Muhamamd Jahangir Minhas Vs The State etc

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN PESHAW HIGHC Ot]RT

(JI'DICIAL DEPARTMENT).

o.P o.23-P

Muhammad Jahangir Minhas vs The State etc Date of hearing: 30.01.2026

Petitioner by: Fazl-e-Hadi' AHC.

Respondentsbv:

H",Ttr"#*TiTi* Kakakhel & Muhammad Riaz Paindakhel, AAGs for state, Mr. Muhammad Khalid Advocate for RespondentsNo2&3, Mr Muhammad Yousaf Orakzai, & Muhammad Haris Iqbal, Advocates for police.

Research Assistance by: Riaz Aslam Daavi, SRO

PHCP

JUDGMENT

S. M. ATT IOUE s The petitioner has invoked the inherent and constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under

Section 561-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure' ("CrPC"), and Afiicle 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic quashment Republic of Pakistan ("the Constitution")' seeking of the order dated28.02.2025 passed by this Court in Criminal

Revision No. 254-P12024 (S.B')'

owner of

2.The petitioner contended rhat he is the lawful the vehicle in question, in respect whereof this Court allowed

the Superdari application of respondent No' 3 (Arif Rasool S/o

vehicle had been Abdul Majeed). He submitted that the said stolen from Islamabad; accordingly' FIR No' 687123 dated

25.08.2023 was registered at Police Station Shalimar'

Islamabad. The motorcar was subsequently taken into custody by the Anti-Car Lifting Cell, Peshawar, and after due verification, was handed over to him being its lawful owner. He further submitted that respondent No. 3 initially filed an application for Superdari before the leamed Judicial Magistrate, Peshawar, which was dismissed. Thereafter, respondent No. 3 approached the leamed District & Sessions Judge, Peshawar, but his application was again dismissed' Subsequently, respondent No. 3 filed Criminal Revision No' 254-Pl2O24 before this Court, which was allowed without impleading the petitioner as a party and without affording him an opportunity ofhearing. Learned counsel further argued that the vehicle claimed by respondent No' 3 is different from the

one allotted to the petitioner and that the petitioner is the lawful

owner thereof. On these grounds, he seeks quashment and review of the imPugrred order.

3.Leamed AAGs for the State and learned counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 contended that a judicial order passed

by another by one Bench ofthe High Court cannot be reviewed jurisdiction trnder Bench of the same Court in exercise of settled Article 199 ofthe Constitution, as this proposition stands It by the superior courts through numerous pronouncements' was further argued that review of a judicial order in criminal

which would be matters would give rise to a novel situation' againstjudicial propriety and the settled principles offinality'

is liable Therefore, the instant petition, being not maintainable' to be dismissed.

4 Arguments heard and record perused.

5 The factual matrix is set out below in tabulated form for ease of understanding.

Particulars First FIR Second FIR Mad No 11 FIR No 44118 FIR No 687/23 dated Uls39284 U/s 3ElA PPC 28.08.2023

PPC

Police Station North Shalimar Anti-car lifting Nazimabad Islamabad cell Peshawar central Karachi Name of Tariq Idrees Muhammad Shehreyar Complainant S/o Jahangir Ahmad SI Muhammad Minhas S/o Idress Muhammad Yousaf Minhas Date of 06.03.2018 2s.08.2023 28.08.2023 FIR/Mad Registration BHB-938 AXH-546 Found without No/date of 05.12.2016 2s.02.2022 registration No. istration Maker/lvlake Toyota/Corolla Toyota/ Corolla Motor car name GLI ALTIS corolla ALTIS Model/Year of 2016 2022 202012021 Manufacture Type of Bodyr Saloon Motor car Motor c&r Chassis No zRElTlR- zRElTlR- zRElTlR-

En No Q-034564 Q-089612 zRQ-@3703 Color Super White Super White White Horse Power 1598 1598 Owner name as Muhammad Syed Aamir Found in per registration Idress S/o Hussain Shah abandoned boolc/Card Muhammad S/o Anwar condition Akbar Shah Bukhari

From the record available, it transpires that Tariq Idrees lodged FIR No. 44118 dated06.03.2018 under Sections 392|34PPC at Police Station North Nazimabad Central' Karachi, in respect of a motor car bearing Registration No' BHB-938 (Sindh)' having

chassis No. ZRElTlR-6012040, model 2016, Toyota Corolla

GLI (Saloon). Subsequently, the present petitioner registered FIRNo. 687123 dated25.O8.2}23 under Section 381-4 PPC at Police Station Shalimar, Islamabad, conceming a motor car

I Note: All srlooN rrc Dotor cars, but trot motor crrs tre 3dooDs'

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bearing Registration No. AXH-546, with chassis No.

ZRE1TIR-6067085, model 2022,Toyota Corolla Altis. In the meanwhile, on 18.09.2023, the Anti-Car Lifting Cell, Peshawar, recovered a motor car in abandoned condition without any registration number. Upon preliminary inspection, its visible chassis number was recorded as ZRE1TIR-6071180;

however, on forensic examination conducted by the Forensic Science Laboratory @SL), Peshawar, the deciphered chassis number was reported as ZREl71R -60X20)OL The car recovered by the Anti-Car Lifting Cell, Peshawar, was subsequently handed over to the Anti-Car Lifting Cell, Islamabad, in the presence of the petitioner, vide Mad No. l0 dated 28.09.2023. Hence, the present controversy now lies between Respondent No. 3, in whose favor the impugned order has been passed, and the petitioner, in whose favor Mad No. l0 dated28.09.2023 is available on file.

6.Since the instant petition has been filed under Section 561-4 CrPC read with Article 199 of the Constitution, the following questions arise for determination:

(i)Whether a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is maintainable against a judicial order passed by this Court?

(ii)Whether this Court, in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 561-,4, read with Section 369 of the Cr.P.C., has the jurisdiction to review the impugned order?

7 As regards Question No. 1, it is by now a settled principle, founded both on the Constitution and the precedents

of the superior courts, that a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is not maintainable against ajudicial order passed by the High Court or a leamed Judge thereof. This exclusion is rooted in the definition ofthe term 'person' in Article 199(5), which expressly places the High Courts outside the ambit of writ jurisdiction. For ready reference, Article 199(5) is reproduced below.

"(5) In this Article, unless the context otherwise requires, "person" includes any body politic or corporate, any authority of or under the control of the Federal Govemment or of a Provincial Govemment, and any Court or tribunal, other than the Federal Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court, aHi Court or a Court or kibunal established under a law relating to the Armed Forces of Pakistan; and"

Therefore, a High Court is thus not a 'person' to whom a writ may issue under Article 199. This principle has evolved through constitutional interpretation and the development of constitutional jurisprudence by the superior courts' Initially, only the judicial acts of High Court Judges were considered excluded from the ambit of Article 199; however, it is now well

settled that the judicial, administrative, executive' and consultative actions of the Chief Justice or Judges of a High jurisdiction Court are likewise not amenabte to constitutional under Article 199' In the case of Abrar Hassan v' Government held that a of Pakistan(PlD 1976 SC 315), the Supreme Court writ petition is not maintainable against a judicial order of the exercise' High Court or a Judge acting in exercise, or purported of judicial functions. It was held that the High Court acts

through its Judges; hence, a writ against a Judge' in such

capacrty, is in substance a writ against the High Court itself, which is constitutionally barred. Any contrary view would create the anomaly of one High Court Judge issuing a writ against another Judge of coordinate jurisdiction.In Muhammad Ikram Chaudhry v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 103), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that there is unanimity among the superior courts that neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, can interfere with an order passed by another Judge or Bench of the same Court. ln Malik Asad Ali v.

Federationof Pakistan(PLD 1998 SC 16l), the Supreme Court held that actions ofa Judge which relate to the discharge ofhis duties and flrnctions as a Judge of the Court, or as a member thereof, cannot be brought under challenge before a High Court underArticle 199 ofthe Constitution. Only those acts of aJudge of a superior Court are amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 which are performed in his personal capacily and have no nexus with his official functions as a Judge ofthe Court. In Asd Saeed v. Registrar, Lahore High Court (PLD 1999 Lah 350), the Court held that the true import of Article 199(5) is to extend protection particularly to the administrative, executive, and consultative acts and orders of the High Court and the Supreme Court, inasmuch as their judicial orders already stood immune from writ jurisdiction on settled jurisprudential principles. The same view was reaffrrmed in Muhammad lqbal v. Lahore High Court (2010 SCMR 632), wherein the Supreme Court held that Article

199(5) protects all orders ofthe High Court whetherjudicial or administrative Aom being challenged through writ jurisdiction before the High Court ilself.la Muhommad Imran v. Peshantar High Court (201I PLC (C.S.) 1465), this Court concurred with and reaffirmed the principle that one Judge of a High Court cannot issue a writ against another Judge of the same Court' However, in Ch. Muhammad Alvam v. Registrar, Islamabad High Cottrt (PLD 2016 SC 961)' the Supreme Court took a different view and hetd that the judicial powers of a High Court under Article 199 are distinct from its administrative, executive, and consultative powers exercised under the Rules framed under Article 208 of the Constitution. It was accordingly held that the protection afforded by Article 199(5) extends to judicid

orders and judgments of the High Court' but does not bar a challenge to its administrative' consultative, or executive orders relating to the High Court establishment where such acts are in

violation of the Rules and result in the infringement of Fundamental Nghts. However, a larger five-member Bench of

the Supreme C otfi, n Gul Taiz Khan Marwat v' The Registrar' Peshawar High Cottrt (PLD 2O2l SC 391), ovemrled Cft'

Muhammad Afuan (supra) and held that the Judges of a High

act for and Court do not act as persona desigtuta; rather, they on behalf of the High Court itself' It was further held that the

administrative, executive, and consultative acts of the Chief

acts of the High Justice or Judges of a High Court are, in law' Court iself and, therefore, are not amenable to writ jurisdiction

in Article 199(5) under Article 199 in view ofthe bar contained

of the Constitution. Thus, in light of the above discussion, it is settled law that a judicial order of a High Court cannot be challenged under Article 199 of the Constitution before the High Court itself, and any such petition is not maintainable' Therefore, the answer to the question No. I is in the negative'

8.As regards Question No.2, admittedly, the High Court does not possess any general power of review in criminal matters. However, in Gulzar Hassan Shah v. Ghulam Mwtaza (PLD l97O SC 335), a larger Bench ofthe Supreme Court held in the following words:

"I am conscious ofthe fact that general principles offinality of judgrnent attaches to the decision or order of the High Court passed in criminal cases. But it will not apDly to cases wl ln such

C . This is

an inherent power of the Court and has been Preserved bY the above provision of law. In my opinion in rare and exceptio nal cases the High Court has inherent power to revoke, review or alter its own earlier decisi ons ln cases which are not govemed bY sections 369, 424 and 430, Cr. P. C. with a view to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the Proce ss ofany Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. lt is, however, not Possible to enumerate the circumstances ln which this Provision can be

invoked."

In rare and exceptional cases, particularly where an order has the parties been passed withoutjurisdiction or without affording an opportunity of hearing, the High Court may invoke its

inherent powers under section 561-4, CrPC to revoke' review'

justice' This or alter such order in order to secure the ends of held that Court in Masood Khan v' The State (1996 MLD 502) cannot "Under section 369, CrPC a Criminal Court though view review its judgment yet can review its order"'A similar was taken by the Federal Shariat Court itAbdul Rashidv' The

State (1999 YLR 1298), wherein it was observed that, although section 369, Cr.P.C. renders a judgment final so far as the Court passing it is concerned, and upon sigring and pronouncing it the Court becomes functus oficio with no power to review or alter the same except as provided by law, the bar contained therein does not extend to orders which are neither judgments in nature nor final in character. This court in th e case of Barakat Ali vs state (2020 YLR 1443) has elaborated the maffer in the following words:

"5. Indeed, it is settled by the august Supreme Court ofPakistan that the right to claim review ofany decision ofa Court of law, like the right to appeal, is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure. The scope of review by a court under criminal jurisdiction has been elaborately expounded by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in "Imdad Ali Khwaja's case reported as 2016 SCMR 2057" as following: - "Once an order is passed by one Bench, the other Bench cannot review such an order ordinarily. In proceedings with the matters in criminal jurisdiction, the High Court does not have the power to review an order."

The aforesaid law laid down by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan is also reflected in various judgnents of the superior Courts reported as "PLD 2016 Peshawar 195,2013 PCr.U 767 Peshawar, 1971 PCT.LI 483, PLD 2015 SC 322, PLD 2004 SC

911,2014 SCMR 1609, 2012 SCMR 334,2008 SCMR 165,

2008 scMR 880, PLD 2004 SC 32,2002 SCMR 1239,2002 SCMR 16l I, PLD 2001 SC 433 and 1986 SCMR 965".

6.However, judicial consensus has developed in our country that certain orders of criminal Court, which do not qualifu to be a judgment as provided in Chapter XXVI of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Hish Court mav review its order in exceptional circumstances under its inherent power. The law laid down by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in "Gulzar Hassan Shah's case reported as PLD 1970 Supreme Court 335" referred by the leamed counsel for the petitioner in support of his arguments is distinguishable as in the said matter tlte issue was relating to the cancellation of bail of the accused in his absence. The order of the Court granting bail or cancellation does not qualifu to be a judgment in terms of section 369 ofthe Cr.P.C, therefore, the ratio ofthe saidjudgment is not applicable to the present case because in the present case this Court has passed the order of conviction of the petitioner. This judgment was distinguished by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in "Muhammad Khalil-ur-Rahman's case reported as PLD I 995 SC 633", wherein it was observed: -

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"I am conscious of the fact that general principles of finality of judgment attaches to the decision or order of tlle High Court passed in criminal cases. But it will not annl v to cases where an ut sd vln oonortunitv to the oarties of beins heard. In such cases section 551-A. Cr-P-C. can be invoked for the numose of doins iustice between the oarties and for seei ns that the act of the Court does not iniurv to anv ofthe narties- This is an inherent nower ofthe the above mv oDtnton ln rafe and cases the Hish Court has inherent nower to invoke- ew or alter its own earlier decisions in which are not soYemed bv S 369.424 and 430. Cr-P.C . with a view to sive effect to order under the Code or to Drevent abuse of the nrocess anv Court or the ends of It is, however, not possible to enumerate the circumstances in which this provision can be invoked. It may, however, be mentioned that the leamed counsel for the appellant has conceded that application for bail can be made from time to time on fresh material. There is thus no difliculty in such cases."

The essence of the above case-law is that review ofa judgment in criminal matters is barred under section 369 CrPC; however, in respect of an order not amounting to a judgment, the High Court may, in rare and exceptional circumstances, invoke its inherent jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction is ordinarily exercisable where the order suffers from want ofjurisdiction or has been passed without providing the affected party an opportunity of hearing, so as to prevent abuse of the process ofthe Court and to secure the ends of justice. The distinction between a iudement and an order in the context of criminal matters has been explained by this Court in Shah Nazar Khanv. Goga Khan (2005 YLR 3297) in the following terms:

5.The word "judgnent" has not been defined in section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, the salient features/characteristics of a judgment have been given in section 367, Cr.P.C. "Judgment" in legal parlance means judicial verdict deciding a case finally so far as the Court seized ofthe case is concemed and with the pronouncement of it the pending proceeding/case stands terminated leaving nothing for future to be considered or re-considered, thus, the rvord "judgnrent" cannot be confined only to an order of conviction and acquittal of accused person because that is one aspect of it. True interlocutory or interim order about any matter providing temporary relief when final determination of the same is to be made at a later date, would not fall within the definition of judgment and the Court

trying the case or holding the proceeding would be competent to review such order but in true legal sense it would not amount to review ofthe order but re-consideration of the interim order at a later stage which is permissible under the law- To the contrary all orders and judgments of the na which finallv deci de the case and s is left for future course or final dec ision then the Court nassins it ufun iurisdiction to review-the same after it has been pronounced.

6.The provision of section 369, Cr.P.C. has placed an absolute bar on altering or reviewing a judgrnent and to understand the said provision it is reproduced below:- "Section 369.--Court not to alter judgnent---Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by 'any other law for the time being in force, or in the case of a High Cour! by the Letters Patent of such High Court, no Court, when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error."

7.The plain language of the above provision of law leaves nothing for a debate thatjudgment can be reviewed or altered by a criminal Court once it is signed, dated, sealed and pronounced by it after conclusively determining the rights and liabilities of the parties on merits and leaving nothing, for the future to be taken up for decision.

8.Although word "judgment" has been used in section 369, Cr.P.C. but it shall not be construed and cannot be placed in watertight compartment by excluding other order of the Court deciding a case conclusively after touching upon its merits because judgments and orders ofthis nature are inter- changeable and are synonymous for one and other. The true legal test for an order as to whether it comes within the meaning of a judgrnent envisaged by the provision ofsection 367, Cr.P.C. is as to whether it has touched upon the deep merits of the case and has conclusively decided the matter and the adjudication has attained finality so far as the Court delivering it is concemed. When nothing is left to be taken at a future date for final decision the order is a iudsment and is a final one which cannot be reviewed or re-ooened on anv sround whatsoever nor it can be corrected exceDt to the extent Dermitted bv the Drovision of section 369. Cr.P.C. The wisdom behind the prohibition contained in section 369, Cr.P.C. is with the object to maintain regularity and consistency so that the criminal justice is put to correct and proper channels. If on any ground review of a final judgrnent is permiued that could create serious chaos and the system would stand eroded shattering the public confidence and faith in it. It is by now well-settled principle that a Judge or Magistrate delivering the finaljudgment/order is denuded of authority/jurisdiction to alter or review the same after it has pronounced it in accordance with section 369, Cr.P.C.

9.The provisions of sections 435, 439 and 439-A, and section 561-A, Cr.P.C. besides other provisions relating to right of appeal are the full machinery provisions to correct legal jurisdictional errors in a judgment committed by fie subordinate Court. These remedies provided by different statutory provisions of the Code axe substitutes for the review powers/ jurisdiction rather these are more efficacious in nature and substance. Final judgments/orders even

obtained by misrepresentation can well be challenged in appeal/revision or before the High Court by invokin-g its inherent powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. but the Court which passes it is debarred from making substantial amendments/alterations in the same.

10.Looked at from the above legal angles the plea of the leamed counsel for the petitioners that all such judgments are liable to be reviewed is nothing but paradoxical and cannot be permitted to prevail as it is fraught with fatal consequences for the system of criminal justice' Any lib-eral view if taken in thiJ regard permitting review of final judgrnents/orders would open a flood gate and would also -orri *u, for criminal Courts to alter or review judgments Ln whimsical grounds by pressing into service the principle of natural justiie or on other grounds albeit trivial in nature' I l. What are interim and interlocutory orders it is diffrcult to lay down a defined criteria and standards for the same because it depends upon the nature and substance of the order itself as ihere miy be cases where interlocutory orders mav amount to a final order/judgnrent if it decides a case/lis conclusively. Ordinarily interlocutory orders are--those *tri"tt i, no ,u*.t decide) the pending matter finally but orovide for interim arrangements and the authority and iurisdiction to take final decision is retained by the Court ieizeJ ofthe case/matter till the finaljudgment is delivered' In these categories of cases fall bail petition,. subject oI to the-principle laid down by the apex Court in the .ur" "itut" r. 2uUaii'pt o 1986 page 173, the discharge of "ou"., .rli". fto, bail bonds, obtaining of fresh surety bonds or enhancing the from accused, the renewal of surety bonds iiability of the sureties, the transfer or re-transfer of cases d'". tfi. Ji".y of one 6ourt to the other, the attachment of immouable property, the interim custodv 9f iFmovablg' or recalling ."r"ui" t-ri,"tiiil"ttt"t... tt e re-examinatio& f"-Gr.-".*t d."pped by a parq- to a case and ott .i of m. like nature where the decision made is not n i,"*., itt nature and substance as such order do not attain finalitv and, therefore, are not hit by the prohibition "i ;;ilJ in section 369, Cr.P.C. The case'law "Gulzar i-.tr.i" Sfr"f, ,. Ghulam Murtaza and others PLD 1970 MLD

SC

f-:S, iufut urn.ua Sayar and another v' The State sai,-MJ;;"d isif v. State 2001 PCr'u 895, Gul iJurturiuJ una otrters v. The state 199 PCr'u 771' Abdul iut"i iuUrt S-i v. Mst. Nooreen and 2 others 2000 PCr'LI iiii, ilt" Ali v. Additional commissioner 2004 MLD iiii'-J rta*i.ipal committee' Gojra v' Deputy Director v' Addrttonal 2004 MLD I 170 and lastly Muhammad Aslam i.*i""t irJg. zoM pcr.-u I2I 4" refened to by the leamed f"t fre petitioners on perusal certainly relates and ""r"r.f nertains to the realm of that category of cases and. orders

which can be conveniently termed interlocutory or lntertm iMuhammad Aslam v' Additional .rJ"^ *ft-if"in" fast case manner detracts i".ti"*-l"ai" 2004 PCr'LI 1214" in no of law consistentlv ;C;;;;;yt". the above principle of the said case are laid lown. However, on perusal the facts ffi."iy;iE;;., fr"; the facts of the present case' hence is not attracted to the Present one'"

g. In light of the above, a judgment in criminal law is a final adjudication which conclusively determines the rights and liabilities of the parties on merits and leaves nothing further for future determination by the Court. Consequently, once such judgment, or any final order partaking ofthe same character' is sigred and pronounced, the Court becomes functtu fficio and' by virtue of section 369 CrPC, cannot review or alter it save for

the correction of a clerical error; however, interlocutory or interim orders, including Superdari or other interim orders may be relating to movable or immovable property or articles' reconsidered in criminal matters. The Lahore High Court' in

Muhammad Amin v. The State (2012 YLR 2275)' reaffirmed

refers to that the expression'Judgment" in section 369 CrPC extend to an the final decision of a case or trial and does not interlocutory order unless such order culminates in the High conviction or acquittal of the accused' The Islamabad PCr'LJ 1536)' Court, in Adam Amin Chaudhry v' NAB Q023 terms:

concurred with the same view in the following t7 Section 369 of Cr'P.C. prohibits a court from revlewrng to correct a its judgment, after it has been sigred, except has been clerical error. The order wherebY the Reference section 4(3) ofthe retumed is an interim order Passed under se envisage transfer of Ordinance of 199, which otherwi ve trials to comPetent cowts.

The order wherebY the leamed trial court to the Reference has been r€turned bY the determination of the Bureau does not contain conclusive cu ilt or innocence of the accused and not a "judgrnent", 369 of Cr'P'C' is therefo re, the bar contained under section ibition on not attracted. ln the absence of any exPlicit Proh has been passed review or recall of an interim order, which ln violation of the exPlicit Prov ision of law, such interim bY the concemed court order can be reviewed and recalled power ofthe to secure the ends ofj ustice. Next, the inherent This Court can Hich Court under section 561-A, Cr.P.C'

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ends ofjustice. The words "secure the ends ofjustice" and "abuse ofthe orocess ofany Court" should be construed with due resard to rest of the orovisions of Cr.P. C. Such powers can be exercised bv this Court when altemate remedy is not available. The main oumose behind these Dowers is to nrevent this Court from beins rendered powerless and emoowers it to make necessary orders if the facts and circumstances ofa case warrant doinq so. The order whereby the reference has been retumed, not being final judgment, passed in violation ofsection 4(3) ofthe Ordinance of 199, can be looked into by this Court under section 561-A of Cr.P.C.

It explains that where an interim order has been passed in violation of law, and no altemate remedy is available, such order may be reviewed or recalled by the Court, and the High Court may also invoke its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-4, CrPC to prevent abuse ofprocess and secure the ends of justice. In a recent case, Qadar Khan v. The State (2025 PCT.LJ 1723), this Court, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-4, CrPC, rectified a final judgment where the accused had been convicted on multiple counts in the same trial but the judgment was silent as to whether the sentences were to run concurently or consecutively. In the present case, the impugred order pertains to the Superdari of a vehicle, which is merely a temporary arrangement pending final disposal of the case in which the vehicle was taken into custody. Thus, by the analogy stated above, the impugned order, being interlocutory in nature and not a final order, does not fall within the ambit of a 'Judgment" as contemplated by section 369 of CrPC; consequently, such an order may, in an appropriate case, be subject to review or reconsideration. The essence of the foregoing discussion is that the High Court may, in appropriate and exceptional circumstances, review or recall its orders, other

than judgments in criminal matters, in exercise of its power of review under section 369 ofthe CrPC. Insofar as judgments are concemed, however, the Court may invoke its inherent powers under section 561-A of the CrPC, notwithstanding the bar contained in section 369 of CrPC. This power may be exercised particularly in cases involving want ofjurisdiction, violation of Article 10A of the Constitution, or any other gross defect leading to a miscarriage ofjustice.

10 . To examine the impugned order on the above touchstone, the record has been perused. It is evident from the record that Respondent No. 3 initially filed a Superdarl application before the Leamed Judicial Magistrate, Peshawar, on 0l'02'2024, which was dismissed on 03.02.2024 primarily on the ground that the vehicle constitutes case property in FIRNo' 44118 (first FIR), wherein Tariq Idrees son of Muhammad Idrees is the complainant, and handing over the same to Respondent No' 3 (Arif Rasool) would hamper the prosecution' Feeling aggrieved by the said order, Respondent No. 3 approached the Court of Worthy District and Sessions Judge, Peshawar, who also dismissed the Superdari application on 15 '02'2024, primarily on the ground that the vehicle constitutes case property in FIR

No. 44118, and the proper course of action is for the Anti-Car Lifting Cell, Peshawar, to contact the concemed police station and its owner to shift the car to the relevant police station' where

forums' such applications could be filed before the appropriate this Respondent No. 3, again feeling aggrieved' approached

Court in CR No. 254-P12024. This Court, vide the impugred order dated 28.02.2025, allowed the application on the ground that the vehicle in question was registered in the name of Muhammad ldrees, who had insured it with EFU General Ltd', and that the vehicle had been snatched from the son of Muhammad Idrees, in respect of which FIR No' 44118 was registered at Police Station North Nazimabad, Karachi' As the vehicle was insured with the company of Respondent No' 3 and the ownership thereof vested in the company, the application was allowed. However, in the meantime, the vehicle had already been handed over to SI Noor Ullatr Khan from the Anti- Car Lifting Cell, Islamabad in the presence of the present petitioner vide Mad No. l0 dated 28.09.2023 @age No' 37 of the Paper book), upon the presumption that the same was case property of FIR No, 687 (the second FIR)' Notably, in all three Superdari applications, firstly before the Judicial Magistrate' secondly before the Sessions Court, Peshawar, and thirdly before this Court neither the present petitioner nor the Anti-Car Lifting Cell, Islamabad, was made a party, despite having received the motor car long ago on 28'09'2023, prior to the

filing of the aforementioned three petitions' This omission present petitioner demonsEates that necessary parties, i'e', the and the Anti-Car Lifting Cell, Islamabad, were not impleaded

handed over before these forums. Once the vehicle had been either to the petitioner or to the Incharge, Anti-Car Lifting Cell'

Islamabad, no order affecting its custody could lawfully be

these passed in favour of respondent No' 3 without impleading

necessary parties. The omission to do so constitutes a fatal defect, thereby depriving the petitioner as well as the Anti-Car Lifting Cell, Islamabad, of their right to hearing and fair trial guaranteed under Article l0-A ofthe Constitution. Thus, when examined on this touchstone, the impugned order is found to be reviewable under section 369 read with section 561-A of the CrPC. Although the petition in hand was instituted under Article 199 of the Constitution read with section 561-,4, of the CrPC, it has already been held, while answering Question No.

l, that it is not maintainable to the extent that it invokes Article 199 ofthe Constitution. Nevertheless, since the impugned order has been found amenable to review under section 369 of the CrPC, the instant petition is hereby converted into and treated as a review petition under section 369 read with section 561-A ofthe CrPC, excluding the invocation of Article 199 therefrom' Accordingly, the answer to Question No. 2 is retumed in the affirmative.

ll. Thus, for the foregoing reasons' the matter requires reconsideration so as to enable the Court to reach a just and

logical conclusion. Therefore, in exercise of powers under section 369 of CrPC, read with the inherent powers under the section 561-A ofCrPC, the impugned order is recalled, and matter shall be deemed to be pending before the Bench which

passed the said order, or, in its non-availability, before another

leamed Single Bench. The present petitioner, along with the

impleaded Incharge, Anti-Car Lifting Cell, Islamabad, shall be also obtain in Criminal Revision No. 254t2024' The Court shall

a report regarding forensic examination of the vehicle from the FSL, covering all relevant features of identification, and' after obtaining such report and such further material as may be deemed necessary, shall decide the matter strictly in accordance with law. Meanwhile, the custody of the vehicle in question shall remain with the petitioner until final disposal of CR No 25412024. The petition stands disposed of in the above terms' An nounced

/ V, P). )4,C<.

CIIIEFJUSTICE

$,0 fusice S M. Aflique Shoh, HCI