direct contravention of any specific law.

24.In quo warranto proceedings, the burden lies squarely upon the petitioner to establish the alleged invalidity by pointing out a specific legal disqualification or a violation of a mandatory provision, as elaborated above. Only upon the disclosure of sufficient material in support of such allegation does the onus shift to the respondent to justify the incumbent title to the office. In the present case, tested on the touchstone of the dicta laid down in the case law referred to hereinabove, the petitioner has failed to discharge that burden and has not been able to show any violation of a mandatory provision or any want of qualification so as to justify the issuance of a writ of quo warranto.

25.The record in the present case reflects repeated litigation initiated by the petitioner against respondent No. 1 as well as the Assembly administration. The former role of the petitioner as Legal Advisor to the Assembly, his evident familiarity with its internal affairs, and his selective reliance upon particular documents tend to indicate that the present proceedings may, at least to some extent, constitute an extension of ongoing personal and institutional disputes rather than a disinterested effort to safeguard the integrity of a public office. It is by now well settled that, although the Superior Courts have recognized the utility of quo warranto as a public law remedy, they have at the same time cautioned that such jurisdiction must be invoked with care and circumspection and must not be permitted to become an instrument of harassment, political

rivalry, vendetta, or personal gain. The manner in which the present petition has been pursued does not satisfy the standard of genuine good faith required for the invocation of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto.

26.The petition has been framed not only against respondent No. 1, but also against the Secretary, the Speaker, and the Government, with a view to broadly challenging policy decisions, recruitment rules, promotion mechanisms, creation of posts, and the inter se rights of other officers serving in the Assembly Secretariat.

Such matters plainly travel beyond the limited scope of a writ of quo warranto, which is concerned only with the legality of an incumbent’s title to a public office, and not with the validity of the surrounding administrative or policy framework. Any attempt to employ quo warranto as a means to question general service or administrative decisions would constitute a misapplication of the remedy, would unduly enlarge its ambit into a supervisory jurisdiction over service matters, and would effectively trench upon the domain of specialized statutory forums. This course is legally impermissible and cannot be approved.

27.In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any patent legal disqualification on the part of respondent No. 1 which may render his appointment void ab initio. The allegations set forth in the petition, at the highest, pertain to procedural irregularities and

administrative impropriety, which are insufficient to warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto. It also appears that the petition is not entirely free from personal grievance, inasmuch as respondent No. 1 had, prior to the institution of the present proceedings, addressed a letter dated 23.05.2025 to the Speaker of the Provincial Assembly against the petitioner.

28.Resultantly, this petition, being devoid of merit and constituting a misconceived invocation of the quo warranto jurisdiction of this Court, is dismissed.

JUDGE

JUDGE

Date of hearing & announcement of judgment -------------------22.01.2026

Date of preparation & signing of judgment ---------------16.04.2026

(D.B)

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Syed Arshad Ali Hon’ble Ms. Justice Farah Jamshed

Himayat, CS.