Wazir Zada Afridi Vs Muhammad Akram & others

Judgment Sheet

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT,

ABBOTTABAD BENCH

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

F.A.O.No. 22-A/2009 Wazir Zada Afridi .....................Appellant Vs.

Muhammad Akram & others..................(Respondents.

Present:

Mr. Jehanzeb Mahsud, Advocate for the appellant.

M/s Muhammad Ayub Awan and Asadullah Jaral, Advocates and Shoaib Ali Assistant Advocate General for respondents.

Date of hearing: 04.05.2026

JUDGMENT

AURANGZEB, J.- Through this single judgment, the instant appeal as well as connected FAO No.

31-A/2011 and FAO No. 52-A/2024 are being decided together, as these connected matters pertain to the same controversy, involve similar questions of facts and law and in respect of same subject matter. This and the connected FAO No.

31-A/2011 are arising out of the common judgment dated 13.07.2009 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ghazi Camp Court,

Haripur, whereby the learned executing Court ordered de-notification of the acquired land to the extent of shares of the decree-holders, subject to deposit of the awarded amount with the Collector and further directed restoration of mutation and possession in favour of the original owners. While FAO NO. 52-A/2024 has been preferred against the order dated 07.12.2023 and 05.09.2024, passed by the learned executing Court, whereby the matter was referred to the Collector Land Acquisition, Haripur for submission before the Provincial Government to consider denotification of the acquired land.

2.Briefly stated, the facts of the case reveal a prolonged and unfortunate litigation arising out of compulsory acquisition of land undertaken in the year 1988 under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the benefit of a private limited company namely M/s Saif Nadeem Kawasaki Motors Limited. Upon completion of acquisition proceedings through Award No.84 dated 15.05.1988, possession of the acquired land was admittedly delivered to the beneficiary company, thereby depriving the original owners

from possession and enjoyment of their proprietary rights.

3.The landowners, being dissatisfied with the amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector, filed reference before the learned Referee Judge. The learned Referee Court enhanced the compensation in their favour. The issue of enhancement of the compensation was finally decided by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan and thus the matter to the extent of compensation of the acquired land, attained finality. The land-owners thereafter, filed execution petition and during proceedings of execution, the acquiring entity as well as the Provincial Government was put on notice but none was willing to deposit the enhanced amount of compensation. The learned executing Court also issued notices to the Provincial Government for denotification of the acquired land and the matter was referred to the Provincial Government, but in vain. Ultimately, vide order dated 13.07.2009, the learned executing Court ordered denotification of the acquired land. Said order was assailed by the parties before this Court through FAO NO. 22-

A/2009 and 31-A/2011. This Court, while giving its judgment in the said matters on 12.09.2022, held that;

“In the given circumstances, it is observed that despite setting aside this order, the Government shall have full freedom to consider de-notification of the property and returning same back to its original owners. The litigation, if any between Saif Nadeem Kawasaki Motors, and Saif Nadeem Bicycles Ltd or any other person, may well continue for the purpose of determining the financial benefits that may accrue as a result of re-deposit of compensation by the land owners or receiving the amount of compensation which may be fixed by the government, to be deposited by the land owners in case award is de-notified.”

When the matter again went to the learned executing Court, it referred the same to the Provincial Government for de-notification as the land-owners had also deposited the amount of compensation, initially received by them. The orders for referring the matter to the Provincial Government were passed by the learned executing Court on 07.12.2023 and 05.09.2024 and said orders have been assailed before this Court

through connected FAO NO. 52-A/2024.

However, the earlier judgment passed by this Court dated 12.09.2022, was assailed before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in CPLA No.

3970/2022, 4065/2022 and 4069/2022 and the august Supreme Court of Pakistan was pleased to remand the matter to this Court vide order dated 23.10.2024, which reads as under;

“After arguing the matter at some length, learned counsel for the parties have arrived at a consensus that the impugned judgments passed by the High Court in FAOs as well as writ petitions be set aside and the matter be remanded to the High Court for deciding the matter afresh after issuing notice to the official liquidators, as well as, the parties, expeditiously. It is an admitted position that the official liquidators stood appointed in the companies concerned, however, the High Court while deciding the matter did not issue notice to the official liquidators, therefore, in the circumstances, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained. In this view of the matter, the impugned judgments are set aside and the matter is remanded to the High

Court. The FAOs, as well as, the writ petitions decided through the impugned judgments shall be deemed to be pending. learned High Court before proceeding further in the FAOs, as well as, writ petitions shall issue notice to all the concerned parties, including the official liquidators and decide the matter afresh strictly in accordance with the law. Considering that the matter is pending since long, we are sanguine that the High Court will decide the matter expeditiously, preferably within a period of three months from the receipt of a copy of this order. These petitions are converted into appeals and allowed in the above terms.”

4.Pursuant to the remand order passed by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan, the matters were taken up by this Court on 05.12.2024. On the said date, Mr. Zahid Idrees Mufti, Advocate, and Mr. Khurram Ghias Khan, Advocate, appeared before the Court and disclosed that they had been functioning as official liquidators in the connected company matters. Mr. Zahid Idrees Mufti, Advocate, submitted that in Company Case No.02- A of 2003 titled “Joint Registrar Companies versus M/s Saif Nadeem Motors,” he had already moved

an application seeking discharge from the responsibilities of official liquidator and requested that the present matters either be clubbed with the said company case or fixed on the same dates so that the issue regarding continuation or discharge of his duties could appropriately be resolved.

5.The record further reveals that thereafter the matters got adjourned from time to time due to pendency of proceedings before the learned Company Bench, requests for adjournments by learned counsel, and non-availability of the parties and their learned counsel. On 24.11.2025, the instant appeals stood transferred to this Court.

Subsequently, on 24.02.2026, both the appeals were dismissed for non-prosecution owing to absence of the parties and their learned counsel;

however, restoration applications were later allowed vide order dated 29.03.2026 and the appeals were restored to their original numbers.

6.In compliance with the directions of the august Supreme Court, notices were duly issued to the official liquidators and they were afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the official liquidators, as

well as learned counsel for the parties, were heard at considerable length and the entire record was carefully examined.

7.The principal question arising for determination before this Court is whether the learned executing Court possessed jurisdiction to de-notify the acquisition and restore the acquired land to the original owners in execution proceedings merely on account of non-payment of enhanced compensation despite final adjudication of rights.

8.Section 47 CPC confers wide jurisdiction upon the executing Court in relation to all questions arising between the parties relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree.

The provision reads as under:-

“47. Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree. (1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.”

9.The language employed in Section 47 CPC is of wide amplitude and mandatory character. The

expression “all questions arising between the parties” clearly demonstrates that the legislature intended to confer exclusive and comprehensive jurisdiction upon the executing Court to resolve every dispute which emerges between the parties in the course of execution proceedings. The bar created against a separate suit reinforces the legislative intent that execution matters must attain finality within execution itself and cannot be allowed to prolong through collateral litigation.

10.The further expression “relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree” expands the jurisdiction of the executing Court to its fullest extent. The words “relating to” are of the widest import and are not to be read in a narrow or restrictive manner. They include not only direct questions of execution but also all ancillary, incidental and consequential issues which have a reasonable nexus with enforcement of the decree.

11.The term “execution” in Section 47 CPC signifies the process of giving effect to the decree through lawful modes provided under Order XXI CPC, such as attachment, sale of property, delivery of possession or any other coercive process

permissible under law. The expression “discharge” denotes the extinction of decretal liability otherwise than by execution, such as payment, adjustment, compromise or waiver, whereby the obligation ceases to exist in law. The expression “satisfaction” refers to complete fulfilment of the decree when the decree-holder has actually received the relief granted by the Court, either in monetary form or otherwise in specie.

12.The combined reading of these expressions makes it evident that Section 47 CPC does not confer a limited or mechanical jurisdiction upon the executing Court. Rather, it casts a substantive duty upon the Court to determine whether the decree has in fact been worked out in its entirety or whether it continues to remain unfulfilled. The executing Court is thus empowered to go behind procedural formality to ascertain the real state of execution, discharge or satisfaction

13.Section 151 CPC further preserves the inherent powers of the Court and reads as under:

“151. Saving of inherent powers of Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders

as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.”

The above provision clearly empowers the Court to pass such orders as may be necessary to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process. Where the express provisions of the Code are insufficient to address extraordinary situations, the Court retains inherent jurisdiction to ensure that justice is not defeated by technicalities or administrative inaction. In execution matters where decrees remain unfulfilled for decades due to persistent non-compliance, the Court is fully empowered to invoke its inherent jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice.

14.In the instant matter, despite final adjudication of rights of the land-owners, the decree remained wholly unsatisfied. The decree- holders initiated execution proceedings for realization of the decretal amount. During execution proceedings, the judgment-debtor company appeared before the executing Court but failed to satisfy the decree on the plea of financial incapacity. The acquiring authorities, including the

Land Acquisition Collector and Provincial Government, were repeatedly called upon to discharge their statutory obligations; however, no effective steps were taken for payment of compensation to the decree-holders. The record further reflects that during pendency of execution proceedings, disputes also arose inter se between M/s Saif Nadeem Kawasaki Motors Limited and M/s Saif Nadeem Bicycle Limited regarding the acquired property and related liabilities.

15.It would be relevant to mention here that the acquisition of the property was actually initiated upon the request of Saif Nadeem Kawasaki Motors Limited for the establishment of a bicycle plant at Mauza Shadi and accordingly, 139 Kanals and 8 Marlas land was acquired through Award No. 84 dated 15.05.1988 and the possession was delivered to Saif Nadeem Kawasaki Motors limited.

However, the shares of M/s Saif Nadeem Kawasaki motors limited were sold by Mian Ishfaq Ahmed and his family to M/S Zakriya Ghani and family and a request was made to the Collector Haripur to correct entries of mutation No. 2228 and the name of M/S Saif Nadeem Bicycle limited

be incorporated in the record instead of Saif Nadeem Kawasaki Motors limited. The Collector vide his order dated 06.08.1989 granted permission to the Tehsildar to review the mutation and thereafter, the Tehsildar reviewed mutation No.

2228 on 04.09.1989, which became the root cause of a lengthy litigation between the Saif Nadeem Bicycle limited as well as Saif Nadeem Kawasaki motors limited. Meanwhile, through mutation No.

4424 dated 20.04.2006, the land was sold to one Wazir Zada, a private person. The said mutation was set-aside by the District Officer Revenue, Haripur vide order dated 31.08.2006, however, his order was set aside by Revenue Appellate Court No. 4 vide order dated 19.12.2006 and the Senior Member Board of Revenue maintained order of the Revenue Appellate Court, in respect whereof writ petition No. 05-A/2008 was also filed, which was also fixed for today and has been heard and has been decided through a separate judgment.

However, said matter also has relevancy with these appeals, therefore, the aforementioned facts have been made part of this judgment.

16.In this particular case, the learned executing Court adopted coercive measures available under law, including attachment proceedings and repeated directions to the concerned authorities.

However, despite lapse of nearly four decades from the date of acquisition, the decree remained unexecuted and the decree-holders continued to suffer deprivation both of possession and compensation notwithstanding a final judicial determination in their favour.

17.There can be no cavil with the proposition that the executing Court is duty bound to ensure effective enforcement of decrees and cannot permit successful litigants to remain remediless despite final adjudication in their favour. The executing Court is therefore empowered to adopt all lawful coercive measures available under Order XXI CPC for satisfaction of the decree. However, the crucial distinction which requires determination is whether such jurisdiction extends to de- notification or withdrawal of acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 expressly provides that the Government may withdraw from

acquisition before possession is taken. The statutory authority of withdrawal or de-notification vests exclusively in the Government. Once possession has been taken pursuant to acquisition proceedings, title stands vested in the Government free from all encumbrances and the acquisition attains statutory finality subject only to remedies recognized under law.

18.However, this Court cannot lose sight of the extraordinarily peculiar and exceptional circumstances attending the present case. The landowners were dispossessed of their property in the year 1988. Nearly four decades have elapsed.

The enhanced compensation finally determined by competent Courts has still not been paid. The beneficiary company has gone into liquidation proceedings. The public purpose for which acquisition was undertaken has admittedly not been fulfilled. The record reflects that the proposed industrial project was never established and the acquired land has remained embroiled in litigation for decades. After final determination of the rights of the landowners, an execution petition was instituted before the learned Executing Court in the

year 2007. Upon noticing that neither the acquiring agency nor the Provincial Government was willing to satisfy the enhanced compensation amount, the learned Executing Court proceeded to order de- notification of the acquired land. However, the said order was challenged before this Court, whereupon it was held that the authority to de- notify the acquired land vested exclusively in the Provincial Government. Subsequent thereto, the learned Executing Court referred the matter to the Provincial Government for necessary action. Even then, the process of de-notification was resisted by the appellants/judgment-debtors on the ground that once the Award had attained finality and possession of the land had been delivered to the acquiring agency pursuant thereto, the provisions of Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were no longer attracted. The learned Executing Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, dismissed the objections raised by the judgment-debtors and directed compliance of the judgment rendered by this Court. The instant case, in fact, reflects an extreme example of frustration of the very object and intent

of the legislature. On the one hand, the landowners have remained deprived of their property for nearly four decades, while on the other hand, they have continuously been denied payment of lawful compensation and compelled to engage in protracted litigation before different fora despite there being no fault attributable to them.

19.Islam provides a complete code of life, laying down comprehensive and universal principles governing every sphere of human existence, including the protection of the life and property of every individual. Islamic injunctions strictly prohibit the unlawful appropriation of another person’s property except through lawful means and just compensation. In this regard, reference may be made to Ayat No.188 of Surah Al-Baqarah, the translation whereof reads as under:

“ اور تم اپنے مال آپس ميں باطل

”طريقوں سے ہڑپ نہ کرو۔

Likewise, the Last Holy Prophet Hazrat Muhammad ()صلى الله عليه وسلم, while delivering the Khutba Hajjat-ul-Wida (Farewell Sermon), declared the sanctity of life, honour and property of every

Muslim in unequivocal terms. The relevant portion of the sermon reads as follows:

“Your blood, your properties, and your honour are sacred to one another like the sanctity of this day of yours, in this sacred town of yours and in this sacred month of yours.”

[Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol. II, Chapter No.132, Hadith No.795, translated by Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan].

Furthermore, history reveals that the first acquisition of land in the early Islamic era was undertaken for the construction of Al-Masjid-an- Nabawi. The land belonged to two orphan children namely Sohul and Sohail, who intended to donate the same. However, the Holy Prophet Muhammad( )صلى الله عليه وسلمdeclined to accept the land without consideration and directed payment of its full price before commencement of construction of the Mosque. This incident, reported in Sahih Bukhari, establishes the fundamental Islamic principle that even land belonging to the weakest and most vulnerable person cannot be taken without lawful compensation, irrespective of the nobility or sanctity of the purpose for which it is required.

20.The aforesaid principles of the Holy Quran and Sunnah have been accorded constitutional

supremacy under Article 227 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, whereby all existing laws are required to be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam and no law can be enacted which is repugnant thereto.

Article 227 of the Constitution provides as under:- “227. Provisions relating to the Holy Quran and Sunnah.—

(1)All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions.

21.Besides the above, Articles 4, 23 and 24 of the Constitution guarantee and protect the proprietary rights of citizens. Article 4 ensures that no action detrimental to the life, liberty or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law. Article 23 confers upon every citizen the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, whereas Article 24 categorically provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law and further prohibits compulsory acquisition of property except for a public purpose and upon payment of compensation

in the manner prescribed by law. The term “property” has further been expansively defined under Article 260 of the Constitution to include every right, title or interest in movable or immovable property.

22.The constitutional dimension of the controversy therefore assumes paramount importance. Article 23 of the Constitution guarantees the right of every citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of property in accordance with law. Article 24 further provides that no person shall be compulsorily deprived of property save in accordance with law and subject to payment of compensation.

23.The august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of “Nisar Ahmed Khan and others versus Collector, Land Acquisition Swabi and others” (PLD 2002 Supreme Court 25) held that compulsory acquisition of private property is constitutionally permissible only when accompanied by lawful compensation. Likewise, in “Maqbool Ahmed Lehri and another versus NAB and another” (2016 SCMR 154), the august Supreme Court emphasized that acquisition for a

public purpose cannot subsequently be utilized in a manner violative of constitutional guarantees under Article 24 of the Constitution.

24.Similarly, in “Province of Punjab through Collector Sialkot and others versus Rana Zildar Khan” (2013 SCMR 219), the august Supreme Court observed that where the public purpose for which land was acquired remains unfulfilled for an inordinate and unexplained period, equity demands that the original owners should become entitled to restoration of such land subject to return of compensation received by them. In the case of “Habib Bank Limited Vs. Mst. Parveen Qasim Jan and others” reported as 2014 SCMR 322, the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan was pleased to hold that;

“From a perusal of the above judgments, it becomes clear that in the proceedings of the execution of decree, the executing Court while exercising jurisdiction under section 47, C.P.C. can question the executability of a decree if it is satisfied that the decree is a nullity in the eyes of law or it has been passed by a Court having no jurisdiction or the non- execution of the decree would not infringe the legal rights of the decree-holder or the

decree has been passed in violation of any provision of law, only then the executing Court can refuse to execute the decree. The learned counsel for the respondents has not pleaded that the initial decree was a nullity in the eyes of law, had been passed by a Court having no jurisdiction or was non-executable or will not infringe the rights of decree holder and therefore the judgments relied on by him are distinguishable. On an examination of the judgment of the Banking Court we are satisfied that while passing the decree against the respondents the banking Court had jurisdiction to pass the above judgment and decree is not a nullity in the eyes of law, is executable and the decree holder has been seriously prejudiced by modifying the original decree without such decree being challenged. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the judgments relied on by the learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court for the respondents are distinguishable and thus arguments of the learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court on this point are repelled.” In the case of “Saif-ur-Rehman Vs. Ijaz and another” (2023 SCMR 2133), it was held that;

“Now adverting to the next important question whether respondent No.1 despite being declared as the lawful owner of the suit house can seek possession thereof when the decree sought to be executed does

provide for it. The law on the subject is so settled in the terms that an executing Court cannot go behind a decree but must execute it as it stands. For this purpose, there is a plethora of case law on this legal point; however, reference may be made to the cases of Ch. Ahmed Nawaz v. Province of Punjab (2015 SCMR 823), Irshad Masih v. Emmanuel Masih (2014 SCMR 1481), Humayun Hassan v. Arslan Humayun (PLD 2013 Supreme Court 557), Dr. Asma Ali v. Masood Sajjad (PLD 2011 Supreme Court 221), Sheikh Attiq-ur-Rehman Sarwar v. Sajjad Hussain (2009 SCMR 684), Muhammad Tariq Khan v. Khawaja Muhammad Jawad (2007 SCMR 818), Province of Punjab v. Burewala Textile Mills (2001 SCMR 396), Mst. Naseem Akhtar v. Shalimar General Insurance Company (1994 SCMR 22) and Muhammad Ali and others v. Ghulam Sarwar (1989

SCMR 640).

11.Nonetheless, there are some exceptions to the above settled rule whereunder an executing Court cannot look beyond the decree or look into the judgment, which are as follows:

i)the executing Court can look into the question of whether the decree or part thereof is executable or in-executable and if for any reason the decree has become in- executable, the executing Court is empowered to declare so and if a part of the decree is in-executable and that part is

severable from other part(s) of the decree then the executing Court is empowered to refuse the execution of the in-executable part of the decree and may proceed with the execution of the rest of the decree. (Tauqeer Ahmad Qureshi v. Additional District Judge (PLD 2009 Supreme Court

ii)the executing Court can look into the judgment in order to find the exact property when the decree is silent regarding what property was the subject matter of execution (Allah Ditta v. Ahmed Ali Shah (2003 SCMR 1202); and

iii)The executability of a decree can be questioned by the executing court if it is satisfied that (a) the decree is a nullity in the eyes of the law, (b) it has been passed by a Court having no jurisdiction (c) the execution of the decree will not infringe the legal rights of the decree-holder, if refused to be executed or (d) the decree has been passed in violation of any provision of law. (Fakir Abdullah v. Government of Sindh (PLD 2001 Supreme Court 131).”

24.The present case squarely demonstrates continuing deprivation of property without effective compensation. Such prolonged deprivation not only frustrates the spirit of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but also offends the

constitutional guarantees embodied in Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution.

25.Nonetheless, while the equities of the case strongly favour the landowners, this Court, sitting in appellate jurisdiction, cannot confer upon the executing Court a statutory power which the law itself does not recognize. Jurisdiction cannot be created on the basis of hardship alone. The executing Court was competent to enforce the decree through all lawful coercive means permissible under Order XXI CPC and Section 151 CPC, but it could not formally de-notify the acquisition.

26.At the same time, it is equally necessary to observe that the Provincial Government is not powerless in the matter. The record reveals that even the District Officer Revenue & Estate, Haripur had recommended that in case the acquired land was not required for any other public purpose, the matter should be processed for return of land to the original owners in accordance with law. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, particularly where:

i. the public purpose has remained unfulfilled for decades;

ii. the beneficiary company is under liquidation proceedings;

iii. the decree for enhanced compensation remains unsatisfied;

iv. the decree-holders continue to suffer deprivation of property without compensation; and v. the constitutional guarantees under Articles 23 and 24 stand seriously implicated;

the Provincial Government would be fully competent to independently consider the question of de-notification, withdrawal or restoration of land strictly in accordance with law, but within a period of one month from today while the learned executing Court shall forthwith proceed to deliver possession of the landed property to the land- owners. Reference may be made to the case of “Mrs. Nighat Naeem and others Vs. Karachi Development Authority and others” reported as 2025 CLC 858 wherein it has been held that;

“In the present Case, only factor weighed with the learned Executing Court for disallowing the Prayer of possession of present Petitioners, is that specific plea of possession was not sought in the Suit and since Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree, therefore, the prayer of possession

mentioned in the Execution Application was declined; whereas, the Revisional Court while passing the impugned judgment, although observed that if the decree in favour of Petitioners is of restitutory nature, then there is no necessity to ask for the relief of possession; however, instead of correcting the order dated 11.04.2017 passed by the Executing Court, the same was maintained through the impugned judgment. What both the Courts have miserably failed to observe or consider is that the present Petitioners were successful throughout in their prolonged and exhausting litigation [spreading over three decades] with the Respondent No.1 - KDA, up to the revisional proceedings decided by this Court, as already stated hereinabove. The judgment and decree was handed down after a full dress trial, which has its own value, giving birth to right and interest in favour of a Decree Holder, if the said judgment and decree is maintained throughout by the Higher Fora, as has happened in the present case. In these peculiar circumstances, if the relief of possession would have been given, then the same cannot be termed as that the Executing Court has traveled beyond the judgment and decree.

9.Secondly, in terms of Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. an Executing Court is empowered to decide all questions relating to the execution. In the case of Haji Abdul wali Khan and another v. Mohammed Hanif and another (1991 SCMR 2457), the Honourable Supreme Court has held, "that every court that has an inherent power to have its orders carried out or enforced, otherwise the orders

be a mere farce.... Object of this section was to save unnecessary expense and delay; and to afford relief finally, cheaply and speedily without the necessity of a fresh suit".

10.Thirdly, the learned Division Bench of this Court in a case reported as Mansoor Ashraf v. Province of Sindh and others (SBLR 2017 Sindh 105), which decision was maintained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, restored the possession of the petitioner [of the reported case] who was dispossessed being a tenant from a premises in which he was running a guest house. It is further held that "an implied objective of law is to ensure an orderly behaviour in a society and if on one hand around for some act is left unattended on the basis of certain technicalities and on the other hand a victim of wrongful act is left to run from pillar to post, then in due course of time, an orderly system of a society would be diminished and will be replaced by a disorderly and intolerant behaviour as well as lawlessness."

11.Since valuable rights and interest have accrued to the present Petitioners after the above mentioned Decisions, and such rights being proprietary rights are protected by the Article 24 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, thus, the relief of possession should have been granted by the learned Courts. The impugned Decisions are not in accordance with the law, as both the Courts have not properly exercised the jurisdiction vested in them, resulting in hardship and injustice to the Petitioners, which can be corrected in this writ jurisdiction.”

27.So far as the present appeals are concerned, this Court is constrained to hold that the learned executing Court travelled beyond its lawful jurisdiction in directly de-notifying the acquisition.

Consequently, the impugned judgment dated 13.07.2009 to the extent of de-notification cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside by partially allowing this and the connected FAO No. 31- A/2011. So far as FAO No. 52-A/2024, is concerned, in view of the findings rendered in the preceding paragraphs, the same has become infructuous and stands disposed of accordingly.

28.However, simultaneously, it is clarified and directed that:

i. the executing Court shall continue execution proceedings and shall adopt all lawful coercive measures available under Order XXI CPC, Section 47 and Section 151 CPC for satisfaction of the decree;

ii. the decree-holders shall be put in possession of their shares forthwith ;

iii. the Provincial Government shall de-notify or restore the land to the original owners in accordance with law and constitutional requirements, within a period of one month; iv. the rights, liabilities and claims inter se between M/s Saif Nadeem Kawasaki Motors Limited, M/s Saif Nadeem Bicycle Limited, official liquidators, or any other claimants shall remain subject to

determination before the competent fora including the learned Company Court.

29.Copy of this judgment shall also be placed on the record of the company matter in respect of the same subject matter, for information and further proceedings in accordance with law.

Heard & Announced on

Judgment prepared and signed on

JUDGE

Tufail PS/* (S.B) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Aurangzeb